In the last century we have witnessed how Russian agents have assassinated individuals throughout the world, even their own, from Trotsky to the latest. In recent cases, rebel commanders in Eastern Ukraine are "committing suicide" in numbers.
Having served their purpose in the barbaric invasion of Eastern Ukraine the various agents and warlords are now being disposed of in a tidying up of any incriminating evidence, including the notorious "Motorola" (Arsen Pavlov) the Russian soldier accused of war crime atrocities and executing at least "...15 Ukrainian prisoners", by his own count.
An improvised explosive device had been set off in an elevator, killing "Motorola" and his bodyguard. Another recent favorite of the Kremlin's "assassination bureau” is poison of various kinds. (I wonder who decides?) For Alexander Litvinenko it was radioactive poison.
Here's a thought: The recent attempt at poisoning Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, leader of ISIS, could that have been Putin's and Russia's most recent assassination target? I know, sounds like another conspiracy fanatic: Let's blame another thing on Putin, why not?
However, this may not be beyond the realm of possibility. There may be a reason why Putin might be anxious to get rid of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. He may no longer be of any use to Putin...and perhaps he knows too much to stay alive? My first question would be: from where did this man, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, obtain such training to lead such a conquering army? Perhaps it's no coincidence that ISIS did attain its formidable force only after "Russian"/Chechen Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi's leadership took over.
In a recent article by Judith Miller she writes that, "American Enterprise Institute’s director of Russian studies, recently noted that Russia has contributed more fighters to ISIS than any other European nation....With an estimated 300-500 ISIS recruiters the Russian capital, Moscow has become a key hub and way station to Syria for foreign fighters." (Fox News)
Putin seems to show no fear of ISIS and "radical Islam", could there be a hidden agenda. As for the reason why Putin would "manufacture" such a strategy, Why not?
At the time, deflect the West from the battles in Ukraine, MH17, and such; and the more instability anywhere, the greater Russian influence and ultimately control. Did anyone bother to wonder why bombing ISIS in Syria was such a no-no for Russia?All Putin had to do was send a special set of Russian Chechen mercenaries just as he did in Ukraine and use the same tactics only much harsher for the Muslim world, and hope that the results were the same as Ukraine, conquer lands and the spoils of war.
And if nothing more than it just being a distraction for the West during his Ukrainian takeover, that would have served its purpose. However unlike Ukraine, ISIS was running extremely wild in Iraq, then Syria. Their butchery was horrendous, but I doubt if Putin lost any sleep or concern over the carnage, they're not his enemy.
If I were Putin I certainly would have entertained such a plan...wouldn't you? And if true, obviously this was a good plan since no one is suspecting it? How inexplicably coincidental that once the Russian Chechens arrived in ISIS that the tone of the fighting had changed. Or did that coincidence also escape everyone?
Even in Ukraine there was a report of an Ukrainian soldier being hung out, crucifixion style, by the roadside where he died......Chechens, Russians, whoever is there, the style of warfare is similar......no life is sacred to them.
Look deeper beyond the obvious and I'm sure you might find some of Putin fingerprints.
Remember this is a man whose lies and deceit have branded all of Russia as a Nation of Liars, and simply not trusted. Putin denies everything, there is no truth in Russia even if proven.
And which world leader is shaping the agenda presently? Putin's only unexpected drawback...the price of oil and sanctions. Otherwise: Mission Accomplished for Putin!
As we are deep into amusing conspiracy theories: here is another bit on Caliph al-Baghdadi: what would happen if the caliph is on the run after both Mosul and Raqqa have been liberated? Would he shave off his beard like so many of his fighters, leaving a conspicuous untanned zone on his face?
No, a caliph does not shave. But where would he go? He has made so many enemies for religious and criminal reasons. Doha and Dubai are out of consideration, and in Baluchistan his enemy al-Zawahiri would surely catch him. Gaza would be a place to welcome him and admire his military prowess. But Gaza is so damn small and exposed to Israeli surveillance. Libya? The Libyans won't like to be bossed around by a defeated caliph.
Remains only one option: asking for asylum in Turkey. The Islamist government in Ankara has given ample proof of its admiration of and support for Daesh, despite the 254 Turkish victims of Daesh terrorism. Why Ankara is so deeply in love with Daesh (and presumably its caliph) has been detailed by someone who should know: Abdullah Bozkurt, a star writer of the Fethullah Gülen media empire and former Ankara bureau chief of Zaman newspaper. He tells it all but beware: he is a dyed in the wool Gülenist!
Ihsan al-Tawil
The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of this magazine or its editors.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina's Census Shows the Demography of Division and the Reality of Illiteracy
Initial results of the census in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) showed that decades of nationalistic politics have entrenched ethnic and religious differences, reconfirming the ethnic cleansing ‘gains’ from the 1990s war. They also pointed to an urgent need for more education, since high levels of illiteracy — including computer illiteracy — affect its capacity to compete in the modern world.
Feminist and digital rights activist Valentina Hvale Pellizzer drew attention to the side-strapped census issue through a comprehensive analysis published on her blog.
Political parties representing the three main ethnic blocks campaigned with a focus on reaffirming the demography of division through three questions: ethnicity, religion and ‘mother language’.
Civil society fought and lost its battle to have those questions as optional instead of compulsory […] so the only choice for people was about getting creative in responding or selecting ‘do not want to declare/state my ethnicity, religion or mother tongue’ option. Twenty years after the war, the priority of the parties was to claim victory, or to bring the ethnic rhetoric of victimhood to a new stage.
For years, due to disagreement on how to aggregate divergences among the three statistic agencies in BiH (the state agency and agencies from the two political entities, Republika Srpska and the Federation), the only census data publicly available was the overall number of people living in the country and in the main cities. Naturally, this allowed for much speculation, similarly to other multi-ethnic Balkan countries. Macedonia, for instance, has not had a census since 2002, even though by law this basic statistical operation needs to take place every ten years.
Under pressure by the international community, the BiH Agency for Statistics published the results just one day before the very last deadline, on June 30, 2016. The agency also created the open data web site popis2013.ba, which — more than three months later — still lacks all the promised visual and interactive elements, instead displaying a demotivating message, “Soon” (“Uskoro”). However, it does provide downloads of PDF and Excel files with the demographic data, which Pellizzer used as the basis for her analysis.
According to the results, most BiH citizens, which number more than 3.5 million, consider themselves as members of one of the three main ethnic communities — Bosniak, Serb and Croat. They speak the corresponding ethnic language and declared in the survey that they are religious, affiliated with the faiths of Islam, Orthodox and Catholic Christianity, respectively.
Population by ethnic/national affiliation, level BIH (the whole country), FBIH (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), RS (Republika Srpska), BD (Brčko District). Source: Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013 final result, Bosnia and Herzegovina Agency for statistics.
Choosing the designation of Bosnian (“bosanski”), and not the more ethnic version of Bosniaks (“bošnjački”) for the language of the Bosniaks, the biggest ethnic group, was the cause of yet another institutional crisis between the main ethnic Bosniak and Serb parties.
The released results also showed that out of 3.5 million residents, over 96,000 belong to the “others” — ethnic communities which are not one of the “big three” — while 27,000 refused to declare any ethnic affiliation, and 6,000 respondents selected “unknown”. No details were released on the numbers comprising the “others”, including the Roma.
Pellizzer made the observation that if the 130,054 inhabitants who do not consider themselves members of the three major ethnic groups all lived in the same town, it would be the third largest town in the country, after Sarajevo and Banja Luka:
In this little town would also live a majority of 118,612 agnostic/atheist/do not declares/others or unknowns with just 63,066 people speaking a language different from the mother language of the three main ethnic groups, a language which the current results defined as other/unknown. And this ‘town’ would summarize the overall size of the multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity of post-war Bosnia Herzegovina.
It seems that, with the exception of major cities like Sarajevo and Tuzla, most BiH citizens live in segregated territorial units, without much contact across ethnic lines.
The census failed to provide meaningful results on people with disabilities, as the questions were incorrectly formulated. “Disability remains marginalized by the census as an additional lost opportunity of bringing clarity and relevant information for a better planning of resources,” Pellizzer wrote. This Twitter user added:
BiH has the highest number of ILLITERATE citizens and the lowest number of citizens with high education in the region. Now, that's the real news about the census, everything else is politicking!
The census also showed that almost 3% of the population — mostly women and girls — is illiterate. Available data on education shows that over a million citizens have either only primary level education or none at all. Data on computer literacy shows that 1.1 million people are computer illiterate, unable to process a text, create a table, or use e-mail and the internet.
Computer Literacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Source: Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013 final result, Bosnia and Herzegovina Agency for statistics.
In the wrap up of her analysis, Pellizzer concluded that nearly half of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not well equipped enough to either participate in or benefit from today's information age; there was also a worrisome gender gap:
If we have more than half of the population […] barely able to use computers and navigate the current digital environment how can we even talk about employment and qualification of workers? Which future are we suggesting when women/girls are suffering a double gap in education: literacy and digital literacy? […]
Bosnia Herzegovina is a country of illiterates, with an adult, aging population. The average age is 39.5 years old. Adults are very challenged in changing their own behavior, so how they can turn around the negative trends of politics, the economy and social welfare of their country? This late, imperfect, incomplete and contested census is more than scary.
Education should be the most serious, urgent and strategic problem for the plethora of politicians constantly ready, at each electoral round, administrative or political, to spend millions of words in campaigning about how they will build or rebuild their country, entity, cantons, or municipality.
In December 2016, the International Monitoring Operation is supposed to provide an “approval” on the census results.
Le sud enclin à la sécheresse de Madagascar est de nouveau aux prises avec une crise alimentaire cette année. La violence inhabituelle du phénomène El Niño se traduit par une absence de pluie. Les prix ont flambé sur les marchés locaux, laissant plus de 665 000 personnes dans un besoin urgent d'aide alimentaire.
Cette immense île de l'océan Indien est l'un des pays du monde les plus exposés aux catastrophes naturelles. Les régions semi-arides de l'extrême sud de Madagascar - Androy, Anosy et Atsimo Andrefana - sont confrontées à de nouvelles crises chaque année. La manifestation récente du phénomène El Niño n'a fait qu'aggraver une situation déjà critique.
Âgé de bientôt trois ans, Dami ne pèse pourtant que 6,9 kilos. Sous son short bleu et son t-shirt d'un blanc poussiéreux, ses membres ne sont guère plus épais qu'une carotte malgré un ventre gonflé : un signe inéluctable de malnutrition.
Il suçote un sachet de Plumpy'Nut, un aliment prêt à l'emploi à haute valeur nutritionnelle à base d'arachide. Lorsque son sachet lui échappe et tombe à terre, sa sœur s'en empare aussitôt et se met à le mâcher. Elle aussi est affamée.
D'appétissants cactus
La sécheresse qui sévit actuellement, l'une des pires à ce jour, a brûlé les cultures de riz et de manioc en laissant 80 pour cent de la population sans approvisionnement alimentaire sûr. De nombreuses communautés agricoles dépendent désormais de l'aide alimentaire - et des cactus.
« Cette sécheresse est la pire que j'aie jamais connue. L'année dernière, nous avons connu la sécheresse, mais il a un peu plu. Cette année en revanche, rien n'est tombé ou presque. »
Le fruit rouge des cactus est utilisé comme denrée d'urgence dans le sud. Difficile à digérer, il peut toutefois provoquer des troubles intestinaux exacerbant les effets de la malnutrition. Dami est l'un des huit enfants d'Ambahinky Kazy, 38 ans, une mère pauvre peinant à trouver du travail. Elle souhaiterait que ses enfants deviennent instituteurs, mais aucun d'entre eux n'a été à l'école.
Dami s'est vu remettre sa ration de Plumpy'Nut à la suite d'une opération de dépistage menée par UNICEF dans le village d'Ambondro, dans la région d'Androy. Lors de l'examen médical, son tour de bras n'était que de 10 centimètres - un chiffre alarmant.
Jusqu'à 90 sachets de Plumpy'Nut sont nécessaires au rétablissement d'un enfant, mais le fait que les familles aient tendance à voir ce « médicament » comme de la nourriture, et à le partager entre les différents membres affamés de la fratrie, complique les choses.
Depuis quatre ans, Mme Kazy a bénéficié du programme de l'UNICEF par intermittence avec ses différents enfants - un exemple tangible de la pauvreté chronique dont souffre la région.
Près d'un million d'enfants sont atteints de malnutrition aigüe à Madagascar, et cet État insulaire affiche l'un des taux les plus élevés au monde s'agissant du retard de croissance chez les enfants de moins de cinq ans.
La crise de malnutrition est le principal enjeu de santé auquel le gouvernement doit faire face, d'après le ministre de la Santé Mamy Lalatiana Andriamanarivo. La situation « reste alarmante, en particulier dans le sud », a-t-il dit.
Une réponse insuffisante
Le gouvernement dit faire de la lutte contre la crise alimentaire une priorité, mais ses efforts sont entravés par le manque de financements (une part importante du budget de la Santé est tributaire de l'aide étrangère) et des difficultés de mise en œuvre. La résilience des communautés vulnérables aux chocs climatiques n'a guère enregistré de progrès, et les infrastructures se délitent : chaque année, le nombre de routes perdues excède celui des routes construites.
Cela s'explique en partie par les quatre ans de crise politique qu'a connus le pays, durant lesquels les pays donateurs ont gelé l'aide au développement - ce qui a affecté « la capacité institutionnelle du gouvernement, la croissance économique et les efforts de développement social », a dit le Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM).
L'insécurité alimentaire ne touche pas seulement les mères célibataires défavorisées et leurs enfants. Toute la communauté est affectée.
« Je suis continuellement inquiet, tous les jours », a dit Damy Miarorala, le maire d'Ambondro. « Cette sécheresse est la pire que j'aie jamais connue. L'année dernière, nous avons connu la sécheresse, mais il a un peu plu. Cette année en revanche, rien n'est tombé ou presque. »
La sécheresse de l'an passé a été meurtrière - en particulier chez les enfants - du fait de la malnutrition, et il semblerait que ce soit encore le cas cette année.
« Ma principale inquiétude est qu'il y ait des décès dus au manque de nourriture. Certaines personnes s'alimentent du fruit rouge du cactus, ce qui est nuisible à leur santé », a dit M. Miarorala.
Lorsqu'il lui a été demandé s'il avait faim, l'ami du maire, M. Malafeno, a ri en montrant ses habits trop larges pour lui. À l'époque où ils lui allaient encore, il pesait 90 kilos. Il en pèse aujourd'hui à peine 63.
Sous le radar
Il est difficile pour Madagascar d'obtenir l'aide dont elle a besoin en raison de sa situation géographique « un peu perdue au milieu de l'océan », a expliqué Willem van Milink, le représentant du Programme alimentaire mondial dans le pays.
Les travailleurs humanitaires estiment que Madagascar a été « rayée de la carte » et oubliée par la communauté internationale. Bien qu'écrasante et d'une gravité constante, la crise alimentaire malgache n'affiche pas les statistiques effroyables ou les événements catastrophiques donnant droit à une aide significative ou à l'attention des bailleurs de fonds en matière de développement.
« Nous n'avons plus d'espoir. Nous attendons simplement de mourir. »
Pourtant, la sécheresse est certainement le symptôme de l'un des enjeux mondiaux les plus urgents : le changement climatique.
Cela fait cinq ans que les précipitations sont en deçà de leur niveau normal, d'après le chef Voasaotsy du village d'Anjampaly, dans le district de Tsihombe. En 2010, une averse de grêle a détruit leurs récoltes de maïs, de patate douce et de pastèque. La fertilité du sol en a pâti, et les cultures ne s'en sont pas remises depuis.
« Nous n'avons plus rien à quoi nous raccrocher », a dit M. Voasaotsy. Mimant la manière dont les villageois s'alimentent en dehors de leur ration quotidienne de maïs assurée par le PAM, il a retiré les épines d'une feuille de cactus et a mordu dedans.
Avec un désespoir flagrant, il a expliqué que les villageois avaient vendu leurs propriétés et leur bétail pour acheter la nourriture qu'ils avaient l'habitude de cultiver eux-mêmes. La moitié du village a migré en direction du nord. La moitié restante n'arrive pas à vendre ses terres, puisque tout le monde souhaite partir. Au moins cinq personnes sont mortes de faim.
« Notre vie se résume à attendre qu'il pleuve », a continué M. Voasaotsy. « Mais nous n'avons plus d'espoir. Nous attendons simplement de mourir. »
Dans le sud de Madagascar, les effets de la grave sécheresse provoquée par le phénomène El Niño sur la production agricole, où près de 850.000 personnes sont en situation de grave insécurité alimentaire, vont vraisemblablement se poursuivre jusqu'en 2017, a prévenu jeudi l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture (FAO).
3 novembre 2016
Des pluies abondantes ont touchées la côte est de Madagascar, surtout Fort Dauphin. Mais le sud-ouest souffre encore de la sécheresse.
I am often confronted by the question “Are you Iranian or Persian, and what’s the difference?” and it has become something of a bonding ritual among Iranians I know to discuss the various ways in which we answer that question. For many years, I answered that there existed little difference between the two besides a political connotation, “Persian” being the adjective of choice for those who avoided any connection to the Islamic Republic. Noted Iranian comedian Maz Jobrani, similarly, points to the historically alluring and exotic sound of “Persian,” as well as its connection to [Persian] cats and rugs, in order to explain why many people prefer to use this word instead of “Iranian.”
This worked pretty well for me until the day I met a young Iranian-American of mixed Azeri-Bakhtiari Iranian heritage. While flippantly describing us jointly as “Persian,” I was pointedly informed that besides the language she spoke and a mainstream Iranian culture we shared, there was not much “Persian” about her. I had been describing myself and other Iranian-Americans I knew as Persian not merely because it was convenient, but in fact because we were Iranians of Persian ethnicity. And this was the day I found out that Iran is not, in fact, a wholly “Persian” country, contrary to popular belief and the continued insistence of many Iranians.
In fact, Persians- here defined as those whose mother tongue is Persian and identify themselves as such- make up about half (though some estimates range as high as 60%), the rest being composed of Azeris, Arabs, Balochis, Kurds, Gilanis, Mazanderanis, Loris, Qashqais, Bakhtiaris, Armenians and a whole host of other ethnic groups who collectively identify as Iranians and speak the Persian language but but whose ethnic identity is other than Persian. In addition to these ethnic and linguistic minorities, there exists a host of religious minorities- Sunni Muslims, Christians, Jews, Bahais, Zoroastrians, etc- who also fit across the ethnic mosaic described above, some identifying as Persians and others not.
On some level, I had always known Iran was not a “Persian” country. I grew up hearing jokes about “Turks”– meaning Iranians of Azeri extraction, sometimes called “Azeri Turks” because of their cultural and linguistic affinities to Turkey- and noticed that I could not always understand languages I heard spoken on Tehran streets. And yet, despite this, every journalist and every Iranian I knew insisted Iranians were Persians, in the process denying the existence of half of Iran’s population.
The injustice and absurdity of this denial finds its roots not just in ignorance but in the prevalent and virulent brand Persian racism rooted in mid-20th century Iranian nationalism that sought to wipe out our country’s ethnic diversity.The development of nation states around the world over the last two centuries has been accompanied by violent attempts to overlook or erase national diversity within the boundaries of the state. The natural diversity of human culture has been manipulated and condemned by state leaders and by politicians seeking re-election, narrowing the limits of belonging and attempting to draw lines to distinguish those who are a part of “us” and those who are “not.”
In countries like France this process has involved the development of a school system that brutally forced children with linguistic and cultural backgrounds other than proper [Parisian] French to assimilate and forget their languages or dialects; often, this was achieved by beating students who spoke their mother tongue at school and teaching them that it was worthless (history of French linguistic nationalism here). In places like Germany, meanwhile, territorial expansion into areas inhabited by German-speakers combined with physical extermination was used to rid the nation of religious minorities (like Jews and Catholics) and cultural minorities (like the Roma and Sinti) who seemed impossible to assimilate while uniting geographically disparate ethnic German communities (overview of those policies here).
The creation of nation states outside of Europe, a process facilitated through both colonialism as well as resistance to it, spread the development of exclusivist national projects globally. Iran has been no stranger to this process; indeed, the development of an Iranian national identity, under both the Pahlavi regime and the Islamic Republic, has involved controlling and marginalizing those who do not fit correctly within the normative construction of what it is to be “Iranian.”
The Pahlavi regime’s definition of Iranianness finds its roots in the construction of an exclusivist Iranian identity in the 1920’s and 30’s. The increasingly centralized and authoritarian state of Reza Shah Pahlavi sought to eliminate linguistic and cultural diversity by crafting a narrative of Persian Iranian history that went back nearly 2500 years that was united by the determination of the Persian people. This was of course an artificial history, just as nationalisms always are- both the Qajar and Safavid dynasties preceding the Pahlavi were Azeri Turkish, for example, and historically it was not ethnicity but ethnically neutral imperialism and the use of Persian language as a lingua franca that had brought together the incredibly diverse peoples populating the lands under control of the “Persian Empire.”
Reza Shah took his cue from the nationalist ideological currents sweeping Europe and Turkey, where colonial scholarship had long equated language with ethnicity as part of the efforts to understand the success of certain nation-states as compared to others. Aryanism was one of the most influential of these ideologies, and it identified the Indo-European language tree (which includes Sanskrit, Persian, and most European languages) as proof of a migration of an imagined Aryan nation out of India, through Persia, and into Europe. Aryanism was highly convenient for Europeans because it made sense of the Indian and Persian civilizations they were encountering through their colonial enterprises.
According to this theory, Europe represented the pinnacle of the racial hierarchy while Indian and Persian civilizations were mere steps on the way to contemporary greatness. Additionally, it distanced Europeans from the Semitic languages of the Jews and Arabs, offering a pseudo-scientific rationale for both racialist anti-Semitism and Orientalism.
Pleased to be offered a position just below his European masters on the ladder of civilizations, Reza Shah declared Iran a nation of “Aryans.” He subsequently banned the use of languages other than Persian in schools and written media more broadly. We all became Persian, and other languages became mere dialects not suitable for official use (especially non-Indo European tongues like Azeri Turkish and Semitic Arabic, but also Indo-European Kurdish).
On one hand, this form of nationalism allowed religious minorities that consider themselves Persians- like most Jews, Bahais, and atheists- to be a part of normative Iranianness, because being Iranian was defined by how Persian you are and thus offered a secular national identity for those 10% of Iranians who were not Shia to be a part of. On the other hand, however, this came at the expense of the 49% of Iranians who now had to either lose their heritage or exist silently at the margins.
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi at the tomb of Cyrus the Great, a 2500-year old emperor known for his commitment to human rights
who probably would not have liked the Shah, a tyrant known for a CIA-trained secret police.
Although his co-option of ancient Persian and Zoroastrian symbols in order to describe his rule was anachronistic and repulsive to some Iranians- many of whom scoffed at his references to Cyrus the Great and divine rule by using terms like, “universal ruler,” Shahanshah (“King of Kings”), and Aryamehr, (“light of the Aryans”) to describe himself- most Iranians eventually bought these racialist myths of Iranian-ness and the narrative became naturalized.
Even today it’s not uncommon to hear Iranians describe themselves as Aryans, usually when emphasizing their non-Arabness to white people and linking themselves to Europe (“Really, we are Aryans, our language is more similar to German than Arabic!”). Of course, these attempts are often received with awkward horror, the term “Aryan” having fallen out of usage following Adolf Hitler’s unfortunate decision to wholeheartedly adopt the Aryan theory as a rationale for genocide.
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 dramatically shifted these meanings of Iranianness. Secular Persianness was replaced with religious Shianess; in the course of just a few years, the official way to be Iranian was by being an observant Shia Muslim and thus lost a great deal of its association with ethnic Persianness.
In contrast to Pahlavi Iranianness which excluded non-Persians, under the Islamic Republic all Shia Muslims regardless of ethnicity could be normative Iranian citizens, meaning that 90% of Iranians could potentially fit the new Iranian national identity.
However, religious minorities- including those who considered themselves Persian, like most Jews and Bahais- were no longer part of mainstream Iranianness, and secular or non-observant people of Shia Muslim background found themselves marginalized as well.
The Islamic Republic dealt with these in different ways: while seculars were to be forcibly assimilated as much as possible, Jews (and other non-Persian religious minorities, like Christians and Sunni Muslims) were to be respected as citizens with equal rights but slightly different status.
Languages other than Persian rapidly entered the public sphere and print use of other languages was legalized. Despite this, the ethno-supremacist version of Persian-Iranian nationalism did not disappear overnight; even as ethnic minorities like Mir Hossein Mousavi (Azeri), Mehdi Karroubi (Lori), and Ayatollah Khamenei (Azeri) reached top political and religious posts, the war against (mostly Arab) Iraq ensured the longevity of Persian nationalism in the face of a virulently anti-Persian foe.
Persian ethnocentrism has remained an influential part of public discourse within Iran, and many Iranians outside of Iran as well cling to notions of Aryanism and Persianism deeply antithetical to an inclusive, egalitarian democratic future. In popular discourse these representations are rife, as the youtube videos above provide evidence of. Alireza Asgharzadeh’s book, “Iran and the Challenge of Diversity: Islamic Fundamentalism, Aryanist Racism, and Democratic Struggles,” tackles this discourse in depth, albeit with numerous methodological flaws (a shorter interview of his can be found here, while an extensive rebuttal to a number of his arguments and sources can be found here).
The 2006 riots in Iranian Azerbaijan highlighted the persistence of this racist discourse- and its linguistic roots- in public discourse. In May of that year a satirical cartoon was published depicted a boy speaking to a cockroach in Persian as the cockroach responded “What?” in Azeri.
An accompanying article pointed to the inability of cockroaches to understand reason and to the incomprehensibility and silliness of their own language, a provocation that led to riots across the majority-Azeri areas of Iran and left four dead. The cartoonist, an ethnic Azeri himself, was subsequently arrested and the newspaper shut down, but it can be surmised from the timing that the state’s reaction was to prevent more rioting, not tackle the prejudice at the heart of the issue.
In our struggle as Iranians both in Iran and the diaspora to develop a national identity that is religiously inclusive, we must not simultaneously build one that is ethnically and linguistically exclusive. Crafting an inclusive national identity by recognizing the historical marginalization and silencing of Iran’s minority languages must be a crucial part of our national struggle for freedom and equality.
Indeed, in a world full of exclusivist nation states and ethnic cleansings with the goal of “purifying” and homogenizing populations, Iran’s diversity stands out. We are a nation united not by ethnicity nor religion but by history and a shared, rich, diverse national culture.
Anciennes fermes en ruine, bories, puits, mares, étables, granges,autant de ruines qui montrent la présence de l'homme et sa désertion des cultures. La Forêt ne recule pas dans toutes les régions: elle suit le mouvement.
Des ruines partout en forêts. La campagne était autrefois beaucoup plus habitée qu'elle ne l'est aujourd'hui.
C'est avec l'ère industrielle qu'elle a commencée à se dépeupler mais aussi parce que les paysans ont apportés un lourd tribu aux guerres, ce que l'on appelle maintenant les dégâts collatéraux pour éviter de nommer les personnes qui ont laissées leur vie pour la nation. Dans de nombreuses régions les familles étaient si nombreuses que la terre ne pouvait nourrir tout le monde entraînant une émigration vers les grandes villes, l'Amérique Latine et celle du Nord.
Et, quand on abandonne la terre, la nature reprend ses droits. La forêt envahie, en quelques années, ces terres abandonnées qui constituent un terreau remarquable pour l'implantation naturelle des essences de bois feuillus. Graines apportées autant par les oiseaux que par le vent.
C'est ainsi que naissent la plus-part des bois-taillis dévorants les maisons, les étables, les cours, bouchant les puits et les marres qui retombent à l'état sauvage dès l'instant où on ne les entretient plus.
Ces ruines sont plus nombreuses que vous ne pouvez l'imaginer. Ne vous arrêtez pas à leur existence ou leur absence au cadastre. Vous devez consacrer une bonne partie de votre temps, après votre achat, à rechercher toute trace d'existence dans vos bois.
Un jour, dans un bois que je traversais pendant une randonnée, je suis tombé dans un puits que je n'avais pas vu car complètement caché par la végétation. Une ancienne ferme partiellement en ruine se tenait à proximité. Je n'étais pas chez moi donc je n'ai pu entreprendre aucune recherche.
Parcourez vos bois ou votre forêt pour découvrir ce que les anciens propriétaires n'ont peut-être pas vus et, ceux qui les ont habités ont pus laisser. Quelque soit leur état elles sont comptées pour zéro même si celui qui vous fait visiter vous en parle avec un clin d'oeil.
C'est un plus vous dit-il. En quoi peuvent-elles être considérées comme un plus ? Elles ne font pas l'ombre d'une réhabilitation !
D'ailleurs, vous avez sans doute remarqué que l'on emploi le pluriel pour les désigner histoire de bien montrer qu'il s'agit d'un tas de pierres. Vous devez avoir un autre regard et dans votre tête les imaginer : murs redressés, charpente et toiture installées.
Inscrites au cadastre ou pas ne doit pas être votre problème.
Faites des pieds et des mains pour trouver la bonne formule qui vous permettra de les réhabiliter : refuge de montagne, gite d'étape et si rien n'y fait, abri pour les animaux largement ouvert mais avec murs dûment maçonnés, charpente réalisée avec le matériaux de votre bois, couverture en tavaillons ou lose. Tout étant réalisé dans le respect des coutumes locales et du patrimoine.
Quelles sortes de ruines pouvez-vous trouver ? Fermes, étables, hangars, porcheries, abris pour animaux, puits.
