Federica Mogherini, the Foreign Representative of the European Union, visited Tehran for the purpose of strengthening relations and coordinating the fight against terrorism. A weird assignment given the fact that Iran is a major sponsor of the terrorist Assad government in Syria, as well as of Hizbollah, the illegal Shi'ite militia in Lebanon.
But what is also disconcerting is the fact that she donned a headscarf during the encounters with the Ayatollahs and during the joint press conference with Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.
The headscarf was pink, o.k. But that does not make it less of a headscarf. Why would a non-Muslim European diplomat wear such a piece of headgear? Is it because Ayatollahs such as President Hassan Rouhani could be embarrassed to see a woman's hair?
Whatever happened to half a century of feminist pride, of gender mainstreaming, if this is the result? How can we expect Iran ever to rejoin the world community if the representative of Europe bows to the whims of a caste of priests turned politicians who are notorious for their awful human rights record?
Ihsan al-Tawil
Written on .
If an IS militant dies in battle and is awarded his 72 "houris" (the heavenly maidens whom, according to IS ideology, militants are given if they are killed in battle), will he forget all about his wife?
It sounds like the opening lines of a joke. But this is a serious question for the Islamic State (IS) group, and especially for the women who join it and marry militants.
Like other violent "jihadi" groups, IS entices men to join its ranks by promising them they will be granted 72 eternally young and beautiful virgins when they die in battle and go to heaven.
This is a powerful piece of recruitment propaganda for male militants.
But it is hardly attractive for IS brides, who are told that after death they will be reunited with their dead husbands in paradise -- after he has settled down with his houris.
'I Am Jealous Of The Houris'
A support group for IS wives and widows on the Russian social network VKontakte openly addresses the problematic issue of houris through a poem.
The poem's author, named as Karima Umm Saad, addresses her husband and admits her jealousy of the heavenly houris who, she believes, will make him forget about his earthly life as soon as he dies.
"I am jealous of the houris who call out to you
Every time you go into battle.
I am jealous of them because they
Might meet you sooner.
They will meet you -- you will forget everything,
Blood still flowing from your chest."
Poem by Karima Umm Saad
Umm Saad goes on to tell her husband she is "also dreaming about a rendezvous" with him in paradise, though she doesn't say how she will deal with his houris.
Other IS brides have dealt with the houri problem in other ways.
In a post on July 20 that has been shared among other female IS militants, a woman called Ubeida Shishan attempts to assuage women's fears that their dead husbands will prefer their ever-beautiful houris to them by relating a hadith, a saying of the Prophet Muhammad.
IS brides need not worry, Ubeida says, because they are actually more attractive and interesting than the houris. "The houris have never passed through the difficulties and trials that accrue to sisters in this world. They never even fought on the path of Allah," she writes.
"They were never slandered because they wore a hijab! They have never encountered the difficulties being obedient to their husbands!"
Romance & The Ideal Wife
As well as the specific issues of houris, the IS wives' support group and other pro-IS groups on VKontakte also deal with the wider problem of how "jihadi brides" are supposed to cope emotionally when their militant husbands leave them to go off to battle and die.
To do this, the groups constantly create and recreate a romantic narrative in which militants who die fighting alongside IS are depicted as brave warriors carrying out God's wishes. They are supported by devoted militant wives whose divinely ordained role is to help their men achieve what the extremist group portrays as the lofty goal of death in battle.
Wholly modest and unfailingly loyal to their husbands, these ideal IS wives are told that they are carrying out God's commands and that they will meet their husbands again in paradise.
A July 10 post by the group Longing For Paradise illustrates this with a photograph of a bearded militant planting a chaste kiss on the entirely covered head of his wife, presumably as he heads off to battle.
"We will meet, inshallah [God willing], only there where all pain and anguish have ended, where there is eternity and the pleasure of Allah. This is the end and the limit of each of our dreams," the caption reads.
IS tries via its propaganda efforts to dress up the realities of life under its rule -- marriage to a violent militant, early widowhood, and remarriage -- as a romantic fairy tale. But there are signs that not all IS militants believe the propaganda.
A post criticizing would-be "jihadi brides" for romanticizing life as a militant's wife in IS-occupied territory in Syria and Iraq recently spread across Russian IS accounts. The post argued that women do not realize the reality of the hardships they will face in Syria or Iraq.
IS has also refused to allow women whose husbands have died in Syria to return home unless they leave their children behind. A Tajik woman, 25-year-old Gulru Olimova, was told in May that her three small children were the "property of Islamic State" and she would have to leave them behind.
Your paper "Die Schuldenfrage lösen und die Investitionsschwäche bekämpfen -- Ein Vorschlag zur Überwindung der (griechischen) Schuldenproblematik im Euro-Raum" constitutes a bold and very interesting proposal. Please allow me to comment on some of the main arguments of your paper:
Did the unbalanced Greek economy create the debt or did the debt derail the economy?
Frankly, I am not very concerned about the current level of the Greek sovereign debt. I think the creditors will delay repayment of the principal ad calendas graecas and the interest rates will be minimal; in the end it will be a semantic rather than an economic issue whether the debts remain on the books or be erased. This fact has not been fully understood in Athens and Washington [well, the IMF considers the debt to be unsustainable…]. The generous conditions [??] offered by the creditors have practically relieved Greece of its debt [??]. I tend to agree with German finance minister Schaeuble that debts are not among Greece's main problems. After the next round of political elections, some Eurozone countries might be more prepared to consider a restructuring of Greece's nominal debt. [so it’s a problem after all…]
The IMF says the volume of the debt is unsustainable and demands a restructuring as a condition for participating in a third bailout deal. But according to agency news of July 30th, the Fund would also be satisfied if "the credit conditions be loosened" which is the line pursued by Chancellor Merkel. Most likely, the IMF will participate in bailout III.
This third bail-out program currently being discussed would take care of the payments Greece needs to make in the near future. Therefore, temporarily, Greece would be relieved of its debt. Afterwards there will be, no doubt, the "restructuring" which in practical terms means that the debts will be forgiven.
Everybody knows that Greece will never be able to repay its current debts but for this truth to sink in takes time (particularly in eastern and northern Europe). As regards the near future, the level of the debts is not likely to harm Greece's economic performance as Ugo Panizza and Andrea F Presbitero explained. Perhaps the IMF should take note of that and worry less.
I am more concerned with the present growth of the debts, especially the internal ones caused by delays of the Tsipras government in honoring its financial obligations. I think it will, even under favourable conditions, take considerable time to undo the economic contraction [that’s right] caused by the policies and actions of the Tsipras government [that’s debatable]. [Wich actions do you mean ? The government action has been MAINLY concentrated to “negociate” with the former Troïka].
Well, let us remember the actions to undo austerity actions by the preceding government: rehiring staff, reopening public TV, abolishing (at least temporarily) the real estate tax, undoing pension cuts etc. The Tsipras government was busy to live up to its pre-election promises.
Given the current distortion of the primary surplus by the rising level of domestic indebtedness. The institutions wisely refrained from setting a numeric target for the surplus [it is not exact; there is a target: 3,5% to be reached in 2018].
The official text (early July version) said: "The new fiscal path is premised on a primary surplus target of (1, 2, 3), and 3.5 percent of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018". However, Silvia Merlerlater reports that "the preliminary agreement of July 13th does not include a precise numeric target for the primary surplus".
Ein schwaches Produktionspotential - Die Produktion ist geringer als der Konsum (P<K) - Die Importe sind größer als die Exporte (M<X) Eine extreme Abhängigkeit von externer Finanzierung - Die Verschuldung ist nicht die Ursache der Probleme Griechenlands, sie ist das Ergebnis dieser Probleme
I am afraid, here I disagree. I believe Greece's current problems result from years of lavish deficit spending, resulting in a mountain of debts, public and private [it’s only half of the story; had the debt been used to build the economy, it would not be an issue].
Well, in a way, the economy has been built: Svimez (Associazione per lo sviluppo dell’industria nel Mezzogiorno) says in its annual report 2015 that Greece's economy from 2000 to 2013 grew by 24 percent whereas the largely similar southern part of Italy grew only 13 percent. Although by 2013 part of the Greek bubble had disappeared, there was still considerable growth left over but largely of the unsustainable kind.
Let us look at history:
Before WWII, Greece was a poor but self-sufficient agricultural community with 40 percent illiteracy (women 63% illiterate; 1939 statistics). Low level self-sufficiency (poverty) continued until the collapse of the military regime in 1974. From then on, Greece's economy and its modernization took off, unfortunately accompanied by increasing levels of corruption and clientelism or patronage. Even the supposedly "clean" Syriza administration soon showed the old vices. (I would not be surprised if future governments discovered that during Syriza's weeks of hectic efforts to stave off default, some millions went missing
The Greek industrial and even agricultural development till 1974 has been very low, indeed. This is due to the weak institutional setting. At the contrary of Germany or France, there is almost no industrial culture in Greece. The Greek “bourgeoisie” is a commercial one. This has led, as an illustration, to prefer to stimulate the importations instead of the national production.
It was not always like this. When Greece was still part of the Ottoman empire, Greek entrepreneurs dominated the world cigarette market, dominated in the restaurant business, not to speak of their global role in shipping.
Corruption and clientelism has been the thing of Nea Democratia and Pasok and this easily provable. About Syriza, we may speculate or think what we want. But for now there is no fact that would prove anything.
A cousin of Alexis Tsipras is focal point for international economic relations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
The Bureau Chief of Culture Minister Nikos Xydakis is Panagiotis Douros, brother of Rena Dourou, Governor of Attica.
Iphigenia Kamtsidou was made head of the National Center for Public Adminstration. She is friend of Justice Minister Paraskevopoulos
Evangelos und Giorgos Kalpadakis, nephews of Interior Minister Nikos Voutsis got jobs in Tsipras' diplomatic division and as bureau chief of Deputy Premier Dragasakis, respectively.
The weekly To Vima reported that the Minister for Administrative Reform Georgios Katrougalos' law firm concluded contracts with 300 former state employees obliging them to deliver 12 percent of their indemnity for former unemployment to the law firm if they are rehired. Etc. etc.
In 1981, Greece joined the European Community and began being showered with funding from Brussels, inviting all kinds of skulduggery. Propped up by the EU, Greece's status in credit rating improved, offering successive governments the potential to sell bonds at favorable conditions. In 2001 Greece adopted the Euro currency, obtained access to the European and global financial markets and their low interest levels, thereby opening the floodgates for more debts to be contracted.
And all this, without any form of reaction from the European authorities, even though they knew very well what was happening As well as Goldman Sachs was not only fully aware, but was powerfully involved in the falsification of Greek government accounts.
Right, of course. In Italy the case was similar but not as extreme. Political and geopolitical considerations prevailed over economic rationale -- a lesson, the Eurozone has learnt, belatedly. It will cost their taxpayers hundreds of billions of euros to be written off, probably after the next round of elections. The issue now is how to stop Greece from contracting more debts.
It was the availability of easy and cheap credit which derailed the Greek economy, not vice versa. The following years of plenty, of economic miracle, elevated Greece to a level of public and private consumption equal to that of advanced European countries, and sometimes even beyond. Imported foodstuffs, school buses, air conditioning, domestic servants, swimming pools, studying fancy subjects abroad, collecting modern art, pensions for unwed daughters, vacation homes at the beach -- everything was possible. Greeks refused to perform menial work which was passed to scores of legal and illegal immigrants. During these years Greece seemed like a Gulf emirate with sudden affluence based not on revenue but on easy credit. We agree, but only in part. All Greeks did not have domestic servants, swimming pools and so on. Just as all Greeks are not cheaters. But it may be more comfortable to think the “cicada way of life” is recorded in the Greek DNA…
Of course, not. Greece's Gini coefficient of wealth and income distribution is traditionally high and probably still rose during the boom years. Greek accounts in Switzerland, Greeks snapping up luxury flats in London -- the bourgeoisie took more of its share. Of course, not all Greeks are cheaters. Take any country, offer the people lucrative business deals and cheap and easy credit and you will get a boom similar to the past one in Greece. It's not a matter of DNA, it"s simply human.
When in 2008 and 2009 the crunch came, the Greek banks discovered themselves saddled with toxic loans, and the state faced a sovereign debt well beyond 100 percent of GDP. When the banks faced default they gambled like the Italian banks: they bought billions of government bonds which offered high interest rates, trusting that the Eurozone would prevent a Grexit and someone (the Greek state?) would eventually repay them.
Die griechische Wirtschaft ist todkrank, sie ist nicht mehr in der Lage, genügend Einkommen zu generieren, um die menschliche Not zu lindern, die Produktionsfaktoren zu entlohnen und den Schuldendienst zu leisten\
Well, this is a question of perspective. True, Greece's economy is currently generating a positive primary surplus because government expenditure shrank even faster than tax revenue [that shows the level of effort for the poorest segment of the population!].
germanpages.de wrote on this subject: "At a time when the world's tax haven countries are gradually losing their secrets, Greece seems ready to replace them. Not only are tax cheaters treated with generosity; the government is also shielding bank debtors by blocking foreclosures of properties under half a million euros' worth. Overall, Syriza's so-called reform agenda creates the impression of a party fighting for the well-to-do middle and upper classes. The poor among the Greeks can only dream of owning assets to the tune of 300,000 euros and their homes, if they own one, are certainly worth less than half a million euros."
An awful situation: citizens dodge taxes, the state shirks its obligations (see Silvia Merler's excellent piece). Greek payments due to creditors had to be funded by the creditors themselves by shifting funds from one account to another [with no real money going to Greece; so where are the “generous conditions” ??].
The bail-outs are not intended to provide Greece with money. They aim at postponing debt payments or paying debts that cannot be postponed, in order to satisfy lenders (including hedge funds) and saving endangered banks considered too big to fail. For Greece to get money, it must seek new loans, as it recently did by again applying to the IMF.
Still, I don't consider the Greek economy moribund [it’s not a matter of opinion, but of facts]. It is only out of tune with the new post-crunch reality. Once the dust settles, Greece will shift from a luxury-oriented, import-centered economy to a frugal, import substituting, export- and tourism-oriented economy. It will take time, investments and technical advice. But I am sure, the keen and well connected Greek business people will meet the challenge it they are offered a modern and efficient institutional framework. Das Schuldenproblem kann nicht durch einen im wesentlichen finanzpolitischen Ansatz gelöst werden. Denn die Schulden sind im Wesentlichen ein Problem der Wirtschaftsstruktur Griechenlands. Die größte Herausforderung für Griechenland -- Unverzüglich ein Modell zur Entwicklung seiner Produktion auf den Weg bringen -- Was aber ohne eine tragfähige Lösung für die Schuldenlast nicht möglich ist. As stated above, I think the debt problem has largely been solved through extremely long time horizons, generous debt servicing holidays and micro-level interest rates. If more action is needed to reduce the weight of the debts, even more favorable terms could be offered by the creditors, the German chancellor, Ms. Merkel, announced. Although, in my view, the debts were neither caused by Greece's economic structure, nor should they be seen as a problem in itself, I do agree that a model to develop domestic production is urgently needed and constitutes a major challenge for the country. Here (in italics) is the core point, which has to be addressed without any moralizing considerations.
It does not really matter who draws up the blueprint for Greece's industrial and agricultural revival: the Greeks themselves or the troika, or both together. No doubt, Greece has excellent economists and planners at its disposal and could very well draw up a plan. The issue is not the plan [we disagree: unfortunately, it is an issue]: it's the implementation [of course that is important too]. This is the point where the troika needs to get active again. I am afraid, the Greeks of Hellas, the patriate Greeks as it were, cannot be trusted to correctly implement a development plan. Too weak is their understanding of the state as a common venture. Too engrained is the urge to pursue clientele and even personal interests at the expense of the common good.
We do not think that the Troika is concerned with a plan for Greece's development. Concerning the Greek elites or “bourgeoisie”, we agree. But as regards the “Greeks of Hellas", the “patriate Greeks”: again a thing of DNA? We think one has to be very careful with such “arguments” or ways of thinking…
It's not a question of DNA. It is simply a result of centuries under Ottoman rule, of failed German-inspired monarchies, of a civil war which saw a minority win over what was probably the majority, of decades of unashamed cleptocracy -- how could in such a country grow any identification with the state?
Any plan would be fragmented and possibly loaded with pork in parliament. We do not understand what is meant here (in italics)???
Sorry, an American idiom. It means that any draft legislation presented in parliament will be used by lobbies or individuals to include benefits or exceptions for special groups.
Even if it passed parliament in recognizable shape, it could be manipulated by the administration, and some of its funding would evaporate before reaching its destination. I am sorry for sounding so negative. I believe the patriate Hellenes are not yet up to such an exercise. Fortunately, there are an estimated 10 million expatriate Greeks plus 840,000 Cypriot Greeks who could help. The Cypriots, as a heritage from their days as a British crown colony, have a much better developed concept of the state and could advise their brethren. Many diaspora Greeks would even consider it a duty and an honor to be called to help Hellas at a crucial time. And then, there are the creditors. In their own best interest they are willing to provide Athens with qualified advisers. These advisers on the payroll of the troika are a major gift to the Greek government. However, these advisers should also have executive powers [do you really think that this complete loss of sovereignty is THE solution for Greece?] to ensure that the plan is not sabotaged or misused in the jungle of the Greek bureaucracy.
Yes, unfortunately, today's Greek politicians and their top bureaucrats, not only Syriza's, have lost their credibility.
The bureaucracy
Without slashing and re-qualifying the administration at all levels, Greece will not be able to enter the 21st century and develop its economy. In addition to the existing unemployment among those who studied fancy subjects for which domestic demand has vanished; in addition to those who practiced rich-country professions which disappeared with the riches, there will be hundreds of thousands of state employees slated to lose their jobs. In recent years, many if not most of those who lost their government jobs used the emergency exit of early retirement: this way of substituting pension for payroll (and continuing to live at state expense) is now being abolished due to troika pressure. The problem is not only that redundant bureaucrats -- many of them political appointees without qualification and interest in their job -- will be fired. Many more must leave to create vacancies for the new, better qualified staff needed to render the administration and its public utilities efficient. Some of the old staff might be willing learn new skills (for instance use of computers [is there hard evidence they do not know how to use one and refuse to learn?]) through training; others will refuse to change their old ways. In any case, the unions, the old parties and the political Left will put up stiff resistance and the troika will have to exert utmost pressure to see the reforms implemented.
There is no hard evidence available but there is anecdotal material about the size and performance of the Greek bureaucracy.
We do not intend to justify the real existing bureaucracy and its ways to behave. But the real problem is wider: the lack of institutions. The French administration is quite strong and professional (at least in our opinion) but it works mainly because the French State is a very old one, having been built together with the French Nation (see the concept of “Etat/Nation”). Nothing similar happened in Greece. No chance for the Greek State to exist but only as a toy in foreign hands
I agree that the concept of the state is weak in Greece due to historical reasons. Also, the state has often been manipulated from abroad. British influence after WWII and during the civil war, American influence thereafter. The current salvaging operation is another case of foreign manipulation but this time many European countries are jointly involved and we should trust them that they are trying to find a solid and durable place for Greece in the Euro community.
Investment
It is a good idea to convert sovereign debt into investment certificates, provided the primary surplus is positive and will not be syphoned off for other purposes (for instance military expenditure).
The Greek government has proposed, on his own initiative, to reduce military investment. This proposal has been refused by some institutions. We wonder why.
Well, that's a somewhat complicated issue. Jean-Claude Juncker proposed to drop a 400 million euro pension cut demanded by the troika if Greece cut military expenditure by the same amount. The IMF was said to be opposed to such swapping deals but later denied its stance. Yannis Bournous of Syriza, not Greece, spoke of a possible 200 million euro cut of military expenditure. Defense Minister Panos Kammenos of the "Indipendent Greeks" party is opposed to cuts.
At present, no investment is taking place. Once the current crisis is overcome and the outlines of a new, stable and more efficient Greece appear on the horizon, potential investors will surface. Small scale, very small scale ventures would line up for investment certificate funding. Import substitution will become profitable for a wide range of goods ranging from feta cheese to mechanical spare parts. Since the government cannot protect fledgling industries by introducing customs duties, the new import substituting industries will have to be extremely competitive, which means low wages for Greeks, legal and illegal migrants [that’s where they are now]. Once they have established themselves in Greece they could probably also be competitive in neighboring Italy and elsewhere. The question of price competitiveness is no relevant here. To develop Greek agriculture and industry, the matter is to organize networks, to think long term strategies, to conceive and produce goods and services the population needs, which would respect the environment.
To sum up: I suppose the Greek GDP has already shrunk to the level it had attained before the euro was adopted. The bubble is gone. Wages are low enough not to pose a cost problem for future investments. The big hurdle for any investor remains the bureaucracy. Here, a revolution is needed, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Contrary to an opinion shared by Finance Minister Schaeuble, German economist Hans-Werner Sinn and many others, I don't think a Grexit would help Greece. All impetus to reform the country would instantly be lost. Greece would simply continue practicing its oriental ways of life with no prospect of returning to the Eurozone any time soon. Agriculture would by necessity be revived and import substitution would become the main objective of new industries, but at an overall income level not much different from that of neighboring Turkey or Romania. The Tsipras government has recognized these dire prospects and therefore decided to fight for continued membership in the Eurozone.
We do not comment further the cultural “arguments”.
The "oriental way of life" is no "cultural argument" possibly to be excluded from an economic discussion. Here is why:
Until the mid-1950s, the Greek economy was embedded in the Middle Eastern economy. Greek and Lebanese companies dominated the economy of Arab countries in the Fertile Crescent and Egypt. A few thousand Greeks still lived in Turkey. Even in the deep South, the catering company of the East African Railroad was Greek. Egypt's only wine was produced by a Greek firm, Gianaclis, the cigarettes were labeled Maspero and Toccos.
In April 1955, the Cypriot Greek assault on the Cyprus Turks created an opportunity for embattled Turkish President Adnan Menderes to provoke the anti-Greek pogrom of 6/7 September 1955 in Constantinople, Smyrna and Ankara which forced the last Greeks to flee. Around the same time, rising Nasserist nationalism in Arab countries convinced the ethnic Greeks to leave the respective country.
As Greece gradually lost the Middle East, European tourism offered new chances. Greece tried to move toward the West and North, and was later embraced by the European Union. However, the new orientation takes time to trickle through the society and change its time honored oriental ways of life.
Unfortunately, the decline of productive activities is not Greece specificity. This is why, we (in this case, Gabriel Colletis) have written in 2012 “L’urgence industrielle!”. We think that Germany’s situation is less bad than that of many other countries in Europe; this not because German administration is better organized or more professional, but because the German industry, at least for the moment, performs better. However structural problems in Germany should not be denied.
BOZAR LITERATURE a demandé à l'écrivaine renommée Elif Shafak de sélectionner des œuvres par l'exposition L'Empire du sultan. Le monde ottoman dans l'art de la Renaissance. Shafak a commenté huit œuvres et écrit des textes pour la guide littéraire et l'audioguide. Extraits suivants.
La Bataille de Lépante
La Bataille de Lépante – ou Inebahti en turc – fut sans aucun doute l'un des affrontements navals les plus importants et les plus sanglants du XVIe siècle. Selon que l’on soit Européen ou Turc, ce jour fatidique occupe une place totalement opposée dans la mémoire collective. Pour le premier, c'est devenu le récit d'une victoire héroïque. Pour le second, l'histoire d'une indigne déroute. Mais plusieurs siècles ont passé et il est temps de repenser la bataille de Lépante, au-delà des notions d'héroïsme ou de défaite, et d’essayer de la comprendre dans son entièreté et sa complexité.
Anonyme, La Bataille de Lépante, fin 16e siècle
Je n'oublierai jamais la première fois où j'ai entendu le mot 'Lépante'. Le même jour, j'ai découvert un auteur qui jouerait dorénavant un rôle majeur dans ma vie littéraire: Miguel de Cervantès.
J'avais dix ans et je venais de quitter un petit quartier musulman d'Ankara, en Turquie, pour rejoindre une école internationale de Madrid, en Espagne. Dès la première semaine à l'école, au cours d'histoire, la professeure se tourna vers moi lorsqu'elle apprit que j'étais turque et lança devant tous les enfants: "Oh, c'est l'un des vôtres qui a mutilé le bras gauche de Cervantès à Lépante! Au moins, je suis contente que vous ne lui ayez pas tranché les deux bras ! Sinon nous n'aurions pas pu lire Don Quichotte aujourd'hui!"
Elle me souriait, mais j'étais terrifiée et confuse, comme si coupable de quelque chose. Je ne savais pas ce qu'était 'Lépante', n'étant que vaguement familière du mot 'Inehbati'. Je ne savais pas qui était ce Cervantès ni ce qui était arrivé à son bras. Et je ne comprenais certainement pas ce que voulait dire la professeure par "l'un des vôtres".
Les années ont passé. J'ai étudié notre histoire commune, ottomane et européenne. J'ai découvert le grand Cervantès et l'admirable imagination grâce à laquelle il captive encore et toujours nos cœurs et nos esprits. J'ai dépassé les généralisations nationalistes/religieuses que, malheureusement, même de bons professeurs d'histoire peuvent relayer.
La Bataille de Lépante, une huile sur toile, est un tableau puissant qui exprime à la fois la vie et la mort, l'espoir et la perte, l'eau et le sang. Le choix des couleurs et l'arrangement des détails sont exceptionnels. Sous un vaste ciel et des nuages floconneux, parmi les tons bleus, verts et bruns apaisants, de soudaines explosions de rouge font presque tressaillir le spectateur, chacune rappelant le feu, la fumée et la violence. Au premier regard, le tableau nous donne une impression bien différente du sentiment qu’il suscite lorsque nous faisons attention aux détails: l'épaisse fumée qui s'élève de tous côtés, les corps à la surface de l'eau...
Je suis aussi frappée par le fait que cette peinture soit restée anonyme. Le fait que nous ne connaissions pas le nom de l'artiste rend l'œuvre encore plus intéressante, et même fascinante. C’est comme si ce tableau n'appartenait pas à quelqu'un, ni à aucun des deux camps. Comme s'il s'agissait d'une expression collective, d’un soupir collectif qui nous vient des siècles passés et implore d'être entendu.
Famille turque
En général, l'historiographie turque dominante se concentre sur les guerres, les traités, les pertes ou les gains territoriaux. En Turquie, chaque écolier mémorise visuellement une série de cartes – les terres de l'Empire ottoman s'y étendent ou s'y réduisent selon les mouvements des frontières à différentes époques. Au sein de ce grand récit, on porte peu d'attention aux êtres humains individuels. Si et lorsque des individus sont mentionnés dans les livres d'histoire, ils appartiennent à l'élite, tels les sultans, cheikhs et grands vizirs.
Albrecht Dürer, Famile tzigane (dit Famille turque), c.1496
Mais que ressentaient les gens 'ordinaires' pendant ces périodes de transformations sociales, économiques et politiques ? Quelle était la vie d'un orfèvre arménien, d'un meunier juif, d'un fabricant de chandelles circassien, d'un paysan yézidi, d'un colporteur kurde ou d'un soldat janissaire ? Même si l'Empire ottoman était multi-ethnique, multilingue et multiconfessionnel, on s'est beaucoup moins intéressé aux vies des sujets du sultan.
La Famille turque d’Albrecht Dürer est une œuvre inhabituelle qui représente un couple turc et leur petit enfant. L'homme et la femme se regardent, comme si la présence de l'un donnait de la force à l'autre. Seul le bébé regarde ailleurs, vers un lieu inconnu hors du cadre, s'interrogeant peut-être sur ce que pourrait être la vie au-delà.
Masque d’un turc utilisé comme visière
Tout au long du Moyen Âge, des informations fragmentaires à propos des Turcs circulaient à travers l'Europe. Si certaines permettaient d'approfondir connaissances et compréhension, d'autres ne servaient qu'à répandre la désinformation. Il y avait toutefois une curiosité bien réelle: à quoi ressemblait donc ‘l'ennemi’? À cette époque d'avant les moyens de communication de masse, les dessins et les récits offraient une réponse, tout comme parfois les masques.
Wolfgang Keiser (?), Melchior Pfeifer (?), Masque d’un turc utilisé comme visière, c.1555
Cet objet me fascine. L'expression en est saisissante. Il s'agit là du visage d'un homme plein de ressentiment et de rancœur, voire de rage. Le visage d'un homme qui peut rapidement se mettre en colère et même être tenté par la violence. Les yeux sont sombres et grands, les sourcils se lèvent en portant un jugement, la moustache – qui est aussi un signe de virilité – est proéminente et la bouche sévère.
Par définition, un masque est conçu pour cacher et remplacer la réalité par l'imaginaire. Ici au contraire, le masque sert à démontrer, affirmer, exhiber ‘le visage de l'Autre’. Je me demande combien de gens se sont donné la peine de soulever le masque et de rechercher la vérité ?
L’accordo preliminare del 13 luglio tra la Grecia e i suoi creditori non contiene nessun obiettivo numerico preciso per l’avanzo primario. Il target già fissato sembra ora difficile da raggiungere per il crollo delle entrate fiscali. E questo peserà sul negoziato per il terzo programma di aiuti.
I numeri di Atene
Il ministero delle Finanze greco pubblica ogni mese i dati sul bilancio consuntivo dello Stato, come già ricordato (quiequi). Si tratta di numeri compilati in base al principio di cassa, quindi particolarmente adatti a valutare la situazione delle finanze pubbliche dal punto di vista dell’esigenza di finanziamento di breve periodo. Inoltre, permettono di comparare i risultati effettivi con quelli attesi ex ante. Da gennaio a questa parte, la Grecia ha un avanzo primario, significativamente superiore alle aspettative. Nei primi sei mesi dell’anno, l’avanzo primario registrato è stato di 1,9 miliardi, contro un deficit di 1,2 miliardi atteso. In termini cumulativi, l’avanzo primario è stato di 3,1 miliardi superiore agli obiettivi (figura 1)
Grafico 1– Avanzo primario della Grecia
Il problema è che da marzo a oggi, l’avanzo primario è stato principalmente il frutto di una compressione della spesa, perché le entrate sono crollate subito dopo le elezioni politiche. Nonostante un modesto aumento a giugno, le entrate cumulate per i primi sei mesi dell’anno restano di 906 milioni in difetto rispetto a quanto previsto. Le spese cumulate tra gennaio e giugno 2015 sono invece di circa 4 miliardi inferiori al previsto (nel solo mese di giugno, i tagli rispetto al target sono stati di 1 miliardo e mezzo). Il contenimento della spesa è in gran parte il risultato di ritardi nei pagamenti da parte dello stato al settore privato, una circostanza che, in un paese nelle condizioni della Grecia, non fa che peggiorare la tendenza recessiva. Per mettere le cose in prospettiva, la Commissione europea ha recentemente rivisto le stime di crescita del Pil reale al ribasso. Per la Grecia quest’anno la crescita è stimata in territorio negativo, tra -2 e -4 per cento, mentre nelle proiezioni di autunno 2014 le attese erano per +2,9 per cento e ancora in quelle della primavera 2015 si attestavano sul +0,5 per cento.
Grafico 2– Entrate complessive, spesa e avanzo primario della Grecia – Dati reali e target (miliardi di euro)
I dati di giugno non includono ancora il pieno effetto delle restrizioni a prelievi bancari e movimenti di capitale, imposte a fine mese per contrastare la corsa agli sportelli pre e post-referendum. I numeri di luglio saranno perciò particolarmente interessanti perché mostreranno gli effetti di queste misure, ma anche perché luglio è il mese più importante dal punto di vista delle entrate, in Grecia (figura 3).
Grafico 3– Imposte per mese e avanzo primario complessivo in Grecia – 2014 (miliardi di euro)
Verso il terzo programma di aiuti
La Grecia e i suoi creditori europei hanno concluso lunedì 13 luglio 2015 un accordo temporaneo, che prevede un prestito di circa 7 miliardi e in contropartita l’approvazione da parte del parlamento greco di una serie di misure preliminari. Questi soldi sono effettivamente stati trasferiti e usati il 22 luglio per ripagare il bond greco in scadenza lunedì e detenuto dalla Banca centrale europea, nonché gli arretrati dovuti al Fondo monetario internazionale. Si tratta però di una situazione estremamente precaria. Secondo le stime incluse nel testo dell’accordo del 13 luglio, la Grecia ha bisogno di altri 5 miliardi soltanto in agosto, per ripagare un’ulteriore quota in scadenza del suo debito verso Bce e Fmi. Per far fronte a questi impegni, la negoziazione di un terzo programma di aiuto alla Grecia dovrebbe avvenire nella maniera più rapida possibile. Ma sul negoziato peserà probabilmente il tracollo nelle previsioni di crescita. La revisione al ribasso della crescita del Pil e il crollo delle entrate fiscali – dovuto probabilmente in parte all’incertezza post-elettorale e post-referendum – fanno sì che oggi il target di avanzo primario all’1 per cento del Pil nel 2015, concordato negli ultimi mesi tra Grecia e creditori, sia un obiettivo molto ottimista. Questo è probabilmente il motivo per cui l’accordo preliminare del 13 luglio non contiene nessun target numerico preciso per l’avanzo primario, una variabile che in questi mesi è stata al centro delle negoziazioni e che ora potrebbe rallentare anche il nuovo negoziato.
