Republican People’s Party (CHP) deputy Aykut Erdoğdu, a member of the (Turkish) parliamentary Coup Investigation Commission, has hinted that a failed (military) coup on July 15 was a calculated move on the part of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice And Development Party (AKP) government.
Sharing a picture that shows Erdoğan and Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım laughing, Erdoğdu tweeted on Saturday: “Why are they laughing? ‘How we have pulled off the coup…’”
Erdoğdu said in an interview with the Birgün daily in October that the AKP is trying to obscure the realities behind the failed coup attempt on July 15 since the commission is being prevented from doing its job by “hidden hands.”
"It was pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) Chairman Selahattin Demirtaş who finally came out and said publicly in his party group meeting on Oct. 4 that Erdoğan knew of the coup plans days in advance and used that to consolidate his power. He said all lawmakers in Parliament knew about it and were chatting about it privately in the halls but did not have the courage to stand up and say it out loud to the public. Demirtaş’s revelations went viral, angering President Erdoğan, who gave the order to detain him and other Kurdish lawmakers on trumped-up charges. Demirtaş is still in prison today because Erdoğan wants him to be silenced in solitary confinement in a Turkish prison."
In Aleppo bricht der Widerstand gegen die Regierungstruppen zusammen und Beobachter prophezeien das mögliche Ende des Aufstands in ganz Syrien. In Mossul sind die Islamisten des Kalifats umzingelt; sie können zwar noch Monate lang Widerstand leisten, doch irgendwann ist Schluss, so sich die Belagerer nicht verzanken. In Syrien wäre Rakka, die sogenannte Haupstadt des Daesh, vielleicht schon erobert, wenn nicht türkisches Militär die Kurden und ihre arabischen Verbündeten am Vorrücken hindern würde.
In Libyen halten spärliche Reste des Kalifats offenbar noch ein Viertel der Stadt Sirte besetzt, aber die Machtträume sind ausgeträumt. In Nigeria, Kamerun, Tschad und Niger ist Boko Haram auf dem Rückzug. In Somalia existiert Al-Shabaab nach wie vor, doch es reicht nicht zu mehr als einem Partisanenkrieg gegen die vom Westen gestützte Regierung. Nur auf dem Sinai führt Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis, jetzt “Sinai Provinz” des Kalifats genannt, weiterhin Krieg gegen die Regierung in Kairo, ohne jedoch mehr als lokale Erfolge und Attentate zu verbuchen.
Der Traum der militanten Dschihadisten von der Eroberung Roms und der danach folgenden Weltherrschaft scheint ausgeträumt. Die zunächst von Fanatismus und barbarischer Grausamkeit überrumpelten Länder und Völker haben gelernt, den Dschihadis das Handwerk zu legen. Militärische Mittel in den von Milizen heimgesuchten Ländern und juristische und polizeiliche Vorkehrungen in den vom Terror betroffenen Staaten haben den Spielraum der Fanatiker langsam, aber doch wirksam eingegrenzt.
Man zögert zwar, vom Licht am Ende des Tunnels zu sprechen, aber dass der Dschihadismus den Zenith seiner Macht überschritten hat, ist ziemlich sicher. Ist das ein Grund, sich zurück zu lehnen?
Keineswegs, denn das Problem dauert fort, wenn auch in anderen Formen. Deutsche Dienste haben beispielsweise ermittelt, dass die Mehrzahl der aus Syrien und anderen Kampfgebieten Zurückgekehrten dem Islamismus keineswegs abschwört, sondern weiterhin die alte Umgebung der frommen Vereine und Moscheen aufsucht.
Selbst wenn eines Tages Syrien und der Irak befriedet sein sollten, werden die überlebenden alten Kämpfer – so sie nicht in Gefängnissen sitzen – ein internationales Terrorpotential darstellen, ebenso wie es die militanten Tschetschenen noch viele Jahre nach der gewaltsamen Befriedung ihres Landes sind, stets bereit, sich einem islamistischen Aufstand irgendwo in der Welt zur Verfügung zu stellen: In Südasien, in Afrika, im Pazifik – wo auch immer. Eine Art extrem bewegliches, islamistisches Rollkommando.
Ein weiteres Problem sind die enormen Mengen an Waffen, die in den Ländern verbleiben, tödliches Spielzeug für neue Jahrgänge wahrscheinlich frustrierter Jünglinge. Religion hin oder her, Dschihad hin oder her: allein die Existenz der Waffen dürfte dafür sorgen, dass diese Länder für lange Zeit nicht zur Ruhe finden werden.
Auch wenn es gelingen sollte, die schlimmsten Brandherde der Gegenwart zu löschen – Syrien, Irak, Jemen, Nigeria – so verbleibt doch das Problem der heimlichen Drahtzieher hinter den Konflikten. Die Türkei, Saudi Arabien, Katar, die Emirate, Kuweit haben jahrelang die Dschihadisten gesponsert.
Zwar mögen die Dschihadisten die Partie im wesentlichen verlieren: ihre Sponsoren jedoch werden weitermachen. Saudi Arabien und Katar werden weiterhin versuchen, die Welt von ihrer wahhabitischen Religion zu überzeugen. Die Türkei wird ebenso versuchen, überall im Nahen Osten Moslembrüder-Regierungen nach türkischem Muster zu installieren.
In Ägypten und Syrien ging das zwar gründlich schief, aber in Libyen ist Ankara durch Waffenlieferungen und mehr äusserst bemüht, den Moslembrüdern in Tripolis zum Sieg über die Laizisten in Tobruk zu verhelfen. Wie die Erdogan-Regierung das macht, hat Abdullah Bozkurt soeben eindrucksvoll dokumentiert. Auch in Tunesien, Algerien und Marokko können sich die Brüder und ihre Freunde des türkischen Mitgefühls erfreuen. Die Hamas in Gaza ist ein enger Freund der türkischen Regierung. Dem islamistischen Regime im Sudan widmet die Türkei besondere Aufmerksamkeit, einschliesslich gelegentlicher Flottenbesuche für gemeinsame Manöver.
Fazit: Das sunnititische Expansionsstreben wird anhalten: zwar weniger brutal und grossmäulig als Daesh, al-Kaida & Co, doch ebenso penetrant. Während die Sunniten sich weiterhin bemühen, den Rest der Welt zu verärgern, ernten die Schiiten unter der Führung des Iran grosse Territorial- und Machtgewinne. Ohne jemand ausser den Sunniten zu ärgern. Soeben erreichen die Iraner ein grosses Etappenziel auf ihrem Streben nach der schiitischen Version der Weltherrschaft: das Ufer des Mittelmeers.
Ihsan al-Tawil
Written on .
Journalist Masha Gessen has spent years reporting on Vladimir Putin’s rule in Russia. She has written that the focus on Russian influence over now President-elect Donald Trump has been overstated and the result of a failure of imagination: the inability to imagine that the president would profoundly break with the norms of our country’s political discourse and practices.
A few days after Trump’s win, Gessen wrote about what citizens should be on the watch for with the incoming administration. ProPublica’s Eric Umansky and Jesse Eisinger sat down with Gessen to talk about how exactly journalists should be covering Trump.
Journalists needed to realize Trump wasn’t playing chess…
I'm going to borrow a metaphor from Garry Kasparov, the chess champion, who when he first quit chess and went into politics, he was explaining to people that going up against Putin was like playing chess against somebody who keeps knocking the figures off the board. It's like he's not playing chess.
I think that what the papers failed to do was write the big story of the fact that Donald Trump wasn't playing chess. It's like the endless fact checking was a little bit like reporting on a chess match by saying, "Okay, well, she opened E2 to E4 and he knocked all the figures off the chess board. He knocked the bishop off the chess board and he knocked the knight off the chess board." Well, just say it! Just say he was not playing chess!
I think that it would have been a story about how Donald Trump was running for autocrat. I think at that point there should have been a big journalistic break with American exceptionalism and that's where we would have gone to other countries to look at what has happened to other countries when politicians have run in democratic elections for autocrat. It's happened many times and it's succeeded many times.
There was a collective failure of imagination…
Many reporters had gone directly from the state of total disbelief that Trump will never be the Republican nominee, even when he had the nomination locked in. Their argument, when I would ask people, they would say, "Well, I just can't imagine it happening." Well, if you can't imagine it happening, that's your problem.
When somebody says, "I can't imagine it happening," that's a problem.
Then what happened was that there was this whole direction of coverage that held, incredibly to me for the entire campaign, this idea that Trump was somehow Putin's agent and that Russia was meddling in the election and that Russia was rigging the election. There's a little tiny bit of evidence for it, but that's a classic conspiracy theory phenomenon where's there is a little bit of evidence but that's not what happened.
What happened was an American phenomenon, a home-grown potential autocrat who was elected by Americans.
It was so difficult to imagine that this was happening here that it was actually easier to do this complete bend over backwards maneuver that would position him as some sort of agent of Putin and Clinton's campaign ran with it.
Journalists should look at how this has played out in other countries...
I would look at the world and I would look for parallels.
When I was reporting on [Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor] Lieberman, a lot of people in Israel, this is 2010, they were saying, "Never mind, he's on his way out because there's this corruption scandal that is going to finally engulf and derail him." Then it didn't happen. There was the corruption scandal, the corruption was proven. It was the sort of thing that would have derailed any traditional Israeli politician and it didn't stick to Lieberman.
It turns out that populist resentment politics can overtake a lot of that, possibly all of that, but also in the specifics, right? We have Lieberman, who turns out to be impervious to the kinds of things that would have damaged a different politician. That's a lesson that would have been very well learned in the summer and fall as more and more details were coming out about Trump.
I was absolutely convinced that he was going to win. The reason why I was convinced he was going to win is because I've been reporting on these people, mostly Putin, but a little bit of Lieberman, a little bit of [Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor] Orban. I've been seeing this happening everywhere.
The job for journalists now is to document changing norms...
We really have to figure out how to tell the truth and not just report the facts. Which is a pretty good sentence but not a great prescription.
I think that I would create new beats. The language beat, language watch.
Understand that normal is going to drift and shift and all sorts of things are about to happen and part of our job is to notice and document how it's happening. We may not be able to influence the course of events, but our job is to at least be able to tell the story."
Andrea B ist Zahnarzt. Sein Vermieter hat ihm die Praxisräume gekündigt. Er muss also umziehen. Aber wohin in der übervölkerten Stadt Rom? Zu mieten gibt es nichts Geeignetes. Andrea möchte kaufen. Aber um eine passende Räumlichkeit zu kaufen, braucht er eine Hypothek.
Seit Tagen irrt er von einer Bank zur anderen. “Ci dispiace” ist immer die gleiche Antwort. “Tut uns leid”, keine Hypothek. Die Banken sind von Pleite bedroht. Sie versuchen, sich zu sanieren und geben deshalb keine Kredite mehr. Da steht Andrea, erfolgreicher Zahnarzt, und muss wahrscheinlich seine Praxis dicht machen. Ihm droht Arbeitslosigkeit, denn anderen Dentalpraxen geht es schlecht, sie nehmen keine Kollegen als Hilfskräfte auf, denn zweieinhalb Millionen Italiener können es sich nicht mehr leisten, notwendige Arztbesuche vorzunehmen, selbst solche, die die Kasse zahlt. Wenn das Geld knapp ist, wird stets zuerst am Zahnarzt gespart. Das ist Tradition in Italien.
Seit 2008 steckt Italien in der Krise. Man hat sich so sehr an die Krise gewöhnt, dass sich die Laune der Italiener zuletzt wieder leicht aufhellt, obwohl die Zahlen des Statistikamts ISTAT weiterhin negativ sind. Nun wird am 4. Dezember über die von Premier Matteo Renzi vorgeschlagene Verfassungsreform abgestimmt, und man rechnet mit Ablehnung und, in der Folge, einem Kollabieren der unter faulen Krediten ächzenden Banken. Renzi hat versprochen, im Falle der Ablehnung zurückzutreten.
Schon wartet in den Kulissen ein möglicher Nachfolger: niemand weniger als Silvio Berlusconi. Altmeister Berlusconi, einst schmählich verjagt und vorbestraft, möchte noch einmal antreten.
Er ist als Kandidat für die Nachfolge Renzis keine Witzfigur: seine Partei Forza Italia ist zwar stark geschrumpft und steht keineswegs einmütig hinter ihm, aber Berlusconi ist ein Renzi-Fan und könnte mit ihm zusammen eine Art Grosse Koalition Rechts-Links bilden, die bei Neuwahlen eine solide Mehrheit erwarten könnte.
Das italienische Bürgertum scheint nach Renzi-Jahren bereit, jeden Schlawiner zu wählen, wenn er nur die Herrschaft der Linken beendet und Renzi entschärft. Renzi hat unklugerweise seine Regierung mit dem Ausgang des Referendums verknüpft. Das kann viele Leute, die gegen Renzi sind und die neue Verfassung an sich begrüssen würden, dazu bewegen, mit Nein zu stimmen, nur um Renzi loszuwerden.
Das Lager-Denken ist in Italien immer noch oder wieder enorm stark: eine Grosse Koalition würde eine echte Umwälzung bedeuten, gilt aber als aussichtsreiche Alternative zu einer Machtübernahme der Fundamental-Opposition der Fünf Sterne des Ex.Komikers Beppe Grillo, vor dem sich Links und Rechts gleichermassen (und berechtigterweise) fürchten.
Benedikt Brenner
Written on .
The morning after the election, Van Jones offered his thoughts on the outcome:
"This was a whitelash against a changing country. It was whitelash against a black president in part. And that's the part where the pain comes."
Jones spoke honestly, from a place of sincere emotion, and I have a great deal of respect for that. His thesis certainly appealed to a lot of people. Given that Trump began his campaign with racist rhetoric and never really stopped, it also makes quite a bit of sense on the surface. There’s one problem: The numbers say it doesn’t hold water.
Yes, Hillary Clinton won the popular vote by a margin now approaching two million. That’s very important to remember going forward, but not especially helpful in terms of exploring why Trump did as well as he did. Let’s also leave aside the impact of James Comey’s completely inappropriate actions. Even if, as it appears true, Comey (the FBI director, --ed)) was enough to swing the election to Trump because of the tight margins in three key states, it doesn’t change what we can learn from the election in terms of race, income, and education.
From the national exit polls, here are the numbers that disprove the whitelash thesis: Trump did a slim 1 percent better among whites than Mitt Romney did four years ago. Were some whites drawn to Trump’s side by racism? Absolutely. But he appears to have lost pretty much an equal amount among those whites disgusted by it.
Furthermore, Trump improved over Romney by much more among every non-white ethno-racial group large enough to measure. He improved by 7% among blacks, 8% among Latinos, and 11% among Asian voters. Along similar lines, an exit poll conducted by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) found that Trump received 13% of the Muslim vote. That doesn't sound like much, but it represents almost twice the percentage Romney won. No whitelash there.
Overall, turnout looks like it will come in at just about the same percentage of the eligible voter population as we saw in 2012. However, as Northern Ohio University political science professor Robert Alexander explained, “You saw turnout spike in more rural counties. If you take a look at a lot of the larger cities you did see depressed turnout there. It certainly was more consequential for Hillary Clinton than it was for Trump.”
Despite the more heavily rural voting population compared to 2012, Trump didn’t do significantly better than did Romney among whites overall. Of course, given that whites are about two-thirds of the voting population, gaining 1 percent among whites is important, but the gain of about 8 percent overall in the one-third of the voter population that is not white adds up to more votes.
Yes, these exit polls could be off by a couple of percent, but remember, the national polls weren’t off by that much. For example, Five-Thirty-Eight predicted a popular vote win for Hillary of 3.6 percent, and it looks like she’ll win the popular vote by close to 2 percent. That’s actually a better performance than the average polling miss of 2.0 percent in the twelve presidential elections before this one. In 2012, for example, the national polls were off by 2.7 percent, but no one noticed because all that happened was that Obama won by more than expected. So, if you reject exit polls this time, you have to always reject them, which would mean we’d know very little about demographics and voting. Either way, they’d have to have been off by a ton for this election to represent a whitelash.
On education, Trump gained significantly over Romney among all voters without a college degree, and Clinton gained significantly over Obama among voters with a degree. Looking at race and education combined tells the fuller story. Trump improved over Romney by 14 points among whites without a college degree, while Hillary improved over Obama in 2012 by 10 points among whites with a degree. Overall, Trump did 16-17 points better among whites without a degree than those with one. Among voters of color, however, non-degree holders were actually a bit stronger for Hillary than degree holders. So education mattered, but much more so among whites.
How about income? Trump improved over Romney by the biggest amount among the people helped most by Democratic policies, i.e., the poorest Americans: by 16 percent among those earning less than $30,000, and by 6 percent among those making $30,000-$50,000. Clinton, on the other hand, improved over Obama by 2 percent among those making $50-100K, and by 9 percent among those making $100-200K. This is clear and striking evidence that the election results were determined much more by class than by race for white voters taken as a whole.
Finally, although my focus is whether the whitelash theory was accurate, let’s talk about gender as well. Trump ran five points stronger among men than Romney did, whereas Clinton improved over Obama’s performance among women four years ago by only one point. Such a result, despite women having the opportunity to vote for the first woman president—not to mention against an opponent who bragged that he could get away with committing sexual assault because he’s a “star”—has to count as a colossal disappointment.