Seit seinem Amtsantritt beschäftigt Donald Trump Amerika und die Welt mit Dekreten, die die Einreise der Bewohner von sieben überwiegend moslemischen Ländern verhindern sollen. Das erste Dekret wurde von Gerichten in zwei Instanzen ausser Vollzug gesetzt; ein zweites, etwas entschärftes Dekret wird derzeit innerhalb der Regierung auf seine Verfassungs-Verträglichkeit geprüft. Kritiker monieren, dass von den sieben Ländern keine Gefahr für die USA ausgehe. Dieses Argument ist richtig und falsch zugleich.

   Richtig ist, dass bislang kein Terrorakt in den USA von einem Bürger dieser Länder verübt wurde. Falsch ist an diesem Argument, dass beispielsweise Somalis, Jemeniten und Sudanesen in salafistischen Terrorzirkeln aktiv sind, und niemand garantieren kann, dass sie weiterhin auf Aktivitäten in den USA verzichten werden.

   Doch die Diskussion über diese Frage ist Spiegelfechterei, denn Trump geht es – nach allem, was wir bislang wissen – garnicht um die Terrorbekämpfung, die er so lauthals verkündet. Im Gegenteil brächte ein neuer islamistischer Terrorakt Wasser auf Trumps Mühle. Er erfindet sogar Terrorakte, die es garnicht gab.  Der Terror ist das Vehikel, mit dem Trump und seine Leute ihr eigentliches Ziel zu erreichen versuchen, nämlich ein Verbot des Islams in Amerika.

   Rudy Giuliani, der schwatzhafte ex-Bürgermeister von New York und Trump-Fan der ersten Stunde, liess die Katze aus dem Sack als er erklärte, Trump habe ihn gebeten, einen rechtlich gangbaren Weg für ein Islam-Verbot zu finden. Beide seien sich klar darüber, dass die amerikanische Verfassung zwar ein Verbot nicht erlaube, doch solle er, Giuliani, einen Weg finden, diese Schranke zu umgehen.

   Warum ein Islam-Verbot? Die Minderheit der Moslems ist klein. Es gibt weniger Moslems (0.9 %) als Juden (2 %) in den USA. Anders als in Europa, wo starke moslemische Bevölkerungen in allen Staaten die Regierungen und die Öffentlichkeit zwingen, auf sie Rücksicht zu nehmen, rüsten sich in Amerika aggressive christliche Gruppen zum Kampf gegen den Islam.

   Aus ihrer Perspektive muss man zumindest im eigenen Land diese mit Terror infizierte Religion verbieten können. Trump und sein Mentor Steve Bannon sind Sprachrohre dieser Gruppen, die überwiegend protestantisch sind, aber auch von katholischen Sympathisanten unterstützt werden. Nicht nur Rechtsausleger-Medien wie Infowars und World Net Daily unterstützen diese Bewegung, sondern auch mächtige Fernseh- und Radio-Prediger, die vor allem ländlichen Gebieten meinungsbildend wirken.

   In einem so fromm christlichen Land wie den USA hat sich, aller traditionellen religiösen Toleranz zum Trotz, spätestens seit 9/11 ein latenter Hass auf den aggressiven Islam aufgestaut, der dort intensiv ist, wo den meisten Amerikanern vor allem in ländlichen Gebieten jener direkte persönliche Kontakt mit Moslems fehlt, der in Europa viele Ängste, Spannungen und Wahnvorstellungen abzubauen hilft.

   Auch in Amerika gilt: je geringer der Anteil der Moslems an der Bevölkerung, desto radikaler die Ansichten der Mehrheit. Da wird ohne Zögern von einem Kreuzzug gesprochen, den es weltweit gegen den Islam zu führen gilt. Drohungen von Präsident Trump, er wolle den Islamischen Staat in Syrien und Irak vernichten, kann man durchaus als Anzahlung auf einen solchen Kreuzzug verstehen.

   Die starken Proteste in der amerikanischen Öffentlichkeit gegen Trumps Einreisesperre für Moslems sollten nicht überbewertet werden: das islamfeindliche Ticket, auf dem Trump ins Weisse Haus gelangt ist, hat ihm wahrscheinlich viele Wähler zugeführt, die ihn sonst wegen seiner Affären, Lügen und Aufschneiderei abgelehnt hätten.

   Nicht bedacht wird bei Trumps Bemühungen, die Einreise von Moslems zu behindern, dass das anglophone Amerika Einwanderer aus islamischen Ländern brauchen wird, wenn es die schleichende Hispanisierung bremsen will. Asiaten und Araber lehnen mehrheitlich Spanisch als Sprache der Wahl ab; sie bilden ein Gegengewicht zu den Latinos, die zum Ärger der anglophonen Trump-Fans in immer mehr Bundesstaaten die sprachliche Gleichberechtigung des Spanischen anstreben. 

 

-- ed

 

La disuguaglianza economica è un tema di grande attualità. Ma quali sono le sue dinamiche di lungo periodo? Tra il 1300 e oggi, la tendenza è stata all’aumento costante. Con due eccezioni: il periodo immediatamente successivo alla peste nera del 1348 e quello compreso tra le due guerre mondiali.

La disuguaglianza nell’Italia preindustriale

    Negli ultimi anni, le dinamiche di lungo periodo della disuguaglianza economica sono tornate al centro dell’attenzione. Almeno per alcune aree dell’Europa, possiamo ricostruire l’evoluzione della disuguaglianza a partire dal 1300 circa. In questo ambito, l’Italia svolge un ruolo fondamentale non solo per le eccezionali fonti storiche di cui dispone, ma anche grazie alle attività di un progetto Erc ospitato dall’Università Bocconi: Einite-Economic Inequality across Italy and Europe, 1300-1800.

    Il progetto ha già prodotto accurate ricostruzioni per alcune regioni italiane (Piemonte, Veneto, Toscana, Puglia), ciascuna appartenente a un diverso stato preunitario. In tutte queste aree, durante l’età moderna la disuguaglianza economica ha teso a crescere costantemente. Nella figura 1 sono riportati gli indici di Gini della disuguaglianza di ricchezza (0 = perfetta eguaglianza, 1 = perfetta disuguaglianza: un solo individuo o famiglia detiene tutta la ricchezza). Le misure riportate fanno riferimento alla ricchezza, ma nel contesto delle società agrarie preindustriali è difficile immaginare che nel medio-lungo periodo la disuguaglianza di reddito si muova in direzione diversa rispetto a quella di ricchezza, visto che la terra era la principale fonte di reddito.

Figura 1 – La disuguaglianza di ricchezza in Italia, 1450-1800 (indici di Gini)

Fonte: database Einite

Fonte: database Einite

    È la tendenza della disuguaglianza a crescere ovunque (Einite ha riscontrato una dinamica analoga anche altrove in Europa), più che il suo livello, ciò su cui dobbiamo soffermarci. Si tratta infatti di un risultato non scontato, visto che la sua crescita sembra essersi verificata anche in fasi di ristagno economico – come nel caso dell’Italia del XVII e XVIII secolo.

    Mentre in passato gli storici individuavano nella crescita economica l’unico fattore propulsivo della disuguaglianza preindustriale, oggi sappiamo che la situazione è molto più complessa e che dobbiamo tenere in considerazione diverse possibili concause. Ad esempio, perlomeno nel Piemonte sabaudo e nella Repubblica di Venezia, ma probabilmente anche altrove in Europa, la crescita della disuguaglianza in periodi di economia stagnante fu conseguenza dello sviluppo di un sistema fiscale più efficiente e capace di “estrarre” una proporzione maggiore della massima disuguaglianza possibile. Per due ragioni: la natura regressiva dei sistemi fiscali d’antico regime (i poveri erano tassati proporzionalmente più dei ricchi e pertanto la disuguaglianza “post-tax” era superiore a quella “pre-tax”),e gli impieghi a cui erano destinate le maggiori risorse acquisite (guerra, non welfare).

La quota dei più ricchi in Europa dal 1300 a oggi

    Se dall’età moderna ci spingiamo ancora più indietro, ai secoli conclusivi del Medioevo, troviamo una situazione diversa. Mentre vi è qualche indizio che tra la fine del XIII e l’inizio del XIV secolo la disuguaglianza stesse già crescendo, la peste nera che colpì l’Europa nel 1347-52 ebbe importanti effetti “egalitari”. Ciò è evidente se guardiamo alla quota di ricchezza detenuta dal 10 per cento più ricco della popolazione (figura 2).

Figura 2 – La quota di ricchezza del 10% più ricco della popolazione in Europa, 1300-2010

Fonte: Alfani, The top rich in Europe in the long run of history, Vox 15 gennaio 2017

Fonte: Alfani, The top rich in Europe in the long run of history, Vox 15 gennaio 2017

    La peste nera eliminò metà della popolazione del continente. Dopo l’epidemia, in un contesto di salari reali fortemente crescenti, più ampi strati della popolazione poterono accedere alla proprietà. A ciò contribuì anche la frammentazione dei patrimoni causata da un sistema ereditario di tipo prevalentemente egalitario (sistema che sarebbe stato “corretto” nei secoli successivi proprio come reazione istituzionale alla peste). Sta di fatto, che in tempi molto brevi il 10 per cento più ricco della popolazione perse il controllo del 15-20 per cento della ricchezza complessiva.

    Per trovare un altro evento capace di sortire effetti redistributivi altrettanto vistosi, occorre attendere un’altra catastrofe, o per meglio dire la serie di catastrofi compresa tra le due guerre mondiali. Se colleghiamo i dati prodotti da Einite per il 1300-1800 con quelli pubblicati da Thomas Piketty per i due secoli successivi, troviamo una perfetta continuità nel ritmo di accrescimento della disuguaglianza passando dall’età moderna al XIX secolo, e una quasi perfetta coincidenza nei livelli attorno al 1800 (Piketty stima che nel 1810 il 10 per cento più ricco della popolazione europea possedeva l’82 per cento della ricchezza complessiva, mentre le stime Einite indicano il 77 per cento nel 1800). Il vertice fu toccato alla vigilia della prima guerra mondiale, quando il 10 per cento più ricco deteneva il 90 per cento della ricchezza. Al termine della seconda guerra mondiale, la distanza tra ricchi e poveri si era ridotta nettamente e, benché a partire dal 1980 circa la quota di ricchezza dei più ricchi sia tornata a crescere, siamo ancora lontani dalla situazione di inizio XX secolo. In effetti, oggi la quota del 10 per cento più ricco della popolazione europea (64 per cento nel 2010) è analoga a quella tipica della vigilia della peste nera. Vi è senz’altro da sperare che per il futuro sia possibile contenere le disuguaglianze senza l’aiuto di eventi così estremi.

Guido Alfani -- lavoce.info

   

    As the news breaks around us  and around Trump, this may be threatening to lead the president to a narcissistic rage reaction, mixed with something Trump has never dealt with before: fear.

    Few rational people are seriously thinking Flynn would have done this on his own. The talk on TV and in the news is that Trump had to have been in on the phone call with the Russian ambassador.  As unstable as the president anything could happen from a rage reaction to a deep depression if his reality testing is intact and he sees impeachment as a real possibility.

     With all of this going on this important letter to the editor of the New York Times may get lost. 

 

To the Editor:

Charles M. Blow (columnnytimes.com, Feb. 9) describes Donald Trump’s constant need “to grind the opposition underfoot.” As mental health professionals, we share Mr. Blow’s concern.

Silence from the country’s mental health organizations has been due to a self-imposed dictum about evaluating public figures (the American Psychiatric Association’s 1973 Goldwater Rule). But this silence has resulted in a failure to lend our expertise to worried journalists and members of Congress at this critical time. We fear that too much is at stake to be silent any longer.

Mr. Trump’s speech and actions demonstrate an inability to tolerate views different from his own, leading to rage reactions. His words and behavior suggest a profound inability to empathize. Individuals with these traits distort reality to suit their psychological state, attacking facts and those who convey them (journalists, scientists).

In a powerful leader, these attacks are likely to increase, as his personal myth of greatness appears to be confirmed. We believe that the grave emotional instability indicated by Mr. Trump’s speech and actions makes him incapable of serving safely as president.

 

(35 signatures)

DailyKos

Update

James Gilligan, a psychiatrist and professor at New York University:

“I’ve worked with some of the most dangerous people our society produces, directing mental health programmes in prisons,” he said. “I’ve worked with murderers and rapists. I can recognise dangerousness from a mile away. You don’t have to be an expert on dangerousness or spend fifty years studying it like I have in order to know how dangerous this man is.”

 

    Georgia erupted in jubilation in early February as EU lawmakers approved visa-free access for Georgian citizens, a prize Tbilisi has long sought. The former Soviet republic hopes that the short-stay visa waiver becomes a major step toward eventual full membership in the European Union.  

    Amid a perception that illiberalism is gaining traction in the region, the news gave embattled advocates of liberal values reason to cheer. 

    “Congratulations! This is a truly historic day!” tweeted Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili after the European Parliament voted to drop visa requirements for short-term visits to the Schengen Zone, the common travel space covering most of the European continent.  

    A screen was set up in Georgia’s parliament to watch live as the European Parliament voted on the visa waiver bill. After the legislation passed, Georgian legislators celebrated with champagne and EU-and-Georgia-themed cake.  

    Georgian leaders took turns to thank the European Parliament for supporting the legislation, which faced a headwind from skeptics who argued that liberalization would expose the EU to potential terrorism and illegal labor migration from Georgia. “The European Union has opened its doors to Georgian citizens just as it is facing major immigration challenges,” said Vice Speaker of Parliament Tamar Chugoshvili, of the ruling Georgian Dream party, in televised comments. 

Originally published by eurasianet.org

   Während des I. Weltkriegs, im Jahre 1916, beugten sich mehrere soignierte Herrn über die Landkarte einer Gegend, die zu Österreich gehörte und sich Südtirol nannte. Die Sachverständigen arbeiteten in den Räumen der ehrwürdigen Società Dante Alighieri.

   Ihr Leiter war der Senator Ettore Tolomei, der Herausgeber der Zeitschrift Archivio per l'Alto Adige. Alto Adige oder Überetsch lautete die italienische Bezeichnung für Südtirol, die er erfunden hatte.

   Die würdigen Herrn hatten die Aufgabe, für zehntausend südtiroler Orts- und Flurnamen italienische Äquivalente zu finden, für den Fall nämlich, dass Italiens Truppen Österreich-Ungarn bezwingen und Südtirol erobern würden.

   So geschah es. Die Provinz südlich des Brenner-Passes wurde 1919 italienisch, und zu den robusten tiroler Namen gesellten sich elegante italienische. Aus Brixen wurde Bressanone, und aus Franzensfeste Fortezza. Sterzing hiess nun Vipiteno, und Kaltern Caldaro. Wo die tiroler Namen wie Bachkiesel mit Halsweh klangen, tat sich melodischer Wohlklang auf.

als.tirol.noch.italienisch.war.at.german.pages.de

 

 

 Das Gleiche in der Sprache der Vereinten Nationen:

 

   In the northern part of Italy, up in the Alps, is the region of South Tyrol. It is a strategic region as it controls the mountain passes onto Vienna and Germany. It belonged to the Austrian Empire, but when Austria lost the First World War Italy annexed it. It had been a German-speaking area for over a thousand years, but the Italians next imposed their language on the area. In the middle of the capital Bozen or Bolzano they erected a triumphal arch with the Latin text on it: „We have brought culture to the barbarians“. And from one day to another they changed the place names. As a matter of fact they changed all names, they even changed family names and names on tombstones in cemeteries. They did so because they did know the power of names. In figure 1 [not shown here, ed.] you will see names like Sterzing, Wiesen, Deutschhaus (or Lichtenberg, Schlanders and Laas). These names have connotations of German dishes like Bratwurst, or Schinken or roasted chestnut. The figure is taken from an Italian map made of this Austrian area before the First World War.

   In figure 2 [not shown here, ed.] you will see exactly the same area, but instead of Sterzing, Wiesen and Deutschhaus (Lichtenberg, Schlanders and Laas) the map bears the names Vipiteno, Prato and La Commenda (or Montechiaro, Silandro and Lasa) for the same localities. And these names bring memories of Italian dishes like pasta and prosciutto con melone. But, more important, these names on the map make the area look like an Italian area. That is the power of names. Naming things conveys power to the one who bestows the names! A comparison of figures 1 and 2 will show that it is indeed the same area. Imagine that from one day to another your hometown and the street on which you live would be re-baptized and receive a name in a foreign language! In 1945 South Tyrol was again assigned to Italy by the Allied forces, on the condition that it would respect the German culture and language of the area. Well, place names are part of the language and of culture, but up till now no German place names have entered any official Italian maps of South Tyrol. There is only one commercial publisher, the Italian Touring Club, which publishes atlases and maps with bilingual names for the area. It does so either because it wants to reflect the local situation that has bilingual road signs now, or because it also publishes the maps for a German-speaking clientele.

   The use of names on maps is nearly as important as the use of boundaries. Naming things conveys power to the one who bestows the name. Reversely, if one is in control over something one can name it: one’s children or one’s house. Italian names show they have been bestowed by Italians, they show Italian sovereign rights. So if names are in Italian, it is an Italian region. Vice versa, if it is part of Italy, it should have Italian names. That is the reasoning, at least. It is the reasoning of nationalism, a very important force, last century, in Western Europe. As topographic mapping is considered to be some sort of sovereign right, just like taking censuses, and as topographic mapping is usually performed by the state’s civil servants, there is a tendency for minority language toponyms to be represented on the map in some transformed way, adapted to the state languages or to the raison d’etat, that is to reasons of state.

   From the cultural viewpoint it should be a nation’s prerogative to preserve the cultural heritage of its population, its minority language population included. Toponyms are parts of this cultural heritage and should therefore be preserved in their minority language versions. The national authorities should also act as a go-between and allow foreign cultural communities to take cognisance of its minority language communities, toponyms included. By paying taxes the members of minority language communities share in the costs of national topographic surveys and the production of topographic maps. They should have the right therefore to see their home area represented on these maps as they know it, and not disguised in an unfamiliar onomastical cloak.

   Based on this European experience a package of measures has been established that should ensure the restoration of minority toponyms: it consists of the following steps

a) Delimitation of minority language area boundaries
b) Introduction of bilingual transitional periods on the map: so after a majority names edition a bilingual edition is published which precedes a monolingual minority language edition
c) Official restoration of minority language name versions
d) Exclusive minority language rendering
e) Accompanied by the rendering of marginal information also in minority language

   In Europe we have developed the feeling that recognition of their language and culture is an important contribution to the strengthening of the identity of minority language communities. The official use of their toponyms in the minority language is part of that recognition. The rendering of toponyms on maps might seem an insignificant aspect of this official recognition, but it should be stressed that these names often are the first and only representation by which the minority language community can manifest itself to outsiders. The acknowledgement of minority language toponyms on the map can be considered as an official recognition and acceptance of the minority language community.

   A national state is nowadays considered responsible for the cultural heritage of all minority language communities, and minority language names also belong to this cultural heritage.

 Ferjan Ormeling, Jörn Sievers and Hans Stabe (eds.), Training Course on Toponymy, Enschede, Frankfurt and Berlin 2002. Training Course on Toponymy forming part of the “documents and literature” of the United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names (UNGEGN)

 

   Als in Italien unlängst ein Referendum über Verfassungsreform anstand, versuchte die Regierung Renzi, sich die Stimmen der Südtiroler Volkspartei und der rechtsextremen Südtiroler Freiheit zu sichern, indem sie die Abschaffung unwichtiger italienischer Flur- und Ortsnamen versprach. Nur die alten tiroler Namen sollten noch gelten.

     Dagegen erhob sich ein Sturm der italophonen Tiroler und anderer Italiener mit Hilfe einiger deutschsprachigen Unterstützer:

   Eine Gruppe italienischer und deutschsprachiger Akademiker wandte sich mit einem Appell an den Präsidenten Sergio Mattarella und die Provinz Bozen, dass die italienischen Namen als Teil der  Zweisprachigkeit Südtirol bewahrt werden sollten, deren Beseitigung "ohne jede ernsthafte geschichtliche Begründung" drohe. 

   Tatsächlich stimmte Südtirol/Welschtirol (Alto Adige/Trentino) mit 54 Prozent für die im Referendum vorgeschlagene Reform.  Genauer gesagt, stimmte nur Südtirol mit "Ja".  Doch das half nicht: Renzi verlor die Volksabstimmung spektakulär, und damit bleiben Ettore Tolomeis Namensschöpfungen weiterhin erhalten, und die Italiener müssen sich nicht den Kopf zerbrechen, wie man Ortsnamen wie "Schlern" wohl ausspricht. Und in der Bar am Brenner gibt es immer noch Espresso statt Einspänner.

--ed