Telegram is a new mobile and desktop messaging service based in Berlin, Germany, created in 2013 by Russian entrepreneurs, Nicolay and Pavel Durov. Telegram focuses on privacy by offering end-to-end encryption and timed self-destruction. A new feature called “Channels” lets users broadcast to other members of the service. It quickly made Telegram the favorite social media of Daesh (IS or ISIS), al-Nusra and other jihadis, particularly because it offers a guarantee of permanence.

   “It is this new feature that has been enthusiastically embraced by many militant groups, becoming an underground railroad for distributing and archiving jihadi propaganda materials,” says TRAC, the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium. "As of Nov. 2, TRAC has recorded more than 200 major jihadi channels. Half of them belong to ISIS. Other major players in the jihadi world, from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to Jabhat al-Nusra to Ansar al-Sharia in Libya to Jaysh al-Islam, are increasingly creating their own channels. The rate of membership growth for the channels has been staggering, quickly climbing to about 150,000 total members, the report concludes."

   Telegram's chat feature is now a prime recruiting venue. In addition, the messaging service also permits a superior way of transferring funds, "a virtual encrypted Hawala system offering new ways to transfer and receive crypto-currency", as TRAC describes it. Telegram is easy to handle and more convenient than Twitter. By subscribing to a Telegram channel not only messages can be instantly exchanged but newly arriving items are announced by an acoustic signal.

   Although Telegram offers the average Joe an unprecedented level of privacy, free of snooping by NSA and its likes, it also renders the work of terrorism watchdogs virtually impossible. 

Heinrich von Loesch

Update

Telegram allegedly says it is deleting chats and sites linked to Daesh (IS). No quotable sources found.

-- ed

 

   Während Deutschland von Masseneinwanderung überrollt wird und die Meinungen, was denn von dieser Völkerwanderung zu halten sei, aufeinanderprallen, zeichnet in Italien die Statistik ein freundliches, eher gemütliches Bild der Folgen der Einwanderung für Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft.

   Das offizielle "Dossier Einwanderung 2015" bezieht sich auf das Jahr 2014  und zeigt, dass die Kriminalität der Ausländer sinkt, während die der lokalen Bevölkerung steigt, dass die Fremden weniger Kinder haben als im Vorjahr, und dass sie dem Fiskus mehr Einnahmen bringen als der Staat für Neuankömmlinge ausgibt.

   Die Zahl der in Italien wohnhaften Ausländer, nämlich rund fünf Millionen, entspricht ziemlich genau der Zahl der ausgewanderten Italiener, die in letzter Zeit wegen der Krise stark gestiegen ist. Im Jahr 2014 haben 155.000 Italiener das belpaese verlassen und eine andere Staatsangehörigkeit angenommen, während nur 92.000 Ausländer eingebürgert wurden. Mehr als 30.000 illegale Einwanderer wurden 2014 aufgegriffen und über die Hälfte von ihnen "repatriiert".

   Während zwischen 2004 und 2013 die Delikte der Ausländer um 6 Prozent zurückgingen, stiegen die der lokalen Bevölkerung um 28 Prozent.  Nach wie vor ist der Anteil der Ausländer an den Gefängnisinsassen mit 33 Prozent zwar hoch, doch er ging seit 2010 um 4 Prozent zurück.

   Im Jahr 2013 leisteten die Einwanderer ein Beitrag von 123 Milliarden Euro oder 9 Prozent zum Brutto-Inlandsprodukt. Das bedeutet pro Kopf, dass die Wertschöpfung der Fremden fast dem Durchschnitt der Italiener entspricht. Überdies zahlen die Einwanderer jährlich 7-8 Milliarden Euro in die Sozialkassen ein, sind jedoch oft nicht in der Lage, ihre Rente zu beanspruchen und schenkten dadurch der Rentenkasse geschätzte 3 Milliarden.

   Obwohl die Ausländer in der Ortswahl flexibler sind als die Italiener und weniger angenehme Arbeit akzeptieren, werden sie eher entlassen und sind häufiger arbeitslos als die Einheimischen, was sich erneut in der Krise zeigte. Der Verlust der Arbeit zieht oft den Verlust der Aufenthaltserlaubnis nach sich, so dass in den letzten Jahren über 150.000 Arbeitslose Italien verlassen mussten.

   Rund 53 Prozent der Einwanderer erklären sich als Christen, 32 Prozent als Moslems. Mehr als die Hälfte der Einwanderer sind Europäer, davon über eine Million Rumänen und eine halbe Million Albanier. Danach folgen Marokkaner, Chinesen und Ukrainer. Mit 15 Prozent aller Geburten sind die überwiegend jungen Einwanderer fruchtbarer als die Italiener, aber ihre Geburtenzahl ging seit 2013 um 3,4 Prozent zurück.

   Die italienischen Daten, so interessant sie sind, können nur bedingt zur Interpretation der jetzigen Lage in Deutschland dienen. Auch muss man bedenken, dass viele tausende Illegaler in Italien leben, ohne der meist faulen Polizei aufzufallen. Allein in Rom leben tausende Bangladeshi, die jeden fliegenden Verkaufsstand, jeden Flohmarkt, jede Tankstelle und ungezählte Restaurantküchen und selbst Chinaläden bevölkern. Tausende Marokkaner verhökern saisonal ihre Waren an den Badestränden, ohne offizielles Dokument. Die Senegalesen-Mafia, die gefälschte Markenware an Touristen verkauft, die Chinesen in Prato, die undokumentiert in den sweatshops arbeiten...eine wirklich glaubhafte Ausländerstatistik existiert in Italien nicht.

   Für Deutschland bietet Italien dennoch interessante Vergleiche. Wer es dort schafft, eingebürgert zu werden, muss entweder hartnäckig oder wohlhabend sein. Italienische Lebensart erleichtert die Integration, ethnische Ghettos finden sich nur in den grössten Städten und sind auch bei Italienern beliebt wegen der guten Restaurants und der billigen Läden. Der hohe Anteil der Europäer und Christen lässt bei ihnen den Drang zur Ghetto-Bildung garnicht aufkommen. Eritreer, Somalis und Libyer bringen aus der Kolonialzeit einige italienische Kultur mit. Dass dennoch so viele der jetzigen Migranten Italien nur als Durchgangsland ansehen, hängt mit den spärlichen staatlichen Leistungen, der maladen Wirtschaft und der hohen Arbeitslosigkeit vor allem der Jugend zu tun.

Benedikt Brenner

 

 Bundesinnenminister Thomas de Maizière (CDU) warnt vor einer Schleuserorganisation, die Afghanen nach Deutschland bringt. Bei seinen Analysen der Vorgänge auf den Fluchtrouten habe der deutsche Auslandsgeheimdienst in Afghanistan „eine hochprofessionelle Schleuserstruktur ausgemacht, deren Netzwerk über die Türkei bis nach Griechenland, Italien und Frankreich reicht“. Die Behörden glauben, dass zahlreiche Flüchtlinge von kriminellen Gruppen nach Deutschland gebracht werden. Bei den Verdächtigen soll es sich unter anderem gerüchtweise um libanesische Großfamilien handeln. Aus Afghanistan berichtet  der Guardian.

 

   After midnight, the sprawling outskirts of Kabul are enveloped in darkness, but the Ahmad Shah Baba bus station lights up like a small town in the night.

   In the cheap neon light from a cluster of hotels, rows of dilapidated buses wait, engines running, for their 2am departure. At a recent visit, inside the buses, the mood was solemn. All passengers were men. Many were teenagers, none looked older than 35. Few were willing to share details about their upcoming trip, though it was obvious.

   Their destination was Nimruz, Afghanistan’s southern desert province bordering Iran and Pakistan. Every night, about 60 buses leave Kabul for Nimruz, according to ticket sellers at the terminal. For the poorest of the many Afghans leaving their country, this is where the journey to Europe begins.

   And for many, “Europe” has become synonymous with one country – Germany. Although that destination may now be harder to reach after the German government announced that it was tightening up its refugee policy.

   “I’m going to Germany. There are no jobs here, and security gets worse day by day,” said Rafi, 30. He had been unemployed for seven years, since his international employer in Kabul closed its business. He decided to leave when the Taliban captured Kunduz in the north.

   “The Taliban went looking for families who cooperated with the government or international organisations. They killed their sons and kidnapped their daughters,” he said. Rafi hoped to obtain residency in Germany and eventually bring his wife and daughter there.

   Germany was also the destination for Farid, 25, about to make his second attempt at crossing into Iran via Nimruz. Two months ago, Iranian police arrested him in Khoy, close to the Turkish border. They held him for eight days and beating him, before deporting him, he said. Because Farid had worked for an organisation funded by the World Bank in Kapisa province.

   Afghans make up 16% of asylum seekers currently arriving in Turkey and Europe, surpassed only by Syrians.

According to the UN, 122,080 Afghans applied for asylum in 44 countries between January and August, more than twice the number last year. The vast majority are young men.

   Trips from Afghanistan to Europe are priced according to the danger involved. According to people smugglers who spoke to the Guardian, an overland journey via Nimruz costs $6-7,000. Flying to Tehran and continuing overland is $9,000. A flight all the way to Istanbul adds another $2,000 to the price.

   One people smuggler, Khan, said every night, 300 to 400 people cross the border from Nimruz to Iran, the most dangerous part of the journey because of often ruthless Iranian police.

Sune Engel Rasmussen -- The Guardian

 

Update

40 percent of Afghans would like to emigrate

Migration. Starting in 2011, the survey has asked respondents if they would leave Afghanistan if given the opportunity. This year (2015), 39.9% of Afghans say yes, an increase from 33.8% in 2011, while 57.9% say no. Afghans most likely to say yes live in the Central/Kabul (47.4%) and West (44.2%) regions; those least likely live in the South West (26.2%).

  Per ridurre l’evasione dell’Iva, va limitato l’uso del contante. Ma come? Si potrebbe proporre alle famiglie di ritirare solo una piccola somma ogni mese, effettuando la maggior parte dei pagamenti con strumenti tracciabili. Il premio sarebbe una detrazione del 3 per cento. I guadagni per lo Stato.

Iva: la grande evasione

   Gran parte dell’evasione dell’Iva, e di conseguenza di altre tasse, proviene da un utilizzo abnorme del contante, che rende possibili i pagamenti in nero. Nel 2013 l’evasione Iva ammontava a 47,5 miliardi di euro su 141,5, un terzo del totale. Per contrastare l’evasione Iva, si studiano perciò misure che limitino l’uso del contante, da sostituire con strumenti tracciabili.

   Le misure suggerite sono essenzialmente quattro: tassare il prelievo di contante; ridurre l’Iva per i pagamenti tracciati; detrarre tutti gli acquisti del consumatore, come per i medicinali; limitare il contante nel singolo acquisto.

Nessuna di queste sembra convincente. La prima, perché è impossibile, nel breve periodo, eliminare totalmente il contante, per motivi pratici e abitudini radicate. La seconda, perché l’unico modo per risultare conveniente, rispetto alla frode, sarebbe di detrarre del tutto l’Iva. La terza, perché, se applicata a tutte le spese, sarebbe molto macchinosa. Senza evitare che, per alcune, il cittadino possa spendere in nero. La quarta, perché difficile da controllare.

   Vediamo un approccio diverso, senza focalizzarsi sulla singola transazione, ma considerando tutte quelle eseguite dal contribuente in un anno fiscale.

Famiglie con contante limitato

   La famiglia media italiana spende circa 2.500 euro al mese, 30mila euro all’anno.
La proposta è di incentivare le famiglie a ritirare contante per un massimo di 500 euro al mese, all’anno 6mila euro, per le piccole spese giornaliere. Le famiglie che accettano questo vincolo godranno dei benefici previsti, per tutte le altre non cambierà nulla.

   Qual è il beneficio? È una detrazione del 3 per cento (ma potrebbe essere anche il 5 per cento) di quanto viene speso in modo tracciabile: non solo attraverso le carte, dunque, ma anche bonifici, Mav, Rav, assegni e Rid.

   Mediamente una famiglia italiana virtuosa spenderà 24mila euro con questi mezzi e 6mila in contanti. Dai 24mila bisogna però levare le spese che, anche se tracciate, sono indirizzate allo Stato (tasse e multe) e i trasferimenti (assegni o bonifici) indirizzati a privati, ad esempio familiari. Diciamo altri 4mila euro anno. La famiglia virtuosa perciò spenderà, in modo tracciabile e detraibile, 20mila euro all’anno e avrà in detrazione, in dichiarazione dei redditi, mediamente 600 euro, se la detrazione è del 3 per cento (mille se è del 5 per cento)

   Le detrazioni tuttavia si applicano ai singoli, e dunque il principio descritto va a loro riportato. Il limite per un single potrebbe essere di 400 euro mese, per una coppia di 600. Il limite per la coppia è ovvio, altrimenti sarebbe facile aggirare la norma: si potrebbe avere un coniuge virtuoso e l’altro che invece ritira contante e paga in nero.

   Il limite del contante è mensile e viene sanzionato perdendo il diritto alla detrazione, anche se viene superato in un solo mese, perché potrebbe essere quello in cui si consuma la frode.

   Perché la detrazione si applica su tutte le transazioni complessivamente? Sulla singola transazione è impossibile essere più convenienti della possibile frode, mentre su un complesso di pagamenti, generalmente regolari, non vale la pena perdere i benefici.

   In alcuni casi, la famiglia potrebbe comunque trovare non conveniente il comportamento virtuoso, ad esempio se effettua una spesa importante: su una ristrutturazione di 50mila euro, pagando in nero, potrebbe evaderne 5mila. Tuttavia per queste spese sono già previsti incentivi generosi che portano il contribuente a eseguire un pagamento tracciabile. E anzi, si potrebbe pensare di escludere dal beneficio questo tipo di spese.

   La misura funziona senza che il cittadino faccia niente: se rispetta il limite sul contante acquisisce automaticamente la detrazione, se non lo rispetta la perde.
Le banche invece dovranno fare qualcosa: trasmettere ogni mese all’Agenzia delle entrate l’importo totale speso elettronicamente da ogni cittadino e quello ritirato in contante. L’Agenzia delle entrate farà le verifiche sui codici fiscali dei cittadini e su quelli di una famiglia.

   Il costo della misura è proporzionale al numero dei cittadini che decidono di adottarla. Il suo costo massimo è di circa 15 miliardi con detrazione del 3 per cento (25 milioni di famiglie per 600 euro), circa 25 miliardi con detrazione del 5 per cento.

   È possibile aggirare la norma? Sì.

  1. a) Con qualche salto mortale, la famiglia che ritira 600 euro al mese in contanti, può costruire una riserva da spendere in nero e avere comunque diritto alla detrazione.
  2. b) Ci potrebbero essere persone che rinunciano alla detrazione, per tornaconto, o anche solo per favorire qualcuno. I trasferimenti a privati sono ammessi e le cifre non vengono conteggiate per le detrazioni: la frode ci sarebbe qualora il beneficiario ritirasse l’importo in contanti e lo restituisse al mittente per spese in nero.

   Rimane, infine, una forte componente di contante circolante che non rientra nel circuito bancario e utilizzabile per operazioni in nero.

Guadagni per lo Stato

   Si possono trarre conclusioni quantitative sugli effetti di questa norma? Ipotizziamo che la metà delle famiglie italiane, circa 12,5 milioni, diventi virtuosa e applichi la norma. Con un rimborso di 600 euro medi a famiglia, il costo per lo Stato sarebbe di 7,5 miliardi (12,5 miliardi se il rimborso fosse di mille euro).

   Quanto si ridurrebbe l’evasione dell’Iva? Se le 12,5 milioni di famiglie rispecchiassero perfettamente la composizione sociale della società, l’evasione si ridurrebbe della metà, circa 24 miliardi, con un guadagno per lo Stato di 16 miliardi con detrazione del 3 per cento e di circa 11 con detrazione del 5 per cento.

   Applichiamo a questi calcoli un fattore di correzione del 30 per cento, per comportamenti scorretti e per un eventuale sbilanciamento del campione verso i virtuosi. Lo Stato ci guadagnerebbe sempre: circa 11 miliardi con detrazione al 3 per cento, quasi 8 miliardi con detrazione al 5 per cento. Senza contare che l’emersione dell’Iva porterebbe a quella di altre tasse, come Irpef, Ires, Irap, contributi.

Nuccio Pellicanò -- lavoce.info

This article was originally published by Pro Publica in 2013. Although much additional information has since surfaced it still offers an overview helpful in understanding the mission and work of the National Security Agency.

What information does the NSA collect and how?

We don’t know all of the different types of information the NSA collects, but several secret collection programs have been revealed:

A record of most calls made in the U.S., including the telephone number of the phones making and receiving the call, and how long the call lasted. This information is known as “metadata” and doesn’t include a recording of the actual call (but see below). This program was revealed through a leaked secret court order instructing Verizon to turn over all such information on a daily basis. Other phone companies, including AT&T and Sprint, also reportedly give their records to the NSA on a continual basis. All together, this is several billion calls per day.

Email, Facebook posts and instant messages for an unknown number of people, via PRISM, which involves the cooperation of at least nine different technology companies. Google, Facebook, Yahoo and others have denied that the NSA has “direct access” to their servers, saying they only release user information in response to a court order. Facebook has revealed that, in the last six months of 2012, they handed over the private data of between 18,000 and 19,000 users to law enforcement of all types -- including local police and federal agencies, such as the FBI, Federal Marshals and the NSA.

Massive amounts of raw Internet traffic The NSA intercepts huge amounts of raw data, and stores billions of communication records per day in its databases. Using the NSA’s XKEYSCORE software, analysts can see “nearly everything a user does on the Internet” including emails, social media posts, web sites you visit, addresses typed into Google Maps, files sent, and more. Currently the NSA is only authorized to intercept Internet communications with at least one end outside the U.S., though the domestic collection program used to be broader. But because there is no fully reliable automatic way to separate domestic from international communications, this program also captures some amount of U.S. citizens’ purely domestic Internet activity, such as emails, social media posts, instant messages, the sites you visit and online purchases you make.

The contents of an unknown number of phone calls There have been several reports that the NSA records the audio contents of some phone calls and a leaked document confirms this. This reportedly happens “on a much smaller scale” than the programs above, after analysts select specific people as “targets.” Calls to or from U.S. phone numbers can be recorded, as long as the other end is outside the U.S. or one of the callers is involved in "international terrorism". There does not seem to be any public information about the collection of text messages, which would be much more practical to collect in bulk because of their smaller size.

The NSA has been prohibited from recording domestic communications since the passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act but at least two of these programs -- phone records collection and Internet cable taps -- involve huge volumes of Americans’ data.

Does the NSA record everything about everyone, all the time?

The NSA records as much information as it can, subject to technical limitations (there’s a lot of data) and legal constraints. This currently includes the metadata for nearly all telephone calls made in the U.S. (but not their content) and massive amounts of Internet traffic with at least one end outside the U.S. It’s not clear exactly how many cables have been tapped, though we know of at least one inside the U.S., a secret report about the program by the NSA’s Inspector General mentions multiple cables, and the volume of intercepted information is so large that it was processed at 150 sites around the world as of 2008. We also know that Britain’s GCHQ, which shares some intelligence with the NSA, had tapped over 200 cables as of 2012, belonging to seven different telecommunications companies.           

Until 2011 the NSA also operated a domestic Internet metadata program which collected mass records of who emailed who even if both parties were inside the U.S.

Because it is not always possible to separate domestic from foreign communications by automatic means, the NSA still captures some amount of purely domestic information, and it is allowed to do so by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.

The collected information covers “nearly everything a user does on the Internet,” according to a presentation on the XKEYSCORE system. The slides specifically mention emails, Facebook chats, websites visited, Google Maps searches, transmitted files, photographs, and documents of different kinds. It’s also possible to search for people based on where they are connecting from, the language they use, or their use of privacy technologies such as VPNs and encryption, according to the slides.

This is a massive amount of data. The full contents of intercepted Internet traffic can only be stored for up to a few days, depending on the collection site, while the associated “metadata” (who communicated with whom online) is stored up to 30 days. Telephone metadata is smaller and is stored for five years. NSA analysts can move specific data to more permanent databases when they become relevant to an investigation.

The NSA also collects narrower and more detailed information on specific people, such as the actual audio of phone calls and the entire content of email accounts. NSA analysts can submit a request to obtain these types of more detailed information about specific people.

Watching a specific person like this is called “targeting” by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the law which authorizes this type of individual surveillance. The NSA is allowed to record the conversations of non-Americans without a specific warrant for each person monitored, if at least one end of the conversation is outside of the U.S. It is also allowed to record the communications of Americans if they are outside the U.S. and the NSA first gets a warrant for each case. It’s not known exactly how many people the NSA is currently targeting, but according to a leaked report the NSA intercepted content from 37,664 telephone numbers and email addresses from October 2001 to January 2007. Of these, 8% were domestic: 2,612 U.S. phone numbers and 406 U.S. email addresses.

How the NSA actually gets the data depends on the type of information requested. If the analyst wants someone's private emails or social media posts, the NSA must request that specific data from companies such as Google and Facebook. Some technology companies (we don't know which ones) have FBI monitoring equipment installed "on the premises" and the NSA gets the information via the FBI's Data Intercept Technology Unit. The NSA also has the capability to monitor calls made over the Internet (such as Skype calls) and instant messaging chats as they happen.

For information that is already flowing through Internet cables that the NSA is monitoring, or the audio of phone calls, a targeting request instructs automatic systems to watch for the communications of a specific person and save them.

It’s important to note that the NSA probably has information about you even if you aren’t on this target list. If you have previously communicated with someone who has been targeted, then the NSA already has the content of any emails, instant messages, phone calls, etc. you exchanged with the targeted person. Also, your data is likely in bulk records such as phone metadata and Internet traffic recordings. This is what makes these programs “mass surveillance,” as opposed to traditional wiretaps, which are authorized by individual, specific court orders.

What does phone call metadata information reveal, if it doesn’t include the content of the calls?

Even without the content of all your conversations and text messages, so-called “metadata” can reveal a tremendous amount about you. If they have your metadata, the NSA would have a record of your entire address book, or at least every person you’ve called in the last several years. They can guess who you are close to by how often you call someone, and when. By correlating the information from multiple people, they can do sophisticated “network analysis” of communities of many different kinds, personal or professional -- or criminal.

Phone company call records reveal where you were at the time that a call was made, because they include the identifier of the radio tower that transmitted the call to you. The government has repeatedly denied that it collects this information, but former NSA employee Thomas Drake said they do. For a sense of just how powerful location data can be, see this visualization following a German politician everywhere he goes for months, based on his cellphone’s location information.

Even without location data, records of who communicated with whom can be used to discover the structure of groups planning terrorism. Starting from a known "target" (see above), analysts typically reconstruct the social network "two or three hops" out, examining all friends-of-friends, or even friends-of-friends-of-friends, in the search for new targets. This means potentially thousands or millions of people might be examined when investigating a single target.

Metadata is a sensitive topic because there is great potential for abuse. While no one has claimed the NSA is doing this, it would be possible to use metadata to algorithmically identify, with some accuracy, members of other types of groups like the Tea Party or Occupy Wall Street, gun owners, undocumented immigrants, etc. An expert in network analysis could start with all of the calls made from the time and place of a protest, and trace the networks of associations out from there.

Phone metadata is also not “anonymous” in any real sense. The NSA already maintains a database of the phone numbers of all Americans for use in determining whether someone is a “U.S. person” (see below), and there are several commercial number-to-name services in any case. Phone records become even more powerful when they are correlated with other types of data, such as social media posts, local police records and credit card purchase information, a process known as intelligence fusion.

Does the NSA need an individualized warrant to listen to my calls or look at my emails?

It’s complicated, but not in all cases. Leaked court orders set out the "minimization" procedures that govern what the NSA can do with the domestic information it has intercepted. The NSA is allowed to store this domestic information because of the technical difficulties in separating foreign from domestic communications when large amounts of data are being captured.

Another document shows that individual intelligence analysts make the decision to look at previously collected bulk information. They must document their request, but only need approval from their "shift coordinator." If the analyst later discovers that they are looking at the communications of a U.S. person, they must destroy the data.

However, if the intercepted information is “reasonably believed to contain evidence of a crime” then the NSA is allowed to turn it over to federal law enforcement. Unless there are other (still secret) restrictions on how the NSA can use this data this means the police might end up with your private communications without ever having to get approval from a judge, effectively circumventing the whole notion of probable cause.

This is significant because thousands or millions of people might fall into the extended social network of a single known target, but it is not always possible to determine whether someone is a U.S. person before looking at their data. For example, it’s not usually possible to tell just from someone’s email address, which is why the NSA maintains a database of known U.S. email addresses and phone numbers. Internal documents state that analysts need only “51% confidence” that someone is a non-U.S. person before looking at their data, and if the NSA does not have “specific information” about someone, that person is “presumed to be a non-United States person.”

Also, the NSA is allowed to provide any of its recorded information to the FBI, if the FBI specifically asks for it.

Is all of this legal?

Yes, assuming the NSA adheres to the restrictions set out in recently leaked court orders. By definition, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court decides what it is legal for the NSA to do. But this level of domestic surveillance wasn’t always legal, and the NSA's domestic surveillance program has been found to violate legal standards on more than one occasion.

The NSA was gradually granted the authority to collect domestic information on a massive scale through a series of legislative changes and court decisions over the decade following September 11, 2001. See this timeline of loosening laws. The Director of National Intelligence says that authority for PRISM programs comes from section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Verizon metadata collection order cites section 215 of the Patriot Act. The author of the Patriot Act disagrees that the act justifies the Verizon metadata collection program.

The NSA's broad data collection programs were originally authorized by President Bush on October 4, 2001. The program operated that way for several years, but in March 2004 a Justice Department review declared the bulk Internet metadata program was illegal. President Bush signed an order re-authorizing it anyway. In response, several top Justice Department officials threatened to resign, including acting Attorney General James Comey and FBI director Robert Mueller. Bush backed down, and the Internet metadata program was suspended for several months. By 2007, all aspects of the program were re-authorized by court orders from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.

In 2009, the Justice Department acknowledged that the NSA had collected emails and phone calls of Americans in a way that exceeded legal limitations.

In October 2011, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled that the NSA violated the Fourth Amendment at least once. The Justice Department has said that this ruling must remain secret, but we know it concerned some aspect of the "minimization" rules the govern what the NSA can do with domestic communications. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court recently decided that this ruling can be released, but Justice Department has not yet done so.

Civil liberties groups including the EFF and the ACLU dispute the constitutionality of these programs and have filed lawsuits to challenge them.

How long can the NSA keep information on Americans?

The NSA can generally keep intercepted domestic communications for up to five years. It can keep them indefinitely under certain circumstances, such as when the communication contains evidence of a crime or when it’s “foreign intelligence information,” a broad legal term that includes anything relevant to “the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.”

The NSA can also keep encrypted communications indefinitely. That includes any information sent to or from a secure web site, that is, a site with a URL starting with "https".

Does the NSA do anything to protect Americans’ privacy?

Yes. First, the NSA is only allowed to intercept communications if at least one end of the conversation is outside of the U.S. -- though it doesn't have to distinguish domestic from foreign communication until the "earliest practicable point" which allows the NSA to record bulk information from Internet cables and sort it out later. When the NSA discovers that previously intercepted information belongs to an American, it must usually destroy that information. Because this determination cannot always be made by computer, this sometimes happens only after a human analyst has already looked at it.

The NSA also must apply certain safeguards. For example, the NSA must withhold the names of U.S. persons who are not relevant to ongoing investigations when they distribute information -- unless that person’s communications contain evidence of a crime or are relevant to a range of national security and foreign intelligence concerns.

Also, analysts must document why they believe someone is outside of the U.S. when they ask for addition information to be collected on that person. An unknown number of these cases are audited internally. If the NSA makes a mistake and discovers that it has targeted someone inside the U.S., it has five days to submit a report to the Department of Justice and other authorities.

What if I’m not an American?

All bets are off. There do not appear to be any legal restrictions on what the NSA can do with the communications of non-U.S. persons. Since a substantial fraction of the world’s Internet data passes through the United States, or its allies, the U.S. has the ability to observe and record the communications of much of the world’s population. The European Union has already complained to the U.S. Attorney General.

The U.S. is hardly the only country doing mass surveillance, though its program is very large. GCHQ, which is the British counterpart to the NSA, has a similar surveillance program and shares data with the NSA. Many countries now have some sort of mass Internet surveillance now in place. Although passive surveillance is often hard to detect, more aggressive governments use intercepted information to intimidate or control their citizens, including Syria, Iran, Egypt, Bahrain and China. Much of the required equipment is sold to these governments by American companies.