Lento declino dei praticanti

    Qual è lo stato di salute della religione in Italia? Come è cambiato negli ultimi decenni? Gli scienziati sociali sono concordi nel ritenere che l’indicatore più adatto per rispondere a tali domande sia la frequenza con la quale la popolazione di un paese si reca in un luogo di culto. Alcuni studiosi, analizzando i dati, sono arrivati alla conclusione che in Italia la quota di praticanti regolari (persone che vanno a messa almeno una volta alla settimana) è diminuita dal 1956 al 1981, mentre è rimasta quasi costante, o ha conosciuto deboli inversioni di tendenza, nel decennio successivo. Ma cosa è avvenuto dopo? L’ultimo ventennio è stato un periodo di grandi cambiamenti, alcuni dei quali, come l’invecchiamento della popolazione e l’immigrazione, supponiamo abbiano fatto crescere la quota dei praticanti, mentre di altri (la lunga crisi economica) non sappiamo se abbiano avuto effetti in questo campo. Secondo i dati dell’archivio Istat (senza dubbio i più affidabili fra quelli esistenti), dal 1995 al 2015, la quota di chi va a messa almeno una volta alla settimana è passata dal 39,7 al 29 per cento, perdendo circa mezzo punto all’anno. Questo si è verificato in tutte le regioni del nostro paese, cosicché le distanze territoriali sono rimaste immutate. Oggi, come venti anni fa, i praticanti sono più numerosi nel Mezzogiorno e nelle isole (figura 1).

Grafico 1

    Abbiamo l’impressione di trovarci di fronte a un declino progressivo, lento, dolce, senza salti bruschi. Tuttavia, se approfondiamo l’analisi, ci accorgiamo che in alcuni casi vi sono state delle forti cadute. La quota di chi va regolarmente in chiesa varia a seconda dell’età. La relazione è stata rilevata molte volte, ma i dati Istat ci permettono di osservarla meglio. Nel 1995, la percentuale dei praticanti raggiungeva il picco fra i ragazzi dai 6 agli 11 anni. Diminuiva fortemente nelle classi di età successive, fino a raggiungere il livello più basso fra i 30 e i 39 anni. Poi riprendeva a salire fino a 80 anni. Scendeva ancora dopo quell’età. Questo andamento era probabilmente effetto sia della generazione di appartenenza che dell’età, cioè della fase della vita. Così, ad esempio, se coloro che avevano fra 60 e 80 anni andavano in un luogo di culto più spesso dei più giovani era perché si erano formati in un periodo storico nel quale la religione aveva maggiore importanza. Ma probabilmente era anche effetto dell’età perché, invecchiando, si sentivano più deboli e fragili e cercavano conforto nella religione. Se gli ottantenni andavano a messa meno dei settantenni era anche perché uscivano meno spesso di casa. Era inoltre riconducibile all’età e non alla generazione di appartenenza il fatto che i preadolescenti andassero così frequentemente in un luogo di culto. Ci andavano, verosimilmente, anche quando i loro genitori avevano smesso di essere praticanti o erano diventati agnostici, perché accompagnati dai nonni.

Il comportamento dei ventenni

    Nell’ultimo ventennio, il declino della partecipazione religiosa è avvenuto non solo in tutte le zone del paese, ma anche in tutte le classi di età. Ma è stato minore fra gli anziani o nelle età di mezzo e maggiore fra i giovani. È stato forte per la classe fra i 12 e i 19 anni, fortissimo in quella successiva, dai 20 ai 29. Fra i ventenni, la quota di chi va in un luogo di culto almeno una volta alla settimana è scesa, dal 1995 al 2015, dal 26,8 al 14,6 per cento. Un vero e proprio crollo, il cui significato appare ancora più evidente se analizzato per zona. Nelle classi più anziane, il declino della pratica religiosa è stato minore nelle regioni meridionali e insulari che in quelle centro settentrionali. Invece, fra i ventenni, la flessione dei praticanti è stata notevole ovunque, ma nel Sud è stata più ampia che nel Nord. È anzi questa l’unica classe di età nella quale le tradizionali differenze territoriali sono diminuite (figure 2 e 3).

Grafico 2Grafico 3

    Dunque, né l’invecchiamento della popolazione, né l’arrivo di milioni di immigrati né la lunga crisi economica hanno arrestato il processo di secolarizzazione. E neppure il carisma di due papi eccezionali – Giovanni Paolo II e Francesco I – è bastato a riportare gli italiani nelle chiese e nelle parrocchie. La partecipazione religiosa ha raggiunto oggi il livello più basso nella storia del nostro paese. La fortissima flessione che ha avuto luogo fra i ventenni fa pensare che il processo continuerà a lungo e avrà effetti rilevanti sulla vita politica e sociale. Non direttamente sull’esito delle elezioni, perché, da quando è scomparsa la Democrazia cristiana, la pratica religiosa ha smesso di essere un buon predittore delle scelte di voto. Ma certamente sulla vita intima, domestica, sul modo in cui si formano e si rompono le famiglie, le coppie etero e omosessuali, sui comportamenti sessuali e riproduttivi, sulle decisioni riguardanti la fine della vita.

Marzio Barbagli -- lavoce.info

 

   Comment les pays comptent-ils faire face au défi de la migration de masse s'ils ne savent pas pourquoi les gens se déplacent ?

   Un nouveau projet de l'Institut d'Études de Sécurité (ISS), en partenariat avec l'Initiative mondiale contre la criminalité organisée transnationale et financé par la Fondation Hanns Seidel, vise à poser et répondre à ces questions difficiles afin d'appuyer les solutions à la crise actuelle des migrants.

   Le projet pluriannuel a débouché sur des recherches novatrices publiées en 2015 par l'ISS et l'Initiative mondiale. Celles-ci ont obtenu un succès critique en Allemagne et dans l'Union européenne grâce à leurs informations fiables et originales sur l’origine de la récente flambée de migrations. 

L'ISS est bien placé pour garantir que les résultats de la recherche atteignent les bonnes personnes

   Cette étude a révélé que les conflits violents, le terrorisme, les régimes répressifs durables dans le temps, la pauvreté chronique et les inégalités sont à l'origine du nombre sans précédent de réfugiés et de migrants vers l'Europe. Couplé avec ceci, on assiste à l'émergence d'une industrie de la contrebande de plus en plus violente et opportuniste, entraînée par des profits durables qui permettent aux réseaux transnationaux de se développer là où ils n'existaient pas auparavant.

   « Nous voulons miser sur nos précédentes recherches afin de mieux comprendre les causes et les catalyseurs de la migration de masse, notamment certaines dimensions illicites, comme le financement de la contrebande et de la menace, afin d'aider les décideurs africains et européens à concevoir une approche visant à répondre à ces difficultés », déclare Ottilia Anna Maunganidze, chercheuse principale à l'ISS. 

   Le Dr Wolf Krug, Représentant résident à la Fondation Hanns Seidel est du même avis. « Nous savons si peu de choses sur l'immigration clandestine et la traite des personnes en Afrique et depuis l'Afrique vers l'Europe. Des recherches et une analyse approfondies sont cruciales pour élaborer des réponses politiques nationales et panafricaines qui fonctionnent ».

   La recherche comprendra des entrevues avec les migrants, les passeurs et les décideurs politiques. Au cours de la première phase du projet, des enquêtes seront réalisées auprès des passeurs dans la Corne de l'Afrique, au Sahel et en Turquie, avec en parallèle des recherches sur les migrations en provenance d'Afrique du Nord. Le projet examinera non seulement les moteurs et les dynamiques de la migration clandestine, y compris les liens avec le crime organisé, mais aussi l'impact socio-économique.

   Avec ses réseaux et ses accès établis aux décideurs, l'ISS est bien placé pour garantir que les résultats de la recherche atteignent les bonnes personnes grâce à sa formation et son support d'assistance technique, l'ISS peut aider les décideurs à élaborer et à mettre en œuvre des politiques qui permettront de répondre à la crise migratoire.

"Spotlight" publié par l'Institut d'Études de Sécurité (ISS)

 

 

   Europe’s countryside is dotted with quaint, postcard-perfect small towns and villages. These are steeped in history – their strong stone buildings and breathtaking squares capture the essence and culture of the continent. Some of them have been inhabited for hundreds of years – but today, the future for many of them is bleak.

   There has been a flight of populations from the countryside to urban centres during the past century. The twin attractions of big cities – mass industrialisation and easy access to jobs – have taken their toll on rural existence. Many architectural gems in these country towns and villages – and the lifestyles that they represnted – are being forgotten and cast aside, as time and technology speed past them toward a new, urban future.

   Worse lies ahead: in coming decades, rural depopulation is set to accelerate. In 2014, the United Nations noted that 54% of the world’s population was already residing in urban areas – up from 30% in 1950. This proportion is expected to increase to 66% by 2050.

   What began as a post-war migration to richer urban areas – as well as international cities, which offered more attractive job prospects – has turned into a chronic problem, which now appears impossible to stop. As younger generations continue to move toward urban centres, the remaining elderly populations of Europe’s semi-abandoned villages and hamlets will pass away, taking a large portion of the region’s history, tradition and lifestyle with them.

   The more that village populations shrink, the more birthrates plummet and economies slow down; the more schools are closed down; the more doctors are centralised into larger towns – and the more post offices and public services are relocated to urban centres. Community or public transport is vital for commuting to work or accessing higher level services or education – all too often, this final lifeline also succumbs.

   The process creates a vicious downward spiral of further abandonment, which becomes increasingly difficult to combat. Areas characterised by spectacular medieval fortresses, beautiful abbeys and frescoed churches grow increasingly desolate, until eventually they are abandoned. As a result, the countrysides of Portugal, Spain and Italy are punctuated by the empty shells of once-thriving towns.

Untapped potential

   In an interview, architect Isabelle Beaumont, the director and founder of Workplace Futures – an organisation that looks at the future of work and the built environment – highlighted the importance of these small villages:

Geographical differences have always brought irreplaceable creative variation to art and architecture; a source of inspiration for current and future generations. As cultures and society homogenise, retaining, and not just conserving, Europe’s diverse industrial and agricultural heritage becomes ever increasingly important.

   A seven-year study carried out by the Italian Revenue Agency, estimated that Italy’s 1.26m unregistered, abandoned homes could generate €589m worth of tax revenue. But unless they appear on the land registry, they are not registered as real estate units – and as such they are not taxable.

   The funds would come in handy for the Eurozone’s third-largest economy – Italy has undergone radical changes, after suffering its longest recession since World War II. Factories across the nation have closed at an unprecedented pace. Years of a strong euro have made Italian exports more expensive for other nations, which led to a decrease in demand and hurt the economy. And unemployment levels have reached record highs: youth unemployment rates hit 45.5% in Spain and 36.7% in Italy earlier this year.

This town, is becoming like a ghost town

   In Spain and in Italy, as in other European nations, recent drastic measures have attempted to combat this slow agony of rural abandonment. In Spain – where it is estimated that there are some 2,900 abandoned villages – entire hamlets are being sold for as little as €45,000.

Free, good home. Rainshift/FlickrCC BY

   In Italy, some calculate that there are 6,000 ghost towns nationwide, as well as 15,000 villages which are down to 10% of their original population. There, residents and local authorities have resorted to some rather original plans of action.

   In the southern Italian medieval village of Sellia, local mayor and paediatrician Davide Zicchinella published a decree forbidding locals from falling ill and dying. While Zicchinella has admitted that he cannot fight the laws of nature, he’s hoping that his action will prompt elderly residents to take up healthier lifestyles.

   Meanwhile, the mayors of Sicilian towns Gangi and Salemi, together with Carreghi Ligure in northern Italy, have resorted to selling abandoned homes for €1 each, providing that buyers agree to rebuild them within a given period of time. Others, such as Civita Bagnoreggia, have started charging visitors tourist entrance fees. And the town of Fillettino even said it would seek to break free of the Italian federal tax system, in a bid to cut down costs.

   The effects of these measures have so far been limited. But the originality and inventiveness of such leaders kindles some hope for the future of Europe’s rural towns.

Researcher, Anglia Ruskin University

Director of Business Development, Anglia Ruskin University

   Reader, Anglia Ruskin University 

THE CONVERSATION

 

 

Comment

   The above article offers a nice, rather British, view of an old continental problem. Compared to the past, the situation has improved a lot following the advent of the Internet and UMTS. In Europe, like in the U.S., small and remote towns and villages became livable for home workers, digital natives and retirees. Internet shopping and courier services brought city conveniences to the countryside.

   However, in southern Europe, the charm of rural life has its limits. Most candidates for moving to shrinking or abandoned settlements are usually retirees. For them, medical services are vital which are poor or missing in remote areas. After a few years of exciting bucolic life they are often for health reasons forced to move back to "civilization".

   Another problem of rural areas in the deep South is crime. Local mafias will prey on any newcomer, foreigner or co-national, and demand protection money, "pizzo".  When returning to your home from a few days' trip can mean that it has been thoroughly emptied -- even water faucets and light switches gone.

   Under such circumstances,  even being given a house for free is a bad deal. Unless countries such as Italy and Spain manage to establish the rule of law in their countryside it is best for any stranger -- and especially a foreigner -- to admire the rotting old villages but to stay out, unless he or she is willing to pay pizzo for living in camping style without the alienable trappings of civilization, lacking adequate health care.  

Sorry!

-- ed

 Daniel Greenfield, a Shillman Journalism Fellow at the Freedom Center, is a writer focusing on radical Islam. He was born in Israel and today lives in New York City.  He posts at his blog "Sultan Knish", at  FrontPage Magazine and Israel National News.

This article was first published by FrontPage Mag, a right wing  online magazine critical of  militant Islamism. Although some statements appear rather sweeping, based on debatable facts, Greenfield's hypothesis of a permanent refugee crisis merits discussion. Currently, migrants from western and eastern Africa are, almost exclusively, arriving at Italy's shores who are not the kind of Muslims usually suspected to be Islamists. Some among them are Christian or perhaps animists. However, with any change in the geography and logistics of migration, Muslim refugees might again become more numerous among the migrants.

 

   Forget the Syrian Civil War for a moment. Even without the Sunnis and Shiites competing to give each other machete haircuts every sunny morning, there would still be a permanent Muslim refugee crisis. 

   The vast majority of civil wars over the last ten years have taken place in Muslim countries. Muslim countries are also some of the poorest in the world. And Muslim countries also have high birth rates.

   Combine violence and poverty with a population boom and you get a permanent migration crisis.

   No matter what happens in Syria or Libya next year, that permanent migration crisis isn’t going away.

   The Muslim world is expanding unsustainably. In the Middle East and Asia, Muslims tend to underperform their non-Muslim neighbors both educationally and economically. Oil is the only asset that gave Muslims any advantage and in the age of fracking, its value is a lot shakier than it used to be. 

   The Muslim world had lost its old role as the intermediary between Asia and the West. And it has no economic function in the new world except to blackmail it by spreading violence and instability.

   Muslim countries with lower literacy rates, especially for women, are never going to be economic winners at any trade that doesn’t come gushing out of the ground. Nor will unstable dictatorships ever be able to provide social mobility or access to the good life. At best they’ll hand out subsidies for bread.

   The Muslim world has no prospects for getting any better. The Arab Spring was a Western delusion.  

   Growing populations divided along tribal and religious lines are competing for a limited amount of land, power and wealth. Countries without a future are set to double in size. 

   There are only two solutions; war or migration. 

   Either you fight and take what you want at home. Or you go abroad and take what you want there. 

   Let’s assume that the Iraq War had never happened. How would a religiously and ethnically divided Iraq have managed its growth from 13 million in the eighties to 30 million around the Iraq War to 76 million in 2050?

   The answer is a bloody civil war followed by genocide, ethnic cleansing and migration. 

   What’s happening now would have happened anyway. It was already happening under Saddam Hussein.

   Baghdad has one of the highest population densities in the world. And it has no future. The same is true across the region. The only real economic plan anyone here has is to get money from the West.

   Plan A for getting money out of the West is creating a crisis that will force it to intervene. That can mean anything from starting a war to aiding terrorists that threaten the West. Muslim countries keep shooting themselves in the foot so that Westerners will rush over to kiss the booboo and make it better. 

   Plan B is to move to Europe. 

   And Plan B is a great plan. It’s the only real economic plan that works. At least until the West runs out of native and naïve Westerners who foot the bill for all the migrants, refugees and outright settlers.

   For thousands of dollars, a Middle Eastern Muslim can pay to be smuggled into Europe. It’s a small investment with a big payoff. Even the lowest tier welfare benefits in Sweden are higher than the average salary in a typical Muslim migrant nation. And Muslim migrants are extremely attuned to the payoffs. It’s why they clamor to go to Germany or Sweden, not Greece or Slovakia. And it’s why they insist on big cities with an existing Muslim social welfare infrastructure, not some rural village. 

   A Muslim migrant is an investment for an entire extended family. Once the young men get their papers, family reunification begins. That doesn’t just mean every extended family member showing up and demanding their benefits. It also means that the family members will be selling access to Europe to anyone who can afford it. Don’t hike or raft your way to Europe. Mohammed or Ahmed will claim that you’re a family member. Or temporarily marry you so you can bring your whole extended family along.

   Mohammed gets paid. So does Mo’s extended family which brokers these transactions. Human trafficking doesn’t just involve rafts. It’s about having the right family connections. 

   And all that is just the tip of a very big business iceberg.

   Where do Muslim migrants come up with a smuggling fee that amounts to several years of salary for an average worker? Some come from wealthy families. Others are sponsored by crime networks and family groups that are out to move everything from drugs to weapons to large numbers of people into Europe. 

   Large loans will be repaid as the new migrants begin sending their new welfare benefits back home. Many will be officially unemployed even while unofficially making money through everything from slave labor to organized crime. European authorities will blame their failure to participate in the job market on racism rather than acknowledging that they exist within the confines of an alternate economy.

   It’s not only individuals or families who can pursue Plan B. Turkey wants to join the European Union. It’s one solution for an Islamist populist economy built on piles of debt. The EU has a choice between dealing with the stream of migrants from Turkey moving to Europe. Or all of Turkey moving into Europe.

   The West didn’t create this problem. Its interventions, however misguided, attempted to manage it.

   Islamic violence is not a response to Western colonialism. Not only does it predate it, but as many foreign policy experts are so fond of pointing out, its greatest number of casualties are Muslims. The West did not create Muslim dysfunction. And it is not responsible for it. Instead the dysfunction of the Muslim world keeps dragging the West in. Every Western attempt to ameliorate it, from humanitarian aid to peacekeeping operations, only opens up the West to take the blame for Islamic dysfunction.

   The permanent refugee crisis is a structural problem caused by the conditions of the Muslim world.

   The West can’t solve the crisis at its source. Only Muslims can do that. And there are no easy answers. But the West can and should avoid being dragged down into the black hole of Muslim dysfunction. 

   Even Germany’s Merkel learned that the number of refugees is not a finite quantity that can be relieved with a charitable gesture. It’s the same escalating number of people that will show up if you start throwing bags of money out of an open window. And it’s a number that no country can absorb.

   Muslim civil wars will continue even if the West never intervenes in them because their part of the world is fundamentally unstable. These conflicts will lead to the displacement of millions of people. But even without violence, economic opportunism alone will drive millions to the West. And those millions carry with them the dysfunction of their culture that will make them a burden and a threat.

   If Muslims can’t reconcile their conflicts at home, what makes us think that they will reconcile them in Europe? Instead of resolving their problems through migration, they only export them to new shores. The same outbursts of Islamic violence, xenophobia, economic malaise and unsustainable growth follow them across seas and oceans, across continents and countries. Distance is no answer. Travel is no cure.

   Solving Syria will solve nothing. The Muslim world is full of fault lines. It’s growing and it’s running out of room to grow. We can’t save Muslims from themselves. We can only save ourselves from their violence.

   The permanent Muslim refugee crisis will never stop being our crisis unless we close the door.

Daniel Greenfield

 

   Der türkische Regierungschef Binali Yildirim bezeichnete die Armenier-Resolution des Bundestags als “lächerlich”.

   Aus deutscher Warte erscheint lächerlich, dass ein mutmasslich eingetragenes Mitglied der Moslem-Bruderschaft kritisiert, wenn ein mehrheitlich christlich gestimmtes Parlament einen vor einem Jahrhundert begangenen Völkermord an Christen als solchen bezeichnet.

   Wie sollte ein Moslembruder denn anders sprechen, wenn er dem Auftrag seines Bundes folgen will? Ein dümmliches Ritual zwingt viele (aber erfreulicherweise nicht alle) Türken, gegen derartige Resolutionen zu protestieren, die in Abständen irgendwo in christlichen Ländern der Welt verabschiedet werden.

   Jeder solche Protest ruft anti-türkische Gefühle hervor und hält die Erinnerung an den Genozid wach. Damit provoziert der türkische Protest nur weitere solche Resolutionen, Mahnaktionen und Erinnerungen.

   Interessant wäre es, zu erfahren, wie die Gemeinschaft der Anhänger des Predigers Fethullah Gülen das Problem sieht.

   Die Gülen-Zeitung Zaman France jedenfalls relativiert die Streitfrage, zitiert sogar den armenischen Staatschef Serge Sarkissian und deutsche Promoter der Resolution.  Könnte es sein, dass die Gülenci die Resolution pragmatisch als nützlich erachten, weil sie beiträgt, das lädierte Ansehen der AKP-Regierung Präsident Recep Tayyip Erdogans im Ausland weiter zu verschlechtern?

   Die breite Unterstützung, die die Resolution im deutschen Parteienspektrum geniesst, auch bei manchen Politikern mit Migrationshintergrund, könnte Gülen durchaus gefallen. Dass sein neuer Erzfeind Erdogan ihn und seine Gefolgsleute soeben zu “Terroristen” geadelt hat, bringt ihn der Legitimität und seine Bewegung “Hizmet” der möglichen Nachfolge der AKP-Partei an der Macht einen grossen Schritt näher. Gleichzeitig kann die Welt den Versuch Erdogans, einen religiösen Rivalen und seine Sekte international als "Terrorgruppe" ächten zu lassen, nur lächerlich finden.

   Das sollte Yildirim vielleicht bedenken, bevor er das Wort “lächerlich” in den Mund nimmt.

--ed

 

Update

   Der Bundestag hat mit großer Mehrheit für eine Resolution gestimmt, die das Massaker an den Armeniern 1915 deutlich als „Völkermord“ bezeicnet. Die Türkei hat daraufhin den deutschen Geschäftsträger ins Aussenministerium einbestellt und ihren Botschafter aus Berlin abgezogen. Droht Abbruch der diplomatischen Beziehungen oder ist das nur Theaterdonner?

   Wie auch immer: seit Monaten gleichen die türkisch-deutschen Beziehungen einer Achterbahnfahrt.  Merkels verzweifelter Versuch, mit Hilfe der Türkei den Zustrom von Flüchtlingen und anderen Migranten einzudämmen und zu kanalisieren, scheitert jeden Tag mehr.  

   Geschäfte machen mit einem nationalistischen, frömmelnden und unberechenbaren Autokraten ist ebenso schwierig wie der Versuch, einen Pudding an die Wand zu nageln. Ihm ist unbegreiflich*), dass Frau Merkel nicht dem Bundestag befehlen kann, dass sie die Presse nicht an die Leine legen kann. Mit 4 Millionen Türkischstämmigen sieht er sich als einen stakeholder der deutschen Politik, vergleicbbar im Rang etwa mit einem Landes-Ministerpräsidenten**). Dass in Berlin die Puppen nicht tanzen, wenn er auf den Tisch haut, ergrimmt ihn, weckt den Verdacht, dass seine Landsleute, ihr Nachwuchs und er mit ihnen diskriminiert werden.

   Dass seine Landsleute in Deutschland das Geschehen bemerkenswert ruhig hinnehmen, sollte ihn lehren, dass sie als seine Fünfte Kolonne nur beschränkt taugen. Schlimmer noch, es könnte sein, dass sich unter ihnen alternative Ideen verbreiten, zum Beispiel erneut die eines gewissen Predigers in Pennsylvania.

 

Update II

*)  "Er verstehe nicht, warum die CDU-Vorsitzende es nicht geschafft habe, ihre eigene Partei dazu zu bringen, gegen die Resolution zu stimmen, sagte Erdogan in einem am Samstag in mehreren türkischen Medien veröffentlichten Interview".

 **) "Deutschland könne einen "wichtigen Freund" verlieren, und verwies ausdrücklich auf die Millionen türkischstämmigen Menschen" in Deutschland".

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has accused a “German ecole” of spearheading a conspiracy against Turkey that also involves the country’s media. "This ecole is pursuing some operations against Turkey."  (Hürriyet Daily News)