The discussions about Brexit have centered around the question of whether it is in the national interest of the United Kingdom to remain in the EU or to leave it. It appears today that the British public is split about this question, so that the outcome of the referendum remains highly uncertain.
The question of whether it is in the interest of the EU that the UK remains a member of the union has been discussed much less intensely. The conventional wisdom in Brussels is that the answer to that question is positive. The UK should remain a member of the EU. A Brexit would be very harmful for the future of the European Union. But is that so?
There is a deep-seated hostility of the British media and large parts of the political elite against the European Union. This hostility has found its political expression in the Brexit movement. The proponents of Brexit cannot accept that the UK has lost sovereignty in many areas in which the EU has competences. They abhor the fact that Britain has to accept decisions taken in Brussels, even if it has opposed these. For the Brexit-camp there is only one ultimate objective: to return full sovereignty to Westminster.
Those who believe that a referendum will finally settle the issue have it wrong. Let us suppose that the Brexit-camp is defeated and the UK remains in the EU. That will not stop the hostility of those who have lost the referendum. It will not reduce their ambition to bring back full sovereignty to the United Kingdom.
Having found out that they cannot leave the EU, the Brexit-camp will shift its strategy to achieve the objective of returning power to Westminster. It will be a Trojan horse strategy. This will imply working from within to undermine the union. It will be a strategy aiming at shrinking the area of decision making with majority rule and replacing it with an intergovernmental approach. The purpose of the British enemies of the EU will be a slow deconstruction of the union so as to achieve the objective of returning power to Westminster.
One may argue that having lost the referendum, the Brexit-camp will lose influence. That is far from certain. The agreement achieved by Cameron with the rest of the EU has not transferred a shred of sovereignty back to Westminster. This will be seen by the Brexit-camp as a huge failure, leading them to intensify their deconstruction strategy.
I conclude that it is not in the interest of the EU to keep a country in the union that will continue to be hostile to “l’acquis communautaire” and that will follow a strategy to further undermine it.
I therefore also conclude that it will be better for the European Union that the Brexit-camp wins the referendum. When Britain is kept out of the EU it will no longer be able to undermine the EU’s cohesion. The EU will come out stronger.
Britain will be weakened and will have to knock at the door of the EU to start negotiating a trade agreement. In the process it will have lost its bargaining chips. The EU will be able to impose a trade deal that will not be much different from what the UK has today as a member of the EU. At the same time it will have reduced the power of a country whose ambition it is to undermine the cohesion of the union.
Doubts have surfaced about the accuracy of figures given by officials regarding the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey, with a prominent opposition figure claiming that there are also 1.5 million unregistered Syrians in the country. Syrians who sought refuge in Turkey were permitted entry without any registration at the border until late 2013.
Since the civil war began in Syria, more than 1.5 million people from Syria have unofficially entered and are wandering around Turkey, Erdal Aksünger, an expert in informatics and top advisor to the main opposition party, told the Özgür Düşüncedaily. The official number of Syrians registered in Turkey is currently around 2.7 million, according to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Salem ist ein berühmtes Internat, in das Patriziat und Adel traditionell ihre Sprösslinge zwecks Erziehung outsourcen. Dies geschah auch mir in jenem bemerkenswerten Jahr 1947, als Trizonesien voll unter Kriegsfolgen, Hunger und dem härtesten Winter (-32 Grad in München, -27 Grad in Stuttgart) litt.
Salem war für mich nicht wirklich Salem, sondern seine Vorschule Burg Hohenfels. Wie üblich war auch 1947 der Hochadel mit klingenden Namen vertreten: Hessen, Hohenlohe, Hohenzollern. Wenn der Fürst von Sigmaringen zu Besuch kam, war das ein Ereignis, vor allem, da seine Maybach-Limousine durch den Einbau eines Holzvergasers im Kofferraum so tief hing, dass sie bei der Einfahrt in den Burghof den Boden kratzte und die Funken stoben.
Hohenfels ist ein wuchtiges altes Gemäuer auf einem Hügel zwischen Wald und Obstwiesen gelegen. Letztere erwiesen sich als lebenswichtig, denn im Spätherbst lieferten sie eine Kostbarkeit, ein Nahrungsmittel: erfrorenes Fallobst.
Die Internatsleitung hielt trotz der Zeitläufte auf die in Vorkriegszeiten eingeübte Disziplin, was angesichts des allgemeinen Nahrungsmangels merkwürdig anmutete. Das Essen war denkbar knapp: jeden Mittag gab es die gleiche Tomatensuppe aus Würfeln, die vage nach Mottenpulver schmeckte und mein Gegenüber am Esstisch regelmässig zum Erbrechen brachte. Das wurde jedoch nicht akzeptiert, er musste, so gut es ging, weiter essen.
Da die Verpflegung so spärlich war, ging das Gerücht unter uns Jungen um, dass die Kochfamilie die Lebensmittelkarten der Zöglinge am schwarzen Markt verkaufe. Also suchte man, sich anderweitig Nahrungsmittel zu beschaffen.
Nützlich war der Kachelofen im Klassenzimmer, auf dem man gefrorene Falläpfel aufwärmen konnte, wobei der Lehrer, Herr v. Poelnitz -- nie ohne seinen kältebedingten Nasentropfen -- das illegale Vorgehen freundlich ignorierte.
Denn die Internatsleitung bestand darauf, dass wir Dreizehnjährige ausreichend ernährt seien und keine Zusatzverpflegung bräuchten. Gelobt sei, was hart macht. Um die Eltern mit unserer Verpflegung zufrieden zu stellen, wurden wir jede Woche gewogen und das stets erfreuliche Ergebnis zur Einsichtnahme der Eltern verzeichnet. Dass Hungerödeme den Körper mit Wasser aufschwemmen können, war nicht bekannt.
Doch das wöchentliche Wiegen konnte einen leidigen Umstand nicht beseitigen, nämlich das Knurren der Mägen.
Erfreulicherweise gab es Abhilfe in Form einer Ölmühle unterhalb der Burg. Bei dieser Mühle konnte man für fünfzig Reichspfennige einen Ölkuchen kaufen, eine dicke Scheibe des gepressten Rückstands der Ölgewinnung, grossteils aus Mohn bestehend, ungekocht.
Als Viehfutter gedacht, erwiesen sich sich die Ölkuchen als Kraftnahrung für Internatszöglinge. Damit war jedoch ein Problem verbunden: man durfte die Ölkuchen nicht in die Burg mitbringen. Also war man, nachdem man sich satt gegessen hatte, auf der steten Suche nach einem Versteck: in der Regel in einer Höhle unter Baumwurzeln. Nicht unproblematisch, denn erstens musste man den Baum am nächsten Tag wieder finden, zweitens konnte es sein, dass Tiere das Versteck entdeckt und sich bedient hatten, denn Plastiktüten waren noch nicht erfunden.
Zwar liess sich mit den Ölkuchen die Nahrungsversorgung deutlich verbessern, doch der Mohn machte schläfrig, belastete die Verdauung und behinderte Herrn v. Pölnitz' Mühe, uns etwas beizubringen.
Viele Eltern erfuhren vermutlich nie, wie es dem Internat in Hohenfels doch gelang, in Hungerzeiten das Gewicht der Zöglinge stabil zu halten.
Heinrich v. Loesch
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La Banca d’Italia, in qualità di autorità di risoluzione bancaria, ha la possibilità di evitare che la scure del bail-in colpisca i risparmiatori al dettaglio, in caso di salvataggio con aiuto pubblico. La stessa direttiva dà lo strumento adatto. Basta volerlo usare.
Titoli con clausola di bail-in
L’entrata in vigore del bail-in (previsto dalla direttiva europea Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive – Brrd) all’inizio di quest’anno ha suscitato numerose reazioni negative, soprattutto per i problemi che crea per la clientela al dettaglio. Il dibattito politico ha visto richieste di modifica o addirittura di sospensione della nuova regola, ma sono istanze destinate a scontrarsi con il fatto che è ben difficile cambiare una direttiva europea appena entrata in vigore.
Alcuni, compresa la Banca d’Italia, hanno richiamato la clausola che prevede una possibilità di revisione nel 2018; tuttavia la clausola fornisce una possibilità di revisione limitata (l’articolo 129 della direttiva si riferisce alla eventuale necessità di minimizzare le divergenze tra nazioni) e lontana nel tempo. Per fortuna, sembra esserci un’altra strada per rimediare all’incauta introduzione del bail-in su tutti gli strumenti finanziari, compresi quelli già esistenti e collocati presso la clientela al dettaglio (con l’unica eccezione dei depositi sotto i 100mila euro). È una soluzione che presenta alcuni costi per le banche, ma che dovrebbe, a mio avviso, essere perseguita dalla Banca d’Italia nell’interesse generale. La stessa direttiva Brrd (articolo 45) prevede che l’autorità di risoluzione (che per le banche più grandi è la nuova autorità europea Single Resolution Board e per quelle più piccole è la Banca d’Italia) imponga un requisito chiamato Mrel (Minimum Requirement for own funds and Eligible Liabilities).
In pratica, è definito dal rapporto tra le passività bancarie che possono essere aggredite (“eligible”) in caso di bail-in (tramite riduzione di valore o conversione di titoli di debito in azioni) e passività totali. Le autorità devono stabilire, per ogni banca, il valore minimo del rapporto. Possono anche imporre che il requisito sia (in parte) soddisfatto includendo tra le passività idonee strumenti provvisti di una apposita clausola contrattuale (contractual bail-in instruments) che prevede che questi titoli siano aggrediti prima degli altri in caso di bail-in e, coerentemente, siano rimborsati dopo gli altri in una normale procedura di insolvenza, cioè siano di fatto titoli subordinati. Il potere così assegnato alle autorità di risoluzione fornisce loro una strada per disinnescare la mina rappresentata dal bail-in.
È sufficiente che impongano che l’8 per cento delle passività bancarie sia composto dalla somma di capitale e contractual bail-in instruments. Perché proprio l’8 per cento? La ragione sta nel fatto che la direttiva impone che un eventuale aiuto pubblico nel salvataggio di una banca possa avvenire solo dopo che l’8 per cento delle passività – detenute dai soggetti privati – sia stato aggredito dal bail-in, al fine di ridurre l’onere per il settore pubblico. La condizione vale sia in caso di aiuto statale (articolo 37) sia in caso di intervento del Fondo di risoluzione (articolo 44). L’effetto dirompente del bail-in deriva proprio da questa condizione, perché impedisce a un governo di intervenire a sostegno di una banca in difficoltà senza imporre perdite ai creditori e azionisti della banca stessa.
Il “salvataggio” delle quattro banche regionali ne ha fornito un chiaro esempio. Tuttavia, se una banca fosse obbligata a emettere passività subordinate (contractual bail-in instruments) in modo che rappresentino (insieme al capitale) l’8 per cento delle passività totali, gli altri creditori sarebbero al riparo dal bail-in in caso di sostegno pubblico. Le nuove obbligazioni subordinate andrebbero collocate solo presso investitori istituzionali, mentre ne andrebbe vietata la vendita ai risparmiatori al dettaglio. Altrimenti si perderebbe lo scopo di tutelare il piccolo risparmiatore.
Una proposta da portare in Europa
Una prevedibile obiezione alla proposta è che i nuovi titoli saranno costosi per le banche, poiché gli investitori chiederanno un adeguato premio al rischio, dovuto alla clausola di subordinazione. Se il nuovo obbligo fosse imposto solo alle banche italiane, subirebbero uno svantaggio competitivo nei confronti degli altri istituti europei. Ma anche qui c’è una via di uscita, fornita dalla stessa direttiva. Vi è infatti previsto che, entro la fine di quest’anno, la Commissione UE faccia una proposta legislativa volta ad armonizzare l’applicazione del Mrel tra i paesi europei. La proposta si baserà su un rapporto della European Banking Authority(Eba), il quale dovrà espressamente considerare l’opportunità che il Mrel sia soddisfatto per mezzo di contractual bail-in instruments (paragrafi 18 e 19(l) dell’articolo 45).
L’Italia dovrebbe attivarsi in sede europea affinché il Mrel venga applicato nel modo qui proposto in tutti i paesi europei. Il governatore Visco ha recentemente affermato: “Un approccio mirato, con l’applicazione del bail-in solo a strumenti provvisti di un’espressa clausola contrattuale, e un adeguato periodo transitorio avrebbero consentito alle banche di emettere nuove passività espressamente assoggettabili a tali condizioni”. La proposta, che qui viene avanzata, consentirebbe di limitare l’impatto del bail-in a strumenti come quelli di cui ha parlato il governatore, in caso di aiuto di Stato. E potrebbe essere applicata subito (seppure in modo graduale), senza aspettare il 2018. Speriamo che la Banca d’Italia voglia prenderla in considerazione.
When Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, an Arab warlord, declared himself Caliph of all Muslims on 1 July 2014, the world laughed. Osama bin Laden had already been bold and presumptuous but his disciple al-Baghdadi outclassed him.
The world laughed: not only the billions of infidels but also many apostates, heretics, Shiites and plain Sunni Muslims who dislike the political Islam.
However, the Salafists, Wahhabites, the Muslim Brothers and their ilk did not laugh. They took the matter seriously. Many felt that establishing a caliphate was a timely and necessary step, and that Sheikh al-Baghdadi was an appropriate candidate for the position because of his descendency from the Qureishi, the tribe of the Prophet Muhammad.
According to tradition, the Caliph is seen as the spiritual leader of all Sunni Muslims, and also the chief of a state called caliphate. A state can exist without a caliph but no caliph can exist without a state. That is why the area in Syria and Iraq occupied by Daesh was called “Islamic State” and was given many attributes of a state, except for a diplomatic service, an airline and a seat at the United Nations.
Why were so many puritan Muslims jubilant, when the Caliphate was announced? Because it offered the possibility of pledging allegiance (baya’a) to the Caliph. According to religious tradition, any Muslim will die ignorant (jahil) and in disbelief if he has failed to pledge allegiance to the Caliph. Which means billions of Sunni Muslims will have died ignorant since the last caliphate was abolished by Atatürk in 1924, as Graeme Wood pointed out.
It's the religious aspect which prompted all sorts of terror chiefs and Islamist warlords in distant countries to declare allegiance to the new Caliph. A pledge not to be taken too literally but understood as strengthening their religious credentials.
Apart from the statehood it requires and the salvation it ensures, a caliphate also offers many practical advantages. Working to establish or strengthen a caliphate equals jihad and allows to circumvent and disobey many rules of Sunni Islam. Muruna means 'flexibility' and allows Muslims striving to advance Islam to deviate from their Islamic laws without suffering a bad conscience.
Muruna and Tawriya, meaning 'pretending', are exceptions permitting the Caliph and his followers in their act of creating the Daesh-Caliphate to break the religious rules as they deem appropriate without risking their spiritual salvation and without incurring criticism by other Muslims.
The enormous advantages inherent in declaring a caliphate have been recognized not only in Raqqa but also elsewhere, for instance in Ankara.
Since his early days as mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was surrounded by a closely knit group of admirers and supporters. Among them were what could be called “religious facilitators” who paved Erdoğan's ascent with suitable fatwas. Turkey is by the priests seen as a non-Islamic country (Atatürk's legacy!) and the Islamists understand themselves as conducting Jihad, thereby permitting themselves to practice Muruna.
By interpreting Erdoğan's career as leading up to a new caliphate – the allegedly ideal form of governance for Turkey – they exonerated him from religious rules binding common mortals.
“President Erdoğanbelongs intellectually to the Muslim Brotherhood. Consequently, he believes that, if the situation changed in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, it means the creation of a new sultanate; not an Ottoman sultanate this time, but a sultanate for the Brotherhood extending from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean and ruled by Erdoğan.”
Replace the word “sultanate” with “caliphate” and you get a pretty good picture of what Erdoğan's inner circle is up to, as many observers suspect:
“ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, (is) among the world’s most significant and influential Muslim leaders and a longtime member of the hard-line Muslim Brotherhood.”
“What this [presidential system] looks like is the Islamic caliphate system in terms of its mechanism. In this system the people choose the leader, the Prince, and then all will pledge the Bay’ah [allegiance].”
The leading scholar supporting Erdoğan, Hayrettin Karaman, is for Turkey as important as Yusuf al-Qaradawi in the Arab world. Karaman replaced Fethullah Gülen as Erdoğan's main religious supporter. He provides the fatwas needed to justify practices such as the custom that winners of public tenders donate large sums to the charities of politicians.
With his pious electorate safely supporting him despite scandals, there is small wonder that Erdoğan has already been “elected” Caliph of all Sunni Muslims:
“As he wrote for Yeni Safak, the pro-Erdoğan main newspaper ….regarding the new presidential system which Erdoğan wants to establish, Karaman desperately defended Erdoğan and declared what we were saying all along they will do; that Erdoğan will soon become the Caliph for all Muslims” ( Dec 29, 2015)
A Belgian voice comments: “Les ambitions d’Erdoğan, en forme de rêves ou de cauchemar concernent la restauration de l’empire ottoman, le rôle d’inspirateur et de quasi-Calife du monde musulman. Pour certains, il est un Prophète, sinon un Dieu ; pour d’autres, il n’est rien de moins que l’Antéchrist. Un personnage d’époque, dans aucun doute.”
Remains the interesting question: how do the two caliphates co-habitate in the Sunni world? From Raqqa's perspective Erdoğan should pledge allegiance to al-Baghdadi, from Ankara's vantage point, al-Baghdadi and his state should be grateful for years of support they received from Turkey, should refrain from sending suicide teams, and enter the planned Erdoğan galaxy of Muslim Brotherhood-governed states, the latest of which is Libya where the Turks with great effort prop up the Tripolis Brotherhood government.
Interestingly, here in Libya the two caliphates are clashing: Ankara is supporting Tripolis, Raqqa is busy strengthening its new Daesh statelet in Sirte; aleady now Tripolis troops are fighting the IS militia. It's an open ended battle.
Ihsan al-Tawil
Update
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu has criticized a bill recently approved by the US House of Representatives Judiciary Committee that calls on the Department of State to designate the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. Speaking at the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Commission on Feb. 26, Çavuşoğlu said, "Parliaments cannot decide on whether the Muslim Brotherhood is a terrorist organization or not." "We don't see the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. And we have previously shared our views with others, including Americans," he added.
The House Judiciary Committee approved H.R. 3892, or the Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act of 2015, with a vote of 17-10 on Feb. 24. The bill cites national security as the reason the designation is needed. (Today's Zaman)
