BOZAR LITERATURE a demandé à l'écrivaine renommée Elif Shafak de sélectionner des œuvres par l'exposition L'Empire du sultan. Le monde ottoman dans l'art de la Renaissance. Shafak a commenté huit œuvres et écrit des textes pour la guide littéraire et l'audioguide. Extraits suivants.
La Bataille de Lépante
La Bataille de Lépante – ou Inebahti en turc – fut sans aucun doute l'un des affrontements navals les plus importants et les plus sanglants du XVIe siècle. Selon que l’on soit Européen ou Turc, ce jour fatidique occupe une place totalement opposée dans la mémoire collective. Pour le premier, c'est devenu le récit d'une victoire héroïque. Pour le second, l'histoire d'une indigne déroute. Mais plusieurs siècles ont passé et il est temps de repenser la bataille de Lépante, au-delà des notions d'héroïsme ou de défaite, et d’essayer de la comprendre dans son entièreté et sa complexité.
Anonyme, La Bataille de Lépante, fin 16e siècle
Je n'oublierai jamais la première fois où j'ai entendu le mot 'Lépante'. Le même jour, j'ai découvert un auteur qui jouerait dorénavant un rôle majeur dans ma vie littéraire: Miguel de Cervantès.
J'avais dix ans et je venais de quitter un petit quartier musulman d'Ankara, en Turquie, pour rejoindre une école internationale de Madrid, en Espagne. Dès la première semaine à l'école, au cours d'histoire, la professeure se tourna vers moi lorsqu'elle apprit que j'étais turque et lança devant tous les enfants: "Oh, c'est l'un des vôtres qui a mutilé le bras gauche de Cervantès à Lépante! Au moins, je suis contente que vous ne lui ayez pas tranché les deux bras ! Sinon nous n'aurions pas pu lire Don Quichotte aujourd'hui!"
Elle me souriait, mais j'étais terrifiée et confuse, comme si coupable de quelque chose. Je ne savais pas ce qu'était 'Lépante', n'étant que vaguement familière du mot 'Inehbati'. Je ne savais pas qui était ce Cervantès ni ce qui était arrivé à son bras. Et je ne comprenais certainement pas ce que voulait dire la professeure par "l'un des vôtres".
Les années ont passé. J'ai étudié notre histoire commune, ottomane et européenne. J'ai découvert le grand Cervantès et l'admirable imagination grâce à laquelle il captive encore et toujours nos cœurs et nos esprits. J'ai dépassé les généralisations nationalistes/religieuses que, malheureusement, même de bons professeurs d'histoire peuvent relayer.
La Bataille de Lépante, une huile sur toile, est un tableau puissant qui exprime à la fois la vie et la mort, l'espoir et la perte, l'eau et le sang. Le choix des couleurs et l'arrangement des détails sont exceptionnels. Sous un vaste ciel et des nuages floconneux, parmi les tons bleus, verts et bruns apaisants, de soudaines explosions de rouge font presque tressaillir le spectateur, chacune rappelant le feu, la fumée et la violence. Au premier regard, le tableau nous donne une impression bien différente du sentiment qu’il suscite lorsque nous faisons attention aux détails: l'épaisse fumée qui s'élève de tous côtés, les corps à la surface de l'eau...
Je suis aussi frappée par le fait que cette peinture soit restée anonyme. Le fait que nous ne connaissions pas le nom de l'artiste rend l'œuvre encore plus intéressante, et même fascinante. C’est comme si ce tableau n'appartenait pas à quelqu'un, ni à aucun des deux camps. Comme s'il s'agissait d'une expression collective, d’un soupir collectif qui nous vient des siècles passés et implore d'être entendu.
Famille turque
En général, l'historiographie turque dominante se concentre sur les guerres, les traités, les pertes ou les gains territoriaux. En Turquie, chaque écolier mémorise visuellement une série de cartes – les terres de l'Empire ottoman s'y étendent ou s'y réduisent selon les mouvements des frontières à différentes époques. Au sein de ce grand récit, on porte peu d'attention aux êtres humains individuels. Si et lorsque des individus sont mentionnés dans les livres d'histoire, ils appartiennent à l'élite, tels les sultans, cheikhs et grands vizirs.
Albrecht Dürer, Famile tzigane (dit Famille turque), c.1496
Mais que ressentaient les gens 'ordinaires' pendant ces périodes de transformations sociales, économiques et politiques ? Quelle était la vie d'un orfèvre arménien, d'un meunier juif, d'un fabricant de chandelles circassien, d'un paysan yézidi, d'un colporteur kurde ou d'un soldat janissaire ? Même si l'Empire ottoman était multi-ethnique, multilingue et multiconfessionnel, on s'est beaucoup moins intéressé aux vies des sujets du sultan.
La Famille turque d’Albrecht Dürer est une œuvre inhabituelle qui représente un couple turc et leur petit enfant. L'homme et la femme se regardent, comme si la présence de l'un donnait de la force à l'autre. Seul le bébé regarde ailleurs, vers un lieu inconnu hors du cadre, s'interrogeant peut-être sur ce que pourrait être la vie au-delà.
Masque d’un turc utilisé comme visière
Tout au long du Moyen Âge, des informations fragmentaires à propos des Turcs circulaient à travers l'Europe. Si certaines permettaient d'approfondir connaissances et compréhension, d'autres ne servaient qu'à répandre la désinformation. Il y avait toutefois une curiosité bien réelle: à quoi ressemblait donc ‘l'ennemi’? À cette époque d'avant les moyens de communication de masse, les dessins et les récits offraient une réponse, tout comme parfois les masques.
Wolfgang Keiser (?), Melchior Pfeifer (?), Masque d’un turc utilisé comme visière, c.1555
Cet objet me fascine. L'expression en est saisissante. Il s'agit là du visage d'un homme plein de ressentiment et de rancœur, voire de rage. Le visage d'un homme qui peut rapidement se mettre en colère et même être tenté par la violence. Les yeux sont sombres et grands, les sourcils se lèvent en portant un jugement, la moustache – qui est aussi un signe de virilité – est proéminente et la bouche sévère.
Par définition, un masque est conçu pour cacher et remplacer la réalité par l'imaginaire. Ici au contraire, le masque sert à démontrer, affirmer, exhiber ‘le visage de l'Autre’. Je me demande combien de gens se sont donné la peine de soulever le masque et de rechercher la vérité ?
Your paper "Die Schuldenfrage lösen und die Investitionsschwäche bekämpfen -- Ein Vorschlag zur Überwindung der (griechischen) Schuldenproblematik im Euro-Raum" constitutes a bold and very interesting proposal. Please allow me to comment on some of the main arguments of your paper:
Did the unbalanced Greek economy create the debt or did the debt derail the economy?
Frankly, I am not very concerned about the current level of the Greek sovereign debt. I think the creditors will delay repayment of the principal ad calendas graecas and the interest rates will be minimal; in the end it will be a semantic rather than an economic issue whether the debts remain on the books or be erased. This fact has not been fully understood in Athens and Washington [well, the IMF considers the debt to be unsustainable…]. The generous conditions [??] offered by the creditors have practically relieved Greece of its debt [??]. I tend to agree with German finance minister Schaeuble that debts are not among Greece's main problems. After the next round of political elections, some Eurozone countries might be more prepared to consider a restructuring of Greece's nominal debt. [so it’s a problem after all…]
The IMF says the volume of the debt is unsustainable and demands a restructuring as a condition for participating in a third bailout deal. But according to agency news of July 30th, the Fund would also be satisfied if "the credit conditions be loosened" which is the line pursued by Chancellor Merkel. Most likely, the IMF will participate in bailout III.
This third bail-out program currently being discussed would take care of the payments Greece needs to make in the near future. Therefore, temporarily, Greece would be relieved of its debt. Afterwards there will be, no doubt, the "restructuring" which in practical terms means that the debts will be forgiven.
Everybody knows that Greece will never be able to repay its current debts but for this truth to sink in takes time (particularly in eastern and northern Europe). As regards the near future, the level of the debts is not likely to harm Greece's economic performance as Ugo Panizza and Andrea F Presbitero explained. Perhaps the IMF should take note of that and worry less.
I am more concerned with the present growth of the debts, especially the internal ones caused by delays of the Tsipras government in honoring its financial obligations. I think it will, even under favourable conditions, take considerable time to undo the economic contraction [that’s right] caused by the policies and actions of the Tsipras government [that’s debatable]. [Wich actions do you mean ? The government action has been MAINLY concentrated to “negociate” with the former Troïka].
Well, let us remember the actions to undo austerity actions by the preceding government: rehiring staff, reopening public TV, abolishing (at least temporarily) the real estate tax, undoing pension cuts etc. The Tsipras government was busy to live up to its pre-election promises.
Given the current distortion of the primary surplus by the rising level of domestic indebtedness. The institutions wisely refrained from setting a numeric target for the surplus [it is not exact; there is a target: 3,5% to be reached in 2018].
The official text (early July version) said: "The new fiscal path is premised on a primary surplus target of (1, 2, 3), and 3.5 percent of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018". However, Silvia Merlerlater reports that "the preliminary agreement of July 13th does not include a precise numeric target for the primary surplus".
Ein schwaches Produktionspotential - Die Produktion ist geringer als der Konsum (P<K) - Die Importe sind größer als die Exporte (M<X) Eine extreme Abhängigkeit von externer Finanzierung - Die Verschuldung ist nicht die Ursache der Probleme Griechenlands, sie ist das Ergebnis dieser Probleme
I am afraid, here I disagree. I believe Greece's current problems result from years of lavish deficit spending, resulting in a mountain of debts, public and private [it’s only half of the story; had the debt been used to build the economy, it would not be an issue].
Well, in a way, the economy has been built: Svimez (Associazione per lo sviluppo dell’industria nel Mezzogiorno) says in its annual report 2015 that Greece's economy from 2000 to 2013 grew by 24 percent whereas the largely similar southern part of Italy grew only 13 percent. Although by 2013 part of the Greek bubble had disappeared, there was still considerable growth left over but largely of the unsustainable kind.
Let us look at history:
Before WWII, Greece was a poor but self-sufficient agricultural community with 40 percent illiteracy (women 63% illiterate; 1939 statistics). Low level self-sufficiency (poverty) continued until the collapse of the military regime in 1974. From then on, Greece's economy and its modernization took off, unfortunately accompanied by increasing levels of corruption and clientelism or patronage. Even the supposedly "clean" Syriza administration soon showed the old vices. (I would not be surprised if future governments discovered that during Syriza's weeks of hectic efforts to stave off default, some millions went missing
The Greek industrial and even agricultural development till 1974 has been very low, indeed. This is due to the weak institutional setting. At the contrary of Germany or France, there is almost no industrial culture in Greece. The Greek “bourgeoisie” is a commercial one. This has led, as an illustration, to prefer to stimulate the importations instead of the national production.
It was not always like this. When Greece was still part of the Ottoman empire, Greek entrepreneurs dominated the world cigarette market, dominated in the restaurant business, not to speak of their global role in shipping.
Corruption and clientelism has been the thing of Nea Democratia and Pasok and this easily provable. About Syriza, we may speculate or think what we want. But for now there is no fact that would prove anything.
A cousin of Alexis Tsipras is focal point for international economic relations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
The Bureau Chief of Culture Minister Nikos Xydakis is Panagiotis Douros, brother of Rena Dourou, Governor of Attica.
Iphigenia Kamtsidou was made head of the National Center for Public Adminstration. She is friend of Justice Minister Paraskevopoulos
Evangelos und Giorgos Kalpadakis, nephews of Interior Minister Nikos Voutsis got jobs in Tsipras' diplomatic division and as bureau chief of Deputy Premier Dragasakis, respectively.
The weekly To Vima reported that the Minister for Administrative Reform Georgios Katrougalos' law firm concluded contracts with 300 former state employees obliging them to deliver 12 percent of their indemnity for former unemployment to the law firm if they are rehired. Etc. etc.
In 1981, Greece joined the European Community and began being showered with funding from Brussels, inviting all kinds of skulduggery. Propped up by the EU, Greece's status in credit rating improved, offering successive governments the potential to sell bonds at favorable conditions. In 2001 Greece adopted the Euro currency, obtained access to the European and global financial markets and their low interest levels, thereby opening the floodgates for more debts to be contracted.
And all this, without any form of reaction from the European authorities, even though they knew very well what was happening As well as Goldman Sachs was not only fully aware, but was powerfully involved in the falsification of Greek government accounts.
Right, of course. In Italy the case was similar but not as extreme. Political and geopolitical considerations prevailed over economic rationale -- a lesson, the Eurozone has learnt, belatedly. It will cost their taxpayers hundreds of billions of euros to be written off, probably after the next round of elections. The issue now is how to stop Greece from contracting more debts.
It was the availability of easy and cheap credit which derailed the Greek economy, not vice versa. The following years of plenty, of economic miracle, elevated Greece to a level of public and private consumption equal to that of advanced European countries, and sometimes even beyond. Imported foodstuffs, school buses, air conditioning, domestic servants, swimming pools, studying fancy subjects abroad, collecting modern art, pensions for unwed daughters, vacation homes at the beach -- everything was possible. Greeks refused to perform menial work which was passed to scores of legal and illegal immigrants. During these years Greece seemed like a Gulf emirate with sudden affluence based not on revenue but on easy credit. We agree, but only in part. All Greeks did not have domestic servants, swimming pools and so on. Just as all Greeks are not cheaters. But it may be more comfortable to think the “cicada way of life” is recorded in the Greek DNA…
Of course, not. Greece's Gini coefficient of wealth and income distribution is traditionally high and probably still rose during the boom years. Greek accounts in Switzerland, Greeks snapping up luxury flats in London -- the bourgeoisie took more of its share. Of course, not all Greeks are cheaters. Take any country, offer the people lucrative business deals and cheap and easy credit and you will get a boom similar to the past one in Greece. It's not a matter of DNA, it"s simply human.
When in 2008 and 2009 the crunch came, the Greek banks discovered themselves saddled with toxic loans, and the state faced a sovereign debt well beyond 100 percent of GDP. When the banks faced default they gambled like the Italian banks: they bought billions of government bonds which offered high interest rates, trusting that the Eurozone would prevent a Grexit and someone (the Greek state?) would eventually repay them.
Die griechische Wirtschaft ist todkrank, sie ist nicht mehr in der Lage, genügend Einkommen zu generieren, um die menschliche Not zu lindern, die Produktionsfaktoren zu entlohnen und den Schuldendienst zu leisten\
Well, this is a question of perspective. True, Greece's economy is currently generating a positive primary surplus because government expenditure shrank even faster than tax revenue [that shows the level of effort for the poorest segment of the population!].
germanpages.de wrote on this subject: "At a time when the world's tax haven countries are gradually losing their secrets, Greece seems ready to replace them. Not only are tax cheaters treated with generosity; the government is also shielding bank debtors by blocking foreclosures of properties under half a million euros' worth. Overall, Syriza's so-called reform agenda creates the impression of a party fighting for the well-to-do middle and upper classes. The poor among the Greeks can only dream of owning assets to the tune of 300,000 euros and their homes, if they own one, are certainly worth less than half a million euros."
An awful situation: citizens dodge taxes, the state shirks its obligations (see Silvia Merler's excellent piece). Greek payments due to creditors had to be funded by the creditors themselves by shifting funds from one account to another [with no real money going to Greece; so where are the “generous conditions” ??].
The bail-outs are not intended to provide Greece with money. They aim at postponing debt payments or paying debts that cannot be postponed, in order to satisfy lenders (including hedge funds) and saving endangered banks considered too big to fail. For Greece to get money, it must seek new loans, as it recently did by again applying to the IMF.
Still, I don't consider the Greek economy moribund [it’s not a matter of opinion, but of facts]. It is only out of tune with the new post-crunch reality. Once the dust settles, Greece will shift from a luxury-oriented, import-centered economy to a frugal, import substituting, export- and tourism-oriented economy. It will take time, investments and technical advice. But I am sure, the keen and well connected Greek business people will meet the challenge it they are offered a modern and efficient institutional framework. Das Schuldenproblem kann nicht durch einen im wesentlichen finanzpolitischen Ansatz gelöst werden. Denn die Schulden sind im Wesentlichen ein Problem der Wirtschaftsstruktur Griechenlands. Die größte Herausforderung für Griechenland -- Unverzüglich ein Modell zur Entwicklung seiner Produktion auf den Weg bringen -- Was aber ohne eine tragfähige Lösung für die Schuldenlast nicht möglich ist. As stated above, I think the debt problem has largely been solved through extremely long time horizons, generous debt servicing holidays and micro-level interest rates. If more action is needed to reduce the weight of the debts, even more favorable terms could be offered by the creditors, the German chancellor, Ms. Merkel, announced. Although, in my view, the debts were neither caused by Greece's economic structure, nor should they be seen as a problem in itself, I do agree that a model to develop domestic production is urgently needed and constitutes a major challenge for the country. Here (in italics) is the core point, which has to be addressed without any moralizing considerations.
It does not really matter who draws up the blueprint for Greece's industrial and agricultural revival: the Greeks themselves or the troika, or both together. No doubt, Greece has excellent economists and planners at its disposal and could very well draw up a plan. The issue is not the plan [we disagree: unfortunately, it is an issue]: it's the implementation [of course that is important too]. This is the point where the troika needs to get active again. I am afraid, the Greeks of Hellas, the patriate Greeks as it were, cannot be trusted to correctly implement a development plan. Too weak is their understanding of the state as a common venture. Too engrained is the urge to pursue clientele and even personal interests at the expense of the common good.
We do not think that the Troika is concerned with a plan for Greece's development. Concerning the Greek elites or “bourgeoisie”, we agree. But as regards the “Greeks of Hellas", the “patriate Greeks”: again a thing of DNA? We think one has to be very careful with such “arguments” or ways of thinking…
It's not a question of DNA. It is simply a result of centuries under Ottoman rule, of failed German-inspired monarchies, of a civil war which saw a minority win over what was probably the majority, of decades of unashamed cleptocracy -- how could in such a country grow any identification with the state?
Any plan would be fragmented and possibly loaded with pork in parliament. We do not understand what is meant here (in italics)???
Sorry, an American idiom. It means that any draft legislation presented in parliament will be used by lobbies or individuals to include benefits or exceptions for special groups.
Even if it passed parliament in recognizable shape, it could be manipulated by the administration, and some of its funding would evaporate before reaching its destination. I am sorry for sounding so negative. I believe the patriate Hellenes are not yet up to such an exercise. Fortunately, there are an estimated 10 million expatriate Greeks plus 840,000 Cypriot Greeks who could help. The Cypriots, as a heritage from their days as a British crown colony, have a much better developed concept of the state and could advise their brethren. Many diaspora Greeks would even consider it a duty and an honor to be called to help Hellas at a crucial time. And then, there are the creditors. In their own best interest they are willing to provide Athens with qualified advisers. These advisers on the payroll of the troika are a major gift to the Greek government. However, these advisers should also have executive powers [do you really think that this complete loss of sovereignty is THE solution for Greece?] to ensure that the plan is not sabotaged or misused in the jungle of the Greek bureaucracy.
Yes, unfortunately, today's Greek politicians and their top bureaucrats, not only Syriza's, have lost their credibility.
The bureaucracy
Without slashing and re-qualifying the administration at all levels, Greece will not be able to enter the 21st century and develop its economy. In addition to the existing unemployment among those who studied fancy subjects for which domestic demand has vanished; in addition to those who practiced rich-country professions which disappeared with the riches, there will be hundreds of thousands of state employees slated to lose their jobs. In recent years, many if not most of those who lost their government jobs used the emergency exit of early retirement: this way of substituting pension for payroll (and continuing to live at state expense) is now being abolished due to troika pressure. The problem is not only that redundant bureaucrats -- many of them political appointees without qualification and interest in their job -- will be fired. Many more must leave to create vacancies for the new, better qualified staff needed to render the administration and its public utilities efficient. Some of the old staff might be willing learn new skills (for instance use of computers [is there hard evidence they do not know how to use one and refuse to learn?]) through training; others will refuse to change their old ways. In any case, the unions, the old parties and the political Left will put up stiff resistance and the troika will have to exert utmost pressure to see the reforms implemented.
There is no hard evidence available but there is anecdotal material about the size and performance of the Greek bureaucracy.
We do not intend to justify the real existing bureaucracy and its ways to behave. But the real problem is wider: the lack of institutions. The French administration is quite strong and professional (at least in our opinion) but it works mainly because the French State is a very old one, having been built together with the French Nation (see the concept of “Etat/Nation”). Nothing similar happened in Greece. No chance for the Greek State to exist but only as a toy in foreign hands
I agree that the concept of the state is weak in Greece due to historical reasons. Also, the state has often been manipulated from abroad. British influence after WWII and during the civil war, American influence thereafter. The current salvaging operation is another case of foreign manipulation but this time many European countries are jointly involved and we should trust them that they are trying to find a solid and durable place for Greece in the Euro community.
Investment
It is a good idea to convert sovereign debt into investment certificates, provided the primary surplus is positive and will not be syphoned off for other purposes (for instance military expenditure).
The Greek government has proposed, on his own initiative, to reduce military investment. This proposal has been refused by some institutions. We wonder why.
Well, that's a somewhat complicated issue. Jean-Claude Juncker proposed to drop a 400 million euro pension cut demanded by the troika if Greece cut military expenditure by the same amount. The IMF was said to be opposed to such swapping deals but later denied its stance. Yannis Bournous of Syriza, not Greece, spoke of a possible 200 million euro cut of military expenditure. Defense Minister Panos Kammenos of the "Indipendent Greeks" party is opposed to cuts.
At present, no investment is taking place. Once the current crisis is overcome and the outlines of a new, stable and more efficient Greece appear on the horizon, potential investors will surface. Small scale, very small scale ventures would line up for investment certificate funding. Import substitution will become profitable for a wide range of goods ranging from feta cheese to mechanical spare parts. Since the government cannot protect fledgling industries by introducing customs duties, the new import substituting industries will have to be extremely competitive, which means low wages for Greeks, legal and illegal migrants [that’s where they are now]. Once they have established themselves in Greece they could probably also be competitive in neighboring Italy and elsewhere. The question of price competitiveness is no relevant here. To develop Greek agriculture and industry, the matter is to organize networks, to think long term strategies, to conceive and produce goods and services the population needs, which would respect the environment.
To sum up: I suppose the Greek GDP has already shrunk to the level it had attained before the euro was adopted. The bubble is gone. Wages are low enough not to pose a cost problem for future investments. The big hurdle for any investor remains the bureaucracy. Here, a revolution is needed, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Contrary to an opinion shared by Finance Minister Schaeuble, German economist Hans-Werner Sinn and many others, I don't think a Grexit would help Greece. All impetus to reform the country would instantly be lost. Greece would simply continue practicing its oriental ways of life with no prospect of returning to the Eurozone any time soon. Agriculture would by necessity be revived and import substitution would become the main objective of new industries, but at an overall income level not much different from that of neighboring Turkey or Romania. The Tsipras government has recognized these dire prospects and therefore decided to fight for continued membership in the Eurozone.
We do not comment further the cultural “arguments”.
The "oriental way of life" is no "cultural argument" possibly to be excluded from an economic discussion. Here is why:
Until the mid-1950s, the Greek economy was embedded in the Middle Eastern economy. Greek and Lebanese companies dominated the economy of Arab countries in the Fertile Crescent and Egypt. A few thousand Greeks still lived in Turkey. Even in the deep South, the catering company of the East African Railroad was Greek. Egypt's only wine was produced by a Greek firm, Gianaclis, the cigarettes were labeled Maspero and Toccos.
In April 1955, the Cypriot Greek assault on the Cyprus Turks created an opportunity for embattled Turkish President Adnan Menderes to provoke the anti-Greek pogrom of 6/7 September 1955 in Constantinople, Smyrna and Ankara which forced the last Greeks to flee. Around the same time, rising Nasserist nationalism in Arab countries convinced the ethnic Greeks to leave the respective country.
As Greece gradually lost the Middle East, European tourism offered new chances. Greece tried to move toward the West and North, and was later embraced by the European Union. However, the new orientation takes time to trickle through the society and change its time honored oriental ways of life.
Unfortunately, the decline of productive activities is not Greece specificity. This is why, we (in this case, Gabriel Colletis) have written in 2012 “L’urgence industrielle!”. We think that Germany’s situation is less bad than that of many other countries in Europe; this not because German administration is better organized or more professional, but because the German industry, at least for the moment, performs better. However structural problems in Germany should not be denied.
Written on .
Ein Vorschlag zur Überwindung der (griechischen) Schuldenproblematik im Euro-Raum
Sowohl ein Grexit als auch ein Scheitern der griechischen Regierung wären eine große Belastung für Europa. Dabei gibt es eine Alternative: Die Umwandlung der Schulden in Investitionsscheine
Nach nun bald acht Krisenjahren müssen sich die Europäer eingestehen, dass es sich in Griechenland nicht um ein „klassisches“ Problem verschlechterter Wettbewerbsfähigkeit wegen zu hoher Produktions- und Lohnkosten handelt. Eine solche Problemanalyse (Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Kostenstruktur) könnte für Frankreich zutreffen, sie kann zumindest teilweise die Situation in den anderen Krisenstaaten erklären, jedoch nicht in Griechenland.
Das grundsätzliche Problem Griechenlands liegt tiefer. Es handelt sich um den sehr starken Rückgang, teilweise sogar die völlige Abwesenheit industrieller und landwirtschaftlicher Produktion. Das griechische Schuldenproblem hat also mit der „Unterentwicklung“ Griechenlands zu tun und kann alleine über immer komplexere Finanzakrobatik nicht gelöst werden. Deshalb schlagen wir eine mittelfristige Lösung des griechischen Schuldenproblems vor, die über die Entwicklung und den Wideraufbau einer Produktionsstruktur in Griechenland erfolgt, oder genauer: über eine gemeinsame europäisch-griechische Entwicklungsstrategie.
Zu diesem Zweck schlagen wir die schrittweise Umwandlung der griechischen Staatsschulden in Investitionszertifikate vor. Diese sollen diejenigen Investitionen ergänzen, die der Juncker-Plan vorsieht. So würde bspw. ein deutsch-griechischer Gemeinschaftsfonds geschaffen, der in Griechenland mit dem Ziel industrieller Entwicklung investieren könnte. Den deutschen Unternehmen käme dies zugute, da sie die Produzenten der Exportgüter wären, in die dieser Fonds investiert. Die Ausweitung dieser Win-Win-Strategie auf andere Länder würde helfen, aus dem gefährlichen Schlamassel herauszufinden, in den das europäische Projekt durch die Schuldenlast geraten ist. Europa bekäme so wieder einen Sinn.
Zur Umsetzung dieser allgemeinen Orientierung schlagen wir die Schaffung von „Investitionsscheinen“ vor, die an Stelle der Schuldforderungen einzelner Staaten gegenüber anderen Staaten treten. Wir wollen unseren Vorschlag am Beispiel Deutschlands und Griechenlands illustrieren, genauer Deutschlands als Gläubiger Griechenlands. Unser Vorschlag setzt sich aus drei untrennbaren Teilen zusammen:
die Schaffung öffentlicher, bilateraler Investitionsfonds, die Schaffung von Investitionsscheinen, Solidarität und Vorverkaufsrecht
1. Die Schaffung öffentlicher, bilateraler Investitionsfonds
Über die Fonds würden verschiedene öffentliche Einrichtungen gleichberechtigt verfügen. In unserem Beispiel wären dies eine deutsche Einrichtung, etwa die Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), und die ihr entsprechende, griechische Institution, deren Schaffung soeben angekündigt worden ist. Die Schaffung solch eines Fonds wäre eine mit den besonderen Umständen begründete Ausnahme von den europäischen Beihilfe-Vorgaben. Er könnte mit der Aufgabe betraut werden, sich an produktiven Investitionen zu beteiligen, die darauf zielen, die griechische Industrie zu modernisieren, ihre Effizienz zu erhöhen, sie an einem Modell nachhaltiger Entwicklung für Mensch und Natur auszurichten und ihre Produktionskapazitäten in den im Außenhandel mit Deutschland besonders defizitären Sektoren zu erhöhen. Dieser Fonds würde von einer Expertengruppe geleitet, die Analysen vornimmt, Auswahlentscheidungen trifft und deren Umsetzung überwacht. Er könnte in bestehende griechische Unternehmen oder griechische Niederlassungen ausländischer Unternehmen investieren: in neue Joint Ventures, in Kreditvergaben oder Kapitalbeteiligungen (oder in eine Mischung aus beiden, das heißt in Beteiligungskredite, die als Eigenkapital verbucht werden könnten). Eine entscheidende, festzuschreibende Klausel sähe die Kontrollhoheit des griechischen Staates über diese Investitionen vor. Der Fonds würde, um in unserem Beispiel zu bleiben, solidarische Investitionen Deutschlands in Griechenland ermöglichen. Er würde sich in die Perspektive des Juncker-Plans zur Investitionsbelebung – der großen Maßnahme der EU-Kommission zur Ankurbelung des europäischen Wachstums – einfügen. Da solch ein Fonds dem Ziel des Juncker-Plans entspricht, könnte er die Zustimmung von EU-Kommission und europäischem Parlament erlangen. Diese Gemeinschaftsinvestitionen entsprächen dem Ziel, das Wirtschaftswachstum wiederanzukurbeln. Es ginge nämlich nicht einfach darum, Deutschland die Zahlung griechischer Schulden aufzubürden, sondern vielmehr darum, zu den Anstrengungen zum griechischen Wiederaufbau beizutragen, zugleich Deutschland schrittweise von seinen eingegangenen Verpflichtungen zu befreien und dabei seinen Unternehmen einen Vorteil zu verschaffen. Was die Finanzierung angeht, besteht unsere grundsätzliche Vorstellung darin, dass die Einlagen in den Investitionsfonds sich auf die Summe der von den Gläubigerländern abgeschriebenen Kredite belaufen. Die Beteiligung an dem Investitionsfonds soll dabei zur Hälfte vom Schuldnerstaat (in unserem Beispiel Griechenland) und zur Hälfte vom Gläubigerstaat (hier Deutschland) getragen werden. Deutschland hält derzeit 72,7 Milliarden Euro an griechischen Schulden. Davon 41,3 Milliarden unmittelbar und 31,4 Milliarden indirekt, v.a. über die Verpflichtungen gegenüber der Europäischen Zentralbank. Wenn Deutschland sich bereit erklären würde, die Hälfte seiner direkten Kredite, d.h. 20,65 Milliarden Euro, in Investitionsscheine mit einer Laufzeit von fünf Jahren umzuwandeln, wäre Griechenland in dieser Zeit pro Jahr von mehr als vier Milliarden Euro seiner Schuldenlast befreit. Dieses Geld stünde dann für produktive Investitionen zur Verfügung. Die vier Milliarden Euro, d.h. etwa zwei Prozent des Bruttoinlandsprodukts, würden jedes Jahr mit Hilfe des gemeinsamen Fonds investiert.
2. Die Schaffung von Investitionszertifikaten
Die Kapitalausstattung des Investitionsfonds, die sich aus den so umgewandelten Krediten speiste, würde gleichmäßig zwischen Griechenland und Deutschland aufgeteilt werden. Der realisierte Gewinn würde vordringlich die deutschen Verbindlichkeiten in dem Fonds ausgleichen und bestenfalls ihren Gesamtumfang tilgen. Dieses Vorgehen stellt nichts anderes als den Rückgriff auf einen klassischen Umstrukturierungsmechanismus dar: Die Verwandlung von Schulden in Eigenkapital (equity) ist eine Routineoperation. Wenn es sich um private Schulden handelt, besteht die Schwierigkeit darin, einen oder mehrere Gläubiger zu finden, die zur Fortentwicklung ihres Risikos bereit sind, vom Risiko ausbleibender Kapitalrückzahlung zum Risiko eines Verlustes des gesamten oder eines Teils des Kapitals. Im vorliegenden Fall sind die Gläubiger Staaten, die ihrer Forderungen verlustig gehen könnten, wenn Griechenland zusammenbräche. Nach unserem Vorschlag würden sich diese Staaten nun nicht mehr dem Risiko des Totalverlusts aussetzen, sondern ihre Schuldforderungen in Investitionsscheine umwandeln, d.h. in eine Form des Kapitals, die gemäß einer Logik solidarischer Entwicklung Griechenland, aber auch den heimischen Industrien zu gute käme.
3. Solidarität und Vorverkaufsrecht
Eine unmittelbare Gegenleistung für die Staaten, die an dem System teilnähmen, wäre ein Vorverkaufsrecht für Exporte nach Griechenland. Dieses Vorverkaufsrecht würde den Unternehmen zugute kommen, die mehrheitlich in den teilnehmenden Ländern angesiedelt sind. Wenn die Investitionen einmal getätigt sind, würden sie automatisch zu Käufen von Ausstattungsgütern und Anlagen, die kurz- oder mittelfristig nicht in Griechenland hergestellt werden können, bei Unternehmen der Länder führen, die im Besitz der Investitionsscheine sind. Das ist die Technik des Marshallplans: Ein Dollar „Hilfszahlung“ fungiert doppelt – als Geldbeschaffung und Subvention des Kaufs von Ausstattung und Anlagen. Eine so organisierte europäische Solidarität ist nicht selbstlos: Für jeden Euro, um den die Schuldenlast erleichtert, bzw. der in produktive Investitionen in Griechenland umgewandelt wird, entstünde ein entsprechendes Vorverkaufsrecht in Höhe von einem Euro für die Unternehmen, deren Länder an dem System beteiligt sind. Hier würden Solidarität und ökonomisches Eigeninteresse nahtlos zusammengehen.
4. Offene Fragen
Man wird uns vorhalten, dass das vorgeschlagene System den derzeitigen europäischen Regeln (Wettbewerbsfreiheit und Beihilfeverbot) zuwider läuft und dass es schwer werden dürfte, teilnahmebereite Unternehmen zu finden. Wir stellen demgegenüber die Frage, ob das Wettbewerbsrecht nicht weiterentwickelt werden sollte, damit es nicht zu einem Hemmnis für ein zugleich stärkeres und solidarischeres Europa wird. Und was die Unternehmen anbelangt, die an dem System teilnehmen könnten, liegt es in ihrem Interesse, von den Möglichkeiten dieser Ausnahmeregelung zu profitieren und dafür unter Beweis zu stellen, dass sie die Teilnahmebedingungen erfüllen. Die exportstarken mittelständischen Maschinen- und Anlagenbauer aus Baden-Württemberg, Bayern oder Sachsen mit ihren hochspezialisierten Produkten, die bereits jetzt häufig auf die Sicherheiten der KfW zurückgreifen, hätten an diesem System bestimmt Interesse. Das Gleiche gilt für die französischen Unternehmen, die heute bereits weltweit erfolgreich große Infrastrukturprojekte planen und umsetzen. Wir wetten darauf, dass der Kontakt zwischen der Regierung, den griechischen Unternehmen und diesen Industriellen äußerst fruchtbar wäre. Schließlich wird man uns entgegenhalten, dass solch ein System nur den europäischen Regeln entspräche, wenn alle EU-Mitglieder entsprechend ihres Bruttoinlandsprodukts beteiligt wären. Allerdings zeigt die Erfahrung, dass es in einem Europa der 28 nahezu unmöglich geworden ist, substantielle Entscheidungen zu treffen – erst recht, wenn es sich um substantielle Fortschritte handeln soll. Einstimmigkeit ist der sicherste Weg in die Ohnmacht, und es handelt sich jetzt darum, die Möglichkeiten der verstärkten Zusammenarbeit und weiterer Verfahren, die für Ausnahmesituationen bereits im EU-Vertrag vorgesehen sind, zu nutzen. Natürlich hat jedes Land die Freiheit zu entscheiden, ob es an einem derartigen System teilnehmen möchte. Die von uns vorgeschlagene Regelung muss außerdem derart allgemein sein, dass sie auch auf Spanien, Portugal oder Italien Anwendung finden kann. Unser Vorschlag lautet entsprechend, einen Rahmen und Mittel zu schaffen, die nicht nur helfen sollen, die griechische Krise zu überwinden. Es geht vielmehr darum, eine konkrete Perspektive auf ein solidarischeres Europa zu schaffen, die durch wirtschaftliche Eigendynamik verwirklicht wird. Damit befinden wir uns in der Tradition großer europäischer Projekte, wie in der Vergangenheit dem Schumanplan oder dem Delors-Paket und der Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte.
Gabriel Colletis, Jean-Philippe Robé und Robert Salais
Gabriel Colletis Professor für Volkswirtschaft an der Universität Toulouse-Capitole
Jean-Philippe Robé Rechtsanwalt der Kammern von Paris und New York und Spezialist für internationale Umstrukturierungsprogramme
Robert Salais Fellow 2005-2006 am Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (WIKO) und wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Forschungsdirektor am französischen Centre National de Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
Aus dem Französischen von Kolja Lindner
(Eine frühere Version dieses Textes erschien im deutschen Magazin "Capital" unter dem Titel "Ein Marshallplan für Griechenland")
Comment
Your paper "Die Schuldenfrage lösen und die Investitionsschwäche bekämpfen -- Ein Vorschlag zur Überwindung der (griechischen) Schuldenproblematik im Euro-Raum" constitutes a bold and very interesting proposal. Please allow me to comment on some of the main arguments of your paper:
Did the unbalanced Greek economy create the debt or did the debt derail the economy?
Frankly, I am not very concerned about the current level of the Greek sovereign debt. I think the creditors will delay repayment of the principal ad calendas graecas and the interest rates will be minimal; in the end it will be a semantic rather than an economic issue whether the debts remain on the books or be erased. This fact has not been fully understood in Athens and Washington. The generous conditions offered by the creditors have practically relieved Greece of its debt. I tend to agree with German finance minister Schaeuble that debts are not among Greece's main problems. After the next round of political elections, some Eurozone countries might be more prepared to consider a restructuring of Greece's nominal debt.
I am more concerned with the present growth of the debts, especially the internal ones caused by delays of the Tsipras government in honoring its financial obligations. I think it will, even under favourable conditions, take considerable time to undo the economic contraction caused by the policies and actions of the Tsipras government. Given the current distortion of the primary surplus by the rising level of domestic indebtedness. the institutions wisely refrained from setting a numeric target for the surplus.
Ein schwaches Produktionspotential - Die Produktion ist geringer als der Konsum (P<K) - Die Importe sind größer als die Exporte (M<X) Eine extreme Abhängigkeit von externer Finanzierung - Die Verschuldung ist nicht die Ursache der Probleme Griechenlands, sie ist das Ergebnis dieser Probleme
I am afraid, here I disagree. I believe Greece's current problems result from years of lavish deficit spending, resulting in a mountain of debts, public and private. Let us look at history:
Before WWII, Greece was a poor but self-sufficient agricultural community with 40 percent illiteracy (women 63% illiterate; 1939 statistics). Low level self-sufficiency (poverty) continued until the collapse of the military regime in 1974. From then on, Greece's economy and its modernization took off, unfortunately accompanied by increasing levels of corruption and clientelism or patronage. Even the supposedly "clean" Syriza administration soon showed the old vices. (I would not be surprised if future governments discovered that during Syriza's weeks of hectic efforts to stave off default, some millions went missing.)
In 1981, Greece joined the European Community and began being showered with funding from Brussels, inviting all kinds of skulduggery. Propped up by the EU, Greece's status in credit rating improved, offering successive governments the potential to sell bonds at favorable conditions. In 2001 Greece adopted the Euro currency, obtained access to the European and global financial markets and their low interest levels, thereby opening the floodgates for more debts to be contracted.
It was the availability of easy and cheap credit which derailed the Greek economy, not vice versa. The following years of plenty, of economic miracle, elevated Greece to a level of public and private consumption equal to that of advanced European countries, and sometimes even beyond. Imported foodstuffs, school buses, air conditioning, domestic servants, swimming pools, studying fancy subjects abroad, collecting modern art, pensions for unwed daughters, vacation homes at the beach -- everything was possible. Greeks refused to perform menial work which was passed to scores of legal and illegal immigrants. During these years Greece seemed like a Gulf emirate with sudden affluence based not on revenue but on easy credit.
When in 2008 and 2009 the crunch came, the Greek banks discovered themselves saddled with toxic loans, and the state faced a sovereign debt well beyond 100 percent of GDP. When the banks faced default they gambled like the Italian banks: they bought billions of government bonds which offered high interest rates, trusting that the Eurozone would prevent a Grexit and someone (the Greek state?) would eventually repay them.
Die griechische Wirtschaft ist todkrank, sie ist nicht mehr in der Lage, genügend Einkommen zu generieren, um die menschliche Not zu lindern, die Produktionsfaktoren zu entlohnen und den Schuldendienst zu leisten
Well, this is a question of perspective. True, Greece's economy is currently generating a positive primary surplus because government expenditure shrank even faster than tax revenue. An awful situation: citizens dodge taxes, the state shirks its obligations (see Silvia Merler's excellent piece). Greek payments due to creditors had to be funded by the creditors themselves by shifting funds from one account to another.
Still, I don't consider the Greek economy moribund. It is only out of tune with the new post-crunch reality. Once the dust settles, Greece will shift from a luxury-oriented, import-centered economy to a frugal, import substituting, export- and tourism-oriented economy. It will take time, investments and technical advice. But I am sure, the keen and well connected Greek business people will meet the challenge it they are offered a modern and efficient institutional framework.
Das Schuldenproblem kann nicht durch einen im wesentlichen finanzpolitischen Ansatz gelöst werden. Denn die Schulden sind im Wesentlichen ein Problem der Wirtschaftsstruktur Griechenlands. Die größte Herausforderung für Griechenland -- Unverzüglich ein Modell zur Entwicklung seiner Produktion auf den Weg bringen -- Was aber ohne eine tragfähige Lösung für die Schuldenlast nicht möglich ist.
As stated above, I think the debt problem has largely been solved through extremely long time horizons, generous debt servicing holidays and micro-level interest rates. If more action is needed to reduce the weight of the debts, even more favorable terms could be offered by the creditors, the German chancellor, Ms. Merkel, announced. Although, in my view, the debts were neither caused by Greece's economic structure, nor should they be seen as a problem in itself, I do agree that a model to develop domestic production is urgently needed and constitutes a major challenge for the country.
It does not really matter who draws up the blueprint for Greece's industrial and agricultural revival: the Greeks themselves or the troika, or both together. No doubt, Greece has excellent economists and planners at its disposal and could very well draw up a plan. The issue is not the plan: it's the implementation.
This is the point where the troika needs to get active again. I am afraid, the Greeks of Hellas, the patriate Greeks as it were, cannot be trusted to correctly implement a development plan. Too weak is their understanding of the state as a common venture. Too engrained is the urge to pursue clientele and even personal interests at the expense of the common good. Any plan would be fragmented and possibly loaded with pork in parliament. Even if it passed parliament in recognizable shape, it could be manipulated by the administration, and some of its funding would evaporate before reaching its destination.
I am sorry for sounding so negative. I believe the patriate Hellenes are not yet up to such an exercise. Fortunately, there are an estimated 10 million expatriate Greeks plus 840,000 Cypriot Greeks who could help. The Cypriots, as a heritage from their days as a British crown colony, have a much better developed concept of the state and could advise their brethren. Many diaspora Greeks would even consider it a duty and an honor to be called to help Hellas at a crucial time.
And then, there are the creditors. In their own best interest they are willing to provide Athens with qualified advisers. These advisers on the payroll of the troika are a major gift to the Greek government. However, these advisers should also have executive powers to ensure that the plan is not sabotaged or misused in the jungle of the Greek bureaucracy.
The bureaucracy
Without slashing and re-qualifying the administration at all levels, Greece will not be able to enter the 21st century and develop its economy. In addition to the existing unemployment among those who studied fancy subjects for which domestic demand has vanished; in addition to those who practiced rich-country professions which disappeared with the riches, there will be hundreds of thousands of state employees slated to lose their jobs. In recent years, many if not most of those who lost their government jobs used the emergency exit of early retirement: this way of substituting pension for payroll (and continuing to live at state expense) is now being abolished due to troika pressure.
The problem is not only that redundant bureaucrats -- many of them political appointees without qualification and interest in their job -- will be fired. Many more must leave to create vacancies for the new, better qualified staff needed to render the administration and its public utilities efficient. Some of the old staff might be willing learn new skills (for instance use of computers) through training; others will refuse to change their old ways. In any case, the unions, the old parties and the political Left will put up stiff resistance and the troika will have to exert utmost pressure to see the reforms implemented.
Investment
It is a good idea to convert sovereign debt into investment certificates, provided the primary surplus is positive and will not be syphoned off for other purposes (for instance military expenditure). At present, no investment is taking place. Once the current crisis is overcome and the outlines of a new, stable and more efficient Greece appear on the horizon, potential investors will surface. Small scale, very small scale ventures would line up for investment certificate funding. Import substitution will become profitable for a wide range of goods ranging from feta cheese to mechanical spare parts. Since the government cannot protect fledgling industries by introducing customs duties, the new import substituting industries will have to be extremely competitive, which means low wages for Greeks, legal and illegal migrants. Once they have established themselves in Greece they could probably also be competitive in neighboring Italy and elsewhere.
Conclusions
To sum up: I suppose the Greek GDP has already shrunk to the level it had attained before the euro was adopted. The bubble is gone. Wages are low enough not to pose a cost problem for future investments. The big hurdle for any investor remains the bureaucracy. Here, a revolution is needed, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
Contrary to an opinion shared by Finance Minister Schaeuble, German economist Hans-Werner Sinn and many others, I don't think a Grexit would help Greece. All impetus to reform the country would instantly be lost. Greece would simply continue practicing its oriental ways of life with no prospect of returning to the Eurozone any time soon. Agriculture would by necessity be revived and import substitution would become the main objective of new industries, but at an overall income level not much different from that of neighboring Turkey or Romania. The Tsipras government has recognized these dire prospects and therefore decided to fight for continued membership in the Eurozone.
Heinrich von Loesch
P.S.
Some thoughts about the economic revival needed in Greece
As is well known, Greece suffers from very high unemployment, especially among the youngest and the oldest. If the troika succeeds in enforcing the current set of reforms, hundreds of thousands more will lose their jobs, especially half or two thirds of all employees of the government, government owned utilities and government-dominated banks. The extent of the new poverty will enormously increase if the reforms are implemented as planned.
Some unemployment of the elderly will be absorbed by the pension system; some unemployment among the young and the highly skilled will be exported through emigration. But for the large rest the only hope is in a rapid economic revival which absorbs large number of workers and clerical staff, as it happened in Portugal and Spain. What are the chances for an economic revival in Greece?
Greece has a few natural and historic advantages which could be exploited.
First, there is the sea, Η θάλασσα.
Greek aquaculture is very successful in exporting to Italy where it is firmly established as the second source of fresh farmed fish after domestic suppliers. Greece produces about half of all sea bass and bream consumed worldwide. However, Turkish aquaculture is catching up and dominates in Germany thanks to the many Turkish supermarkets. In principle, with reduced labor costs, Greek fish farming should be able to expand its exports. But like other industries in Greece, aquaculture companies are now stumbling under the weight of easy credit they piled up during two decades of fast expansion the 1980s and 90s. The collapse of the banking system renders refinancing almost impossible.
Another gift of the sea are the refugees. With currently more refugees arriving in Greece than in Italy, the Dodekanese islands are overwhelmed. Hellas is already overpopulated with foreigners. While many seasonal and menial labor from abroad left after the crunch and returned to their countries, the rapid increase in refugee influx creates an intolerable burden on the country already struggling with new poverty and shortages of all kinds.
In the coming negotiations between the government and the troika, Athens could make a strong case for being compensated for hosting the refugees. In practical terms: the European Union (not the Eurozone) should pay Greece an indemnity for every refugee-month registered. This indemnity should be generous enough to recoup not only the cost to accommodate, clothe, feed and train (language, vocational skills) the refugees but include an overhead element to cover the cost of administrative work, policing etc. In other words: for Greece, the refugees should be converted from a liability to an asset.
The traditional shipping sectoris endangered. The turmoil in Greece, a left-wing government with anti-capitalistic reflexes, the threat of new taxes and the fear of an imminent Grexit are driving shipping companies owning the world's second largest commercial fleet away from Greece. Since most of the hardware is already registered abroad, all it takes is relocating the head office to a safer and friendly country such as Cyprus.
But it's not only an issue of shipping: the ship building industry is also involved. As Loretta Napoleoni, an Italian economist, explained, the Greek shipbuilders were driven out of Greece shortly after year 2000 because of an ill-conceived regulation from Brussels. After a troubled Greek tanker in 2002 was not permitted to enter Spanish ports for fear that its hull could break and cause a disastrous oil spill, Brussels ordered that all tankers should be double hulled. Greek shipping companies operating 19 percent of the world commercial fleet could not face the enormous investment required. The Greek government refused to help; the Greek banks were too small to lend the funds.
Instead, the shipping companies were offered credit by Asian banks with low interest rates subsidized by their governments, under the condition that the work be conducted in Asian shipyards. That's how the Greek ship building industry lifted its anchors and moved to Japan, China and Korea, Napoleoni says. The story of Greek de-industrialization is long and sad. The ports of Piraeus and Salonica are for sale to be snapped up by the Chinese and, likely, the Russians.
In agriculture, another important sector, the situation is not much better. Although Greece with its long, dry summers is able to produce excellent quality fruit and vegetables, very little produce is exported. Apart from asparagus and olive oil, hardly any Greek product makes it to European supermarkets. Greek olives were traditionally exported to Italy to be processed there but many small Greek oil mills have in recent years started exporting under their own brands. Sadly, the quality of the oil leaves much to be desired; usually, Greek oil cannot compete with Italian market leaders on price, quality and brand recognition. With help from Brussels, the government should be able to improve and standardize the quality.
Regarding fruit and vegetables, Greek exports to Europe are hampered by the long and dangerous routes through the Balkan countries. However, Turkish companies succeed in being competitive with Italians and Spaniards by overcoming transport problems thanks to the large volume of their exports.
Generally speaking, Greek agricultural exports should specialize in high quality niche products such as asparagus. At the bulk level, Greece will not be able to compete with Turkey, Egypt or Morocco. Government-sponsored marketing boards for farm products in importing EU countries could advise their Greek opposite numbers on niches to be explored and possibly filled. Fresh farmed fish and seafood would be products to start with. Whatever happened to the famous Greek honey which once could claim to be Europe's best? What about the red Naoussa wines? Usually, economists say that Greek products are too expensive because of the euro currency and only a Grexit would solve the problem. That is hard to believe because Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands are powerful exporters of farm products despite the euro.
-- ed
Written on .
L’accordo preliminare del 13 luglio tra la Grecia e i suoi creditori non contiene nessun obiettivo numerico preciso per l’avanzo primario. Il target già fissato sembra ora difficile da raggiungere per il crollo delle entrate fiscali. E questo peserà sul negoziato per il terzo programma di aiuti.
I numeri di Atene
Il ministero delle Finanze greco pubblica ogni mese i dati sul bilancio consuntivo dello Stato, come già ricordato (quiequi). Si tratta di numeri compilati in base al principio di cassa, quindi particolarmente adatti a valutare la situazione delle finanze pubbliche dal punto di vista dell’esigenza di finanziamento di breve periodo. Inoltre, permettono di comparare i risultati effettivi con quelli attesi ex ante. Da gennaio a questa parte, la Grecia ha un avanzo primario, significativamente superiore alle aspettative. Nei primi sei mesi dell’anno, l’avanzo primario registrato è stato di 1,9 miliardi, contro un deficit di 1,2 miliardi atteso. In termini cumulativi, l’avanzo primario è stato di 3,1 miliardi superiore agli obiettivi (figura 1)
Grafico 1– Avanzo primario della Grecia
Il problema è che da marzo a oggi, l’avanzo primario è stato principalmente il frutto di una compressione della spesa, perché le entrate sono crollate subito dopo le elezioni politiche. Nonostante un modesto aumento a giugno, le entrate cumulate per i primi sei mesi dell’anno restano di 906 milioni in difetto rispetto a quanto previsto. Le spese cumulate tra gennaio e giugno 2015 sono invece di circa 4 miliardi inferiori al previsto (nel solo mese di giugno, i tagli rispetto al target sono stati di 1 miliardo e mezzo). Il contenimento della spesa è in gran parte il risultato di ritardi nei pagamenti da parte dello stato al settore privato, una circostanza che, in un paese nelle condizioni della Grecia, non fa che peggiorare la tendenza recessiva. Per mettere le cose in prospettiva, la Commissione europea ha recentemente rivisto le stime di crescita del Pil reale al ribasso. Per la Grecia quest’anno la crescita è stimata in territorio negativo, tra -2 e -4 per cento, mentre nelle proiezioni di autunno 2014 le attese erano per +2,9 per cento e ancora in quelle della primavera 2015 si attestavano sul +0,5 per cento.
Grafico 2– Entrate complessive, spesa e avanzo primario della Grecia – Dati reali e target (miliardi di euro)
I dati di giugno non includono ancora il pieno effetto delle restrizioni a prelievi bancari e movimenti di capitale, imposte a fine mese per contrastare la corsa agli sportelli pre e post-referendum. I numeri di luglio saranno perciò particolarmente interessanti perché mostreranno gli effetti di queste misure, ma anche perché luglio è il mese più importante dal punto di vista delle entrate, in Grecia (figura 3).
Grafico 3– Imposte per mese e avanzo primario complessivo in Grecia – 2014 (miliardi di euro)
Verso il terzo programma di aiuti
La Grecia e i suoi creditori europei hanno concluso lunedì 13 luglio 2015 un accordo temporaneo, che prevede un prestito di circa 7 miliardi e in contropartita l’approvazione da parte del parlamento greco di una serie di misure preliminari. Questi soldi sono effettivamente stati trasferiti e usati il 22 luglio per ripagare il bond greco in scadenza lunedì e detenuto dalla Banca centrale europea, nonché gli arretrati dovuti al Fondo monetario internazionale. Si tratta però di una situazione estremamente precaria. Secondo le stime incluse nel testo dell’accordo del 13 luglio, la Grecia ha bisogno di altri 5 miliardi soltanto in agosto, per ripagare un’ulteriore quota in scadenza del suo debito verso Bce e Fmi. Per far fronte a questi impegni, la negoziazione di un terzo programma di aiuto alla Grecia dovrebbe avvenire nella maniera più rapida possibile. Ma sul negoziato peserà probabilmente il tracollo nelle previsioni di crescita. La revisione al ribasso della crescita del Pil e il crollo delle entrate fiscali – dovuto probabilmente in parte all’incertezza post-elettorale e post-referendum – fanno sì che oggi il target di avanzo primario all’1 per cento del Pil nel 2015, concordato negli ultimi mesi tra Grecia e creditori, sia un obiettivo molto ottimista. Questo è probabilmente il motivo per cui l’accordo preliminare del 13 luglio non contiene nessun target numerico preciso per l’avanzo primario, una variabile che in questi mesi è stata al centro delle negoziazioni e che ora potrebbe rallentare anche il nuovo negoziato.
President Lyndon B. Johnson signing the Medicare Bill at the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence,Missouri, with former President Harry S. Truman, July 30, 1965. (photo: Lyndon Baines Johnson Library)
House Republicans are still making Medicare vouchers and Medicaid block grants their official policy goals, and they are still wildly out of step with public opinion on these two programs. With this month's 50th anniversary of these two programs, Kaiser Family Foundation has released its most recent survey about American attitudes toward them. They find that the programs are as important to and popular with Americans as ever, and that congressional Republicans' policies are supported only by a narrow band of fellow Republicans.
Medicare is very important to 77 percent of people, with only Social Security ranked as more important (at 83 percent) and Medicaid is very important to 63 percent (tied roughly with student loans).
Republicans identify these programs as either very important or important: 96 percent for Medicare, 86 percent for Medicaid. (Those numbers for Democrats are 99 percent and 97 percent, respectively.)
Sixty percent say Medicare is an effective program (jumping to 75 percent for people actually Medicare) and 50 percent say Medicaid is effective (jumping to 65 percent of Medicaid recipients).
Medicare is personally important to 76 percent of all people (and 71 percent of Republicans) and Medicaid to 51 percent to all (though only 35 percent of Republicans).
The rhetoric of critics has taken a toll: more than half—54 percent—are concerned about Medicare's future.
This is where it gets interesting. "When asked about several specific proposals, this survey finds strong public support [upward of 88 percent] across age groups and party lines for allowing the federal government to negotiate lower prices with drug companies. About six in ten (58 percent) favor increasing Medicare premiums for wealthier seniors, but much fewer (31 percent) support increasing Medicare premiums for all seniors." What's really unpopular? A voucher system, which only gets 26 percent support. Only 31 percent of Republicans support vouchers! With Medicaid, only 32 percent of the general population supports the idea of block grants, though it rises to 50 percent with Republicans.
Meanwhile, just 44 percent of the population trusts Democrats more than Republicans on Medicare, and 46 percent on Medicaid. Which is pretty much insane and absolutely reiterates why Democrats need to be making these programs—including Social Security—key issues. They're among the most important issues for the whole country, including Republicans!
Democrats need to be not just holding the line on these programs, but talking about strengthening and expanding them. They need to be taking every opportunity to show just how destructive and extreme the Republican vision for these cherished programs is. Clearly, Democrats have a lot to gain by doing so since not even 50 percent of the population recognizes that contrast.
