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I was standing at the border of Henricus Park high above the James river and the Dutch Gap, looking northeast across the water and wondering where, on the opposite estuary, John Rolfe and Pocahontas had built their residence, Varina Farms.

I knew that John Rolfe had been killed by Pocahontas’ tribesmen who probably also torched the farm. And yet, had British America’s first plantation house completely disappeared?

In those days I spent part of my time in southern Virginia, impressed by its beauty and history. The idea of conducting a bit of research fascinated me, and one day I decided to explore myself the area where the Varina plantation had presumably existed.

A few facts

But before I continue with my account, a few facts about Pocahontas and John Rolfe. Pocahontas, also known as Matoaka, a daughter of Paramount Chief Powhatan of the Algonquian Indians, was a child of ten or eleven years when in 1607 she first encountered an Englishman. In the beginning, Virginia had only two centers of importance: Wicomico in Gloucester County, the capital of the Powhatan Indians, and Jamestown, the first British settlement.

Frequently coming to Jamestown with women who bartered food and furs for tools and trinkets, she ran around naked, and found Captain John Smith's interest who considered the child extremely intelligent, pretty and sweet. For her, Smith was a father figure. He was probably the first person to teach her English language and manners. Early on he recognized her value as a friend of the British and a mediator between them and the native Americans.

It may be true that she, at one point, saved him from the horror of a mock execution at the court of Powhatan. She mediated between her father's tribes and the English and ensured that the latter received food from the Indians when suffering famine due to an unusual series of cold and wet years.

In 1610, after Smith —badly blessed— had returned to England (and she was made to believe he was dead), she was kidnapped by the British to be exchanged against some captives held by the Indians, plus ransom. She was taken to a new settlement, Citie of Henricus, also called Henricopolis, situated where the Dutch Gap meets the James River. Henricus, considered a safer and healthier place than Jamestown, was expected soon to eclipse the latter. The first brick church, the first hospital and the first college in America were being built at Henricus.

Here, Pocahontas met in July 1613 John Rolfe, the first English planter who had smuggled seeds of the sweet Spanish Varina tobacco variety out of Bermuda. The princess, now probably 18 years old, fell in love with Rolfe. In April 1614, after Pocahontas had been baptized and released from captivity, her father Powhatan and the British governor agreed that Rolfe and Pocahontas could marry. During the massacre of 1622, Henricus Citie was destroyed by Indians but it is being rebuilt today and well worth visiting. (Access from Jeff Davis highway near Chester, or from I-295 near Varina)

The couple had a son, Thomas, and moved to Rolfe's tobacco plantation which he called Varina Farms, located in Henrico County. Rolfe's tobacco proved very successful in Britain and promised to make the new colony not only viable but rich. From his father-in-law Powhatan Rolfe had received, as a wedding gift, 450 square miles of land, which means that his Varina Farms, the first plantation in British America, comprised the present Henrico County plus the city of Richmond (Janet Chase Stoneman: A History of Varina on the James. Manuscript 1957)

In spring of 1616, Governor Sir Thomas Dale took Rolfe, Pocahontas and her child, as well as a dozen Algonquian Indians, to England to drum up support for the Virginia Company. Pocahontas was received with royal honors and was surprised to meet her old friend Smith. Despite her success at court and in the palaces of the rich and famous she was not happy. She complained that London was chaotic, smelly and filthy.

In March 1617 John Rolfe decided to take his family back to Virginia but Pocahontas was already lethally ill, probably with tuberculosis, and died in England, only 23 or 24 years old. She is buried at Gravesend. Husband and son returned to Varina Farms. John Rolfe was apparently killed by the Indians in 1622 but his son Thomas later became an important businessman and politician in Virginia.

Many historians believe that, without Pocahontas, Jamestown (and with it Virginia) would have become another "lost colony" of the British. There is little doubt that Pocahontas deeply influenced America's history. She helped to establish, at least temporarily, better relations between the colonists and the Indians but she could not save her paternal tribes from their cruel fate. In 1616, Captain Smith wrote: Pocahontas "was the instrument to pursurve this colonie from death, famine, and utter confusion."

The memory the world kept of her is arguably stronger than that of any other native American personality. In the few years of her life she — as a dark-skinned "savage" — succeeded in rising to a rank equal of European royalty. In retrospect, Pocahontas may have been, for three short years, the only queen America ever had.

Trespassing

I knew a small town near Richmond airport which happens to be called Varina. That is where I started my exploration. I stopped at the local gas station and asked for Varina Farms. A blank gaze answered. Never heard of. I asked whether they knew that Varina was probably the third oldest British settlement in America, after Jamestown and Henricus. I got another blank gaze but the advice to see a local amateur historian.

I was lucky finding him a his home. Yes, he had heard of Varina Farms. It probably still existed but he did not know where. I should see the Fire Marshal, he would know. Again I was lucky at the fire station. The marshal was there, he knew Varina Farms and showed me on the map how to find it.

So far, so good. But when I arrived at the end of a small road there was the ominous sign “No trespassing. Private property.”

I gathered all my courage and continued driving. But after a few hundred yards I saw two men with rifles looking at ne. I jumped on the brake, got out and walked toward them. No, they were not taking aim at me. They were friendly and asked me what I wanted. I explained. One of them took the cellphone asking his wife to lock up the dogs and receive those people who had come all the way from Washington, D.C. (my number plate) to be briefed on the history of Varina Farm.

Shortly after we were graciously received by the lady of the mansion, a mid-19th century Federal style building. The eastern wing is believed to have been built on the remnants and with the materials of the original residence of John Rolfe and Pocahontas.

Attached to the eastern part is a small stone cubicle known as Pocahontas’ kitchen. A narrow space with a low ceiling which could very believably have served as a kitchen in those days when to avoid fire hazard kitchens were kept separate from the main house.

Had Pocahontas herself been cooking here? Or had she just supervised the work of the cook? In any case I thought I had found the place I had been looking for, guarded and knowingly preserved by a family that has owned one of America’s most historic estates for over a century.

 

Heinrich von Loesch

   If discussion turns today to cultures of memory, these are mostly thought to involve the variety of national forms that they take: days of remembrance and the way in which different countries marks such days, together with national monuments and places of remembrance, all of which also have their own symbols, myths or icons.

   Viewed historically, these national cultures of memory often turn on a heroic version of the history of a nation, whose roots are usually located far in the distant past. But they also function to demarcate a nation in terms of an 'other'; in particular, marking one nation off from other nations. National cultures of memory are often therefore interwoven, in both a positive and a negative sense.

   This has been apparent in the relationship between German and Italian cultures of memory since the last three decades of the nineteenth century, when both countries first appeared on the stage of international politics as newly-united nations.

German and Italian national movements were very conscious of each other at this time, engaging in mutual support – this was for example how Giuseppe Garibaldi became a 'hero' for the Germans. However, the gradual development of German pre-eminence after 1870 meant that the political elites of both nations gradually drifted apart.

   The tensions to which this gave rise came to a violent head in 1915, when Italy entered the First World War on the side of the Entente and in opposition to its former allies in the Triple Alliance. This created a constellation of forces that would eventually overshadow the cultures of memory in both countries through the twentieth century.

   Of course, Germany and Italy became very close during the Fascist era; and then, after the war, both countries were dominated by Christian-Democrat parliamentary majorities which co-operated closely with each other. The relation of respective cultures of memory remained however somewhat negative.

  On the German side, the public memory of Italy was marked by the 'betrayal' of 1915. This was then intensified by events during the Second World War: for on 8 September 1943 Italy declared a ceasefire and joined the Western powers in fighting their former Fascist ally. The idea that the Italians had yet again betrayed their ally remained a fixed feature of German memories long after 1945.

   However, the Italian and Mediterranean theatres had been quite secondary for the Germans during the war, and correspondingly played a limited part in German memory.

   By contrast, the German occupation of Northern and Central Italy after the autumn of 1943 became a focus for Italian memory. Many Italians bitterly remembered the destruction caused by the fighting as the German army slowly retreated north up the peninsula; far more important however was the memory of the systematic war crimes committed by German troops and police in their struggle with the Italian resistance.

   Added to that was the fate of hundreds of thousands of Italian prisoners of war who were shipped into the Reich where they were used as forced labour, contrary to all convention and practice.

   In the longer run, however, there were many and significant blind spots in the Italian culture of memory. Both official and unofficial efforts to cleanse the impact of twenty years of Fascism from Italy's political culture had clear limits, since these efforts were directed primarily to “the local pain of fascism” (Hans Woller), tending to overlook the wider impact of Fascist rule.

It was some time before the crimes of Fascism beyond the Italian peninsula gained any recognition, and there is still room for considerable doubt about the degree to which large sections of the Italian public are at all aware of this.

   Moreover, Italian public memory has always cared less for the victims of German war crimes, and more for the 'heroes' of the resistance movement, the 'good Italians' who stood up to the 'evil Germans'.

   While in both countries after 1945 a collective desire for exoneration prevailed, we should not lose sight here of the wider constellation of international politics.

   The outcome was that, during the 1950s, the Germans and Italians chiefly responsible for the devastation of their nations maintained a pact of silence regarding the politics of the past; legal proceedings against those Germans who had committed war crimes in Italy were simply ruled out.

   Self-interest on the Italian side also played a role here, since the Italian state was anxious to avoid having to respond to demands from other countries (mainly Yugoslavia) that Italian war criminals be extradited to face trial.

   It took a long time before Italians and Germans were prepared to face up to the “unpleasant parts” (Nicola Tranfaglia) of their own pasts, and so recognise how close the alliance had once been between the Fascist Axis powers. And it took even longer for this recognition to enter into national cultures of memory.

  There were several stages in this process, beginning in the later 1960s with the emergence of a more self-critical approach to the past of one's nation.

   In this, one should not lose sight of the fact that Italian affairs did not enjoy any great prominence in Germany; no great progress was made either in putting German war criminals on trial, nor in providing compensation for Italian prisoners of war.

   Alongside these developments the Italian resistenza was endowed with an even greater degree of idealisation, such that resistance to the German occupying forces came to be treated as a mass movement.

   Hundreds of monuments, tens of thousands of plaques and street re-namings, together with the dedication of schools and other institutions – all of this supported this central political message. For large sections of the population the resistenza took on mythic properties.

   The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and in the German Democratic Republic marked yet another decisive shift for cultures of memory throughout Europe. Besides Germany, Italy experienced perhaps the greatest disruption among Western European countries from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of a bipolar political system.

   There was a basic shift of perspective which can be described, in both countries, as an accelerating process of “victimisation”, or an increasing tendency to view history from the perspective of a victim.

   In a united Germany there was renewed debate about the victims of the Holocaust, of forced labour, but also about the mass expulsions of Germans following the end of the Second World War.

   This was paralleled in Italy, where the ritual presentation of the memory of Resistance had grown stale for large sections of society. There was also an emphatic desire to see those German war criminals who were still alive put on trial.

   The judicial events that have followed have sparked historical debate in which the experience of Italians and Germans during the Second World War is allowed more scope than hitherto permitted.

   Even if many of these studies are not yet complete, it is already clear that the older, autonomous and solipsistic metanarratives of national memory have in both countries lost their force and justification.

  Translated by Keith Tribe

 

CHRISTOPH CORNELISSE

 

Comment

   "Germany and Italy became very close during the Fascist era" .... yes and no. After World War I, many Germans and, of course, Austrians hated Italy because of the loss of South Tyrol and Trentino (Welschtirol) due to the peace treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye. Italian nationalists forcibly italianized South Tyrol (Alto Adige) while German and Austrian nationalists clandestinely supported the German speaking minority in its resistance. The stubborn refusal of Tyroleans to adopt Italian language and life style poisoned relations for many decades even after World War II. How little love was lost between Germans and Italians showed after September 1943 when allies suddenly became enemies. The destruction due to the war and the atrocities committed by German forces were deeply felt by the Italians; the Germans, on the other hand, were surprised how often activities of Italian partisans ( the Macchia) were mentioned in the daily war bulletins (Wehrmachtsbericht).

   Italy remembers not only the slave labor of Italian POWs in Germany; the persecution of Jews  (e.g. the massacre of the Fosse Ardeatine in Rome) and their abduction to concentration camps in Germany and Poland left deep scars in the collective memory.  Some Italians, however, continued to hold Germany in high esteem: the Neofascists who were later emboldened by the revisionist attitude of Silvio Berlusconi's governments. While the "wrong" Italians continue to love Germany for the "wrong" reasons, the economic weight of the re-united Germany in the Euro community is considered oppressive by Italians in general. Although not as vociferous as in Greece, anti-German feelings are nowadays quite pervasive.  To these feelings contributes the refusal of the German judiciary to adequately deal with the WW II atrocities, and the refusal of consecutive German governments to pay compensation. 

Heinrich von Loesch

 

   The trouble brewing in Libya is making Italy very nervous. The numbers of refugees currently waiting on the beach to cross the Mediterranean are estimated at between 250,000 to one million. In addition, the local branch of ISIS is spreading and threatening to send terrorists among the boat people to Italy.

   Small wonder that Italy is exploring ways to control the illicit maritime traffic by blocking the main route from the Libyan coast to Lampedusa island. Unfortunately, the entire stretch of coast opposite Lampedusa,  from Abu Kammash/Farwah to Zawyah  and Tripoli is under control of groups loyal to the Islamist counter-government of Tripolis which enjoys the support of Turkey and Qatar.

   Given the chaos prevailing in Libya and the predominance of Islamist groups, Italy is thinking of acting on its own by imposing a naval blockade some 15 miles outside the Libyan coastline in order to prevent criminal or Islamist gangs from sending refugee boats in direction to Lampedusa.

   In fact, the Plan B is already in implementation as a naval maneuver. The Chief of General Staff, Claudio Graziano, announced that a program "Mare Aperto" (Open Seas) had begun in early March deploying vessels of the Italian navy along the Libyan coast. The maneuver started with three vessels, he said, the torpedo destroyer Duilio, the fregate Bergamini, and an amphibian ship of the San Giorgio class which carries helicopters and features a hospital unit.

   The idea, according to General Graziano. is to dissuade refugee boats from departing and, at the same time, to provide routine training for amphibian operations. According to media reports. Italy disposes in the area of a sizeable fleet of about ten units led by the aircraft carrier Cavour. with fregates, submarines and amphibious warfare ships. supported by aircraft from the Trapani and Pantelleria bases. Since the aggressive ISIS affiliate in Libya directly threatens Italy, the fleet would be "active to guarantee the security of our country on a daily basis through air defense, action to ensure maritime safety, to control the movements of migrants and to defend (our) territory," General Graziano said.

   Italy considers Libya a direct neighbor. Ever since the colonial days Italy always maintained close relations with Libya and can rely on a profound knowledge of the coast of Tripolitania. Although Italy's government would prefer to guide a joint European intervention there can be little doubt that Italy will act on its own if need be. A maritime blockade would stop refugee boats, transfer the passengers to the amphibious ships where they could receive medical treatment, and then unload them on the Libyan shore near Zawyah from where most boats leave for Lampedusa. Aircraft and navy infantry would protect the landing operations. The blockade is likely to be supported by the U.N. Security Council,  the Special Representative of the United Nations for Libya, Bernardino Leon, told Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi during a recent visit in Rome. The blockade would also correspond to maritime law which demands that survivors of shipwrecks be saved and reported to the nearest safe shore.

Benedikt Brenner

Update

While participating in the economic summit at Sharm-el Sheikh, Italy's Prime Minister Matteo Renzi dropped his former reluctant attitude and urged an international intervention in Libya "before the ISIS militias systematically occupy not only small and scattered places but a part of the country. It is therefore necessary to arrive before ISIS does, and do it quickly." As a result of his shuttle diplomacy, Renzi can count on the support of Russia's President Putin and Egypt's President al-Sisi. Outside this picture, however, remains Turkey's President Erdoǧan who supports the Islamist counter government in Tripoli.

 

Update

"For the time being", Prime Minister Matteo Renzi excluded putting troops on Libyan soil because of the incalculable risks, he said. 20/04/15)

 

 

   Nachmittag auf der Via del Corso in Rom. Ströme von Shoppern und Touristen, dazwischen Taxis und Busse. Da, ein Streifenwagen der Polizei. Der fliegende Händler, der sein Tablett mit kleinem Silberschmuck den Touristinnen anbietet, rennt weg. In eine Seitenstrasse, wo er sich hinter ein geparktes Auto duckt.

   Ich folge ihm: "Du versteckst Dich vor der Polizei, stimmts?" Er grinst, bejaht. "Von wo kommst Du?" Bangladesh. Aus Dhaka.

   Simon nennt er sich, 22 Jahre alt. Vier Jahre in Italien. Illegal, wie man sieht. "Bist Du mit dem Flugzeug gekommen oder mit dem Schiff?" "Lampedusa", antwortet er unumwunden. "Fünf Tage, ein Toter."

   Er fasst sich mit der Hand nach hinten, auf seinen Oberschenkel. "Kaputt". Sein italienisch reicht nicht aus. "Haut?", frage ich. "Ja, Haut weg, Benzin." Mehr erfahre ich nicht. Brandwunde oder verätzt?

   Am Abend esse ich in einem italienischen Restaurant. Die ganze Mannschaft ist aus Bangladesh. Ich erzähle dem Manager, Babul, von seinem Landsmann Simon. "Der ist verrückt. Er hat sein Leben riskiert mit der Überfahrt."

   Wie seine Leute nach Rom gekommen seien, frage ich Babul. "Alle mit dem Flugzeug. Einige aus anderen europäischen Ländern." Er selbst war zuerst in Italien, dann ein paar Jahre in Frankreich, nun wieder hier.

   Am nächsten Morgen treffe ich einen anderen Strassenhändler, diesmal an der Engelsbrücke. Ich hielt ihn für einen Bangladeshi, aber gefehlt, Junius ist aus Sri Lanka. Wie er hierher gekommen sei? Mit dem Flugzeug. Wie viele seiner Landsleute wohl mit dem Boot gekommen seien? Nur zehn Prozent, antwortet er ganz präzise. Neunzig Prozent kommen mit einem Visum, sagt Junius.

   Neben ihm an der Brücke stehen zwei Afrikaner als Touristenberater der Stadtverwaltung, einer aus Nigeria, der andere aus Kenia. Beide natürlich offiziell mit Visum in Italien eingereist. 

   Mare Nostrum heisst die jüngste Pirouette der italienischen Einwanderungspolitik. Mare Nostrum  fischt jeden Tag hunderte, ja manchmal sogar über tausend Bootsleute aus dem Mittelmeer.

   Jahrelang hatte man die illegale Einwanderung übers Meer weitgehend ignoriert. Dann kamen die Albaner. Nach dem Zusammenbruch des kommunistischen Regimes kamen von 1991 bis 2003 rund 350.000 albanische Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge nach Italien, meist auf Schiffen. Eine Welle albanischer Kriminalität wurde in ganz Italien von den Medien verzeichnet: das italienische Bürgertum verdächtigte vor allem die Linksregierung von Romano Prodi 1996-98, die Einwanderung aus ideologischen Gründen begünstigt zu haben -- ein wichtiger Grund für den Aufstieg der xenophoben Nordliga und Silvio Berlusconis.

   Damit gerieten die Boots-Flüchtlinge aus Nordafrika ins Visier der Lega Nord. Unverhohlen wurde gefordert, die illegale Einwanderung nicht nur zu erschweren, sondern die Flösse der Bootsleute zu beschiessen und zu versenken. Der Chef der Lega Umberto Bossi und der Chef der Neofaschisten Gianfranco Fini formulierten das berüchtigte und immer noch geltende Gesetz Bossi-Fini, das Hilfe und Rettung von Flüchtlingen unter Strafe stellt. Jeder italienische Fischer, der Bootsleute rettet, ist ein Gesetzesbrecher.

   Der Arabische Frühling in Tunesien und später in Libyen und Ägypten kippte das austarierte System der Flucht übers Meer. Statt einigen hundert pro Monat kamen ab 2011 plötzlich Tausende an. Die Insel Lampedusa wurde weltweit bekannt durch Horrorstories und schreckliche Fotos. Enormer Druck zwang schliesslich die Koalitionsregierung Enrico Letta, einzugreifen und in einer Volte um 180 Grad die italienische Marine für die grosse Rettungaktion Mare Nostrum einzusetzen, unterstützt durch das europäische Fluchtvereitelungssystem Frontex.

   Die Lega Nord ist wenig begeistert. Für sie ist Mare Nostrum der verlängerte Arm der kriminellen Fluchthelferbanden an der Küste Libyens. Fraglos hat die neue Bereitschaft Italiens, die Bootsleute aus dem Meer zu fischen, einen ähnlichen Durchbruch gebracht wie der Fall der Mauer in Berlin 1989. Hunderttausende stehen angeblich an der Küste Libyens bereit, den Sprung zu wagen -- vorausgesetzt, sie haben genug Geld für die Fluchthelfer und diese genug billige Einwegboote für die Überfahrt.

   Italiens jetzige Regierung Matteo Renzi ruft laut um Hilfe. Das seit Jahren am Rande der Pleite und in einer zähen Rezession manövrierende Land könne eine solche Masseneinwanderung nicht allein bewältigen: es brauche massive europäische Unterstützung.

   Aber ist dieser Hilferuf berechtigt?

   Erstens wandert ein grosser Teil der Flüchtlinge entweder sofort in andere Schengen-Staaten weiter oder verlässt nach einiger Zeit Italien wegen der schlechten Behandlung der Bootsleute in den Auffanglagern und der ungünstigen Wirtschaftslage im Lande.

   Zweitens verdient die italienische Einwanderungspolitik, unter die Lupe genommen zu werden, was die Zahlen und die Methoden anlangt.

   Ein paar Fakten springen ins Auge:<p>
* Italien hat weniger Immigranten als andere Länder der EU<p>
* Italien ist sehr langsam in seinen Prozeduren der Einbürgerung, so dass die Einwandererziffern nicht, wie in anderen Ländern, abschmelzen.<p>
* Die Hälfte der derzeit einwandernden Personen stammt aus Nicht-EU-Ländern Europas, zum Beispiel Albanien, Moldawien, der Ukraine oder Russland.<p>
* Die meisten Visa für Nicht-EU-Bürger gab es für Russen, Chinesen, Türken und Inder. 28 Prozent der Visa gab es für Asiaten, 12 Prozent für Bewohner des Mittleren Ostens und Nordafrikas, und nur 4 Prozent für Afrikaner und Amerikaner.

   Wer heute die Grosstädte Italiens besucht, erwartet, die Boots-Einwanderer zu sehen, also Syrer, Ägypter, Tunesier, Iraker und die politisch verfolgten Eriträer, Somalis und Südsudanesen.

   Doch was sieht er: Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Inder, Chinesen, Filipinos, Marokkaner, Senegalesen, Nigerianer. Jede dieser Gruppen verfolgt ihr eigenes erfolgreiches Geschäftsmodell;

   Die Bangladeshi in Rom betreiben die meisten<i> bancarelle</i>, die fliegenden Stände, die jedes Verkehrsbauwerk, jeden Touristentreffpunkt und jedes Kaufhaus umgeben. So viele Bangladeshi gibt es, dass scherzhaft vermutet wird, es herrsche in Bengalen Mangel an jungen Männern, weil alle in Rom sind.

   Chinesen, Inder und Pakistani haben eigene Handelsstrukturen und Industrien aufgezogen. In Prato bei Florenz existiert eine grosse chinesische Textilindustrie mit rund 25.000 wohl meist illegalen chinesischen Arbeitern, die in Tag- und Nachtschichten <i>Made in Italy</i> herstellen. In Rom wird das Viertel des Esquilin nahe des Hauptbahnhofs von Asiaten beherrscht.

   Die Filipinos -- besser gesagt, die Filipinas -- sind auf Haushaltshilfe spezialisiert. Die Marokkaner dominieren als fliegende Händler die Strände. Die Senegalesen kontrollieren den Handel mit illegalen und legalen Handtaschen und Lederwaren. Die Nigerianer und Nigerianierinnen sind als Transvestiten und Prostituierte aktiv.

   Erst einmal im Lande, behelligt die Polizei selten die "undokumentierten Ausländer". Solange sie nicht auffallen und keine Missetaten begehen, können sie jahrelang im reichen Italien leben.

   Wie aber sind sie alle nach Italien gekommen? Auf dem Boot die Allerwenigsten. Wenn im späten Frühjahr die Strand-Marokkaner mit Visum und Royal Air Maroc nach Italien einfliegen, dann duftet das Flugzeug ländlich, doch viele von ihnen besitzen daheim Haus und vielleicht Geschäft. Keine armen Teufel.

   Offenkundig ist, dass Italiens Konsulate über die Jahre hinweg millionenfach Visa vergeben haben, wohl wissend, dass der angebliche Tourist oder Student in Wirklichkeit in Italien Arbeit und Einkommen suchen wird, über 2 Millionen Visa allein 2013. Da ein Visum 60 bis 116 Euro kostet, verdient der italienische Fiskus auch an voraussichtlich illegaler Einwanderung.

   Kein Wunder, dass sich kommerzielle Agenturen um Einwanderungslustige bemühen und ihre langjährig erfolgreiche Arbeit preisen. Der Anteil der abgelehnten Anträge steigt zwar, verharrte aber 2013 immer noch bei 4 Prozent, was dem Geschäftsmodell der Agenturen sicherlich zuträglich ist. (Alle Zahlen: Aussenministerium)

   Der Eindruck drängt sich auf, dass Italien als Einwanderungsland weit offen ist für den, der weiss, wie man an ein Visum kommt und das nötige Geld dafür besitzt. Absurderweise müssen die Bootsleute in Libyen vielleicht mehr Geld an die Fluchthelfer abführen als in einem anderen Land ein Visum samt Schmiergeld für Agenten und Flugzeugticket kosten würde. Kein Wunder, dass Asiaten staunen, wenn einer der Ihrigen den Weg übers Wasser wählt.

   Ende 2012 gab es 5,0 Millionen wohnhafte Ausländer in Italien. Der Anteil der Nicht-Europäer beziffert sich auf rund 2,5 Millionen oder 4 Prozent der Bevölkerung. Dazu addieren sich die Illegalen, die 2008 auf 650.000 geschätzt wurden. In den ersten vier Monaten 2014 nahm Italien 39.000 Bootsleute auf. Aufs Jahr umgerechnet sind das knapp 120.000. Keine erschreckende Ziffer, aber sie wird wohl erheblich steigen.

   Italien ist laut Eurostat das drittwichtigste Einwanderungsland der EU nach Deutschland und Spanien und gleichauf mit Grossbritannien. Das Bild ist jedoch schief, da Länder wie Frankreich, Grossbritannien und Deutschland massiv Einwanderer naturalisiert haben, was in Italien kaum geschah.

   Um auf die Titelfrage zurück zu kommen: Muss man Italien helfen, den Einstrom der Boots-Flüchtlinge zu bewältigen? Die Antwort kann nur lauten: Nein.

   Alles, was Italien tun sollte, ist sein mutmasslich korruptes System der Visavergabe durchforsten und die Anträge vor allem aus Asien strenger prüfen. Ohne die Gesamtzahl der Einwanderer pro Jahr zu vermindern, könnten dann anstelle der Abgelehnten Abertausende von Bootsleuten aufgenommen und wirtschaftlich integriert werden. Über die schrittweise Legalisierung der Undokumentierten könnte man später reden. Italien weiss, wie man das macht.

 Benedikt Brenner

 

Update

Wie kommt man übers Meer ohne zu schwimmen?

   Ein italienisches Visum zu bekommen ist fast unmöglich, wenn man "extracomunitario" ist, also Nicht-EU-Bürger. Man muss ein Ticket für Hin- und Rückflug vorlegen, dazu den Nachweis einer Unterkunft, eine Krankenversicherung mit mindestens 30.000 Euro Deckungssumme, plus einer Pauschale für Rücktransport im Krankheitsfall, plus Nachweis des Besitzes von mindestens 44 Euro Tagegeld für die Dauer des Aufenthalts in Italien. 

   Doch es geht auch anders, wie ein Vorfall am italienischen Konsulat in Tunesien zeigte. Während der Monate der Jasmin-Revolution erhielten fünf Freunde eines Sachbearbeiters der Visa-Abteilung ihr Visum, nachdem er auf dem Antrag vermerkt hatte "persönlich bekannt". Das sei eine gewöhnliche Praxis, kommentiert die Gewerkschaft der Angestellten des auswärtigen Dienstes. Da die fünf Freunde aber nach Ablauf ihres Visums in Italien untertauchten, flog die Sache auf und der Sachbearbeiter wurde fristlos gefeuert. Die nunmehr illegalen Fünf addierten sich zu den 146.000 Personen, die laut offizieller Statistik 2014 mit abgelaufenem Visum in Italien lebten. Dazu kamen die 170.000 Illegalen, die 2014 übers Meer angekommen sind.

   Während der kleine Konsulats-Sachbearbeiter sich einen neuen Job suchen muss, wurde seine Vorgesetzte zwar getadelt und nach Rom versetzt, blieb aber sonst unbehelligt.  Der Botschafter, der angeblich seinem damaligen Koch zu einem Sechs-Monate-Visum verhalf, (das dieser benutzte, um sich nach Frankreich abzusetzen) wurde auf einen höheren Posten befördert, wie Huffington Post berichtete.

 

   Während die EU-Finanzminister jetzt in die Montags-Sitzung gehen, mehren sich Anzeichen, dass die Entscheidung über Griechenlands Geldbedarf möglicherweise bereits gefallen ist. Die von Athen vorgelegte Liste von Reformvorschlägen ist -- wie alle sagen, die sie gesehen haben -- total unbefriedigend. Syriza scheint entschlossen, eher den Untergang zu riskieren, als nachzugeben.

   Die Euro-Gruppe hingegen ist in "Basta"-Stimmung. Griechenland hat seine Hand überreizt; die kleineren Staaten scharen sich hinter Merkels und Schäubles breiten Rücken. Merkel und Juncker haben die Öffentlichkeit demonstrativ wissen lassen, dass ein Grexit für sie nicht infrage komme. Diese philhellenischen Gelübde wecken den Verdacht, dass beide mit dem schnellen Kollaps der griechischen Regierung rechnen und sich durch ihren Treueschwur für den Sturm wappnen, der hinterher in der Öffentlichkeit losbricht.  

   Syriza, dem masochistischen παράδειγμα der griechischen Linken getreu, will die Reinheit des theoretischen Modells nicht der Brutalität des Kapitals unterwerfen und wird eher das Wohlergehen der Hellenen opfern, als nachzugeben. Man sollte die Befriedigung nicht unterschätzen, die es einem linken Revolutionär bereiten würde, Kredite der Kapitalisten in Höhe von 230 Milliarden Euro mit einem Federstrich zu vernichten.

Ihsan al-Tawil