Written on 25 November 2016.

In Arabic نقاش: 

The fight against the Islamic State has united Iraqis. Details of a new Shiite-sponsored plan that will try and make that unity last leaked in Baghdad last week.

   If the extremist group that caused Iraq’s current security crisis starting mid-2014, has done just one good thing, it would be to engender a feeling of national unity among Iraqis – something that is extremely unusual outside of a football game featuring the Iraqi team. A common enemy appears to have brought the country together as no other force has been able to for 13 years.

   The question that is being posed now by so many, both inside and outside the country, is this: Can it last?

   The different demographic sectors of Iraq have been engaged in conflict for years – firstly, exacerbated by the divide-and-conquer tactics used by former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, then split again as oppressed locals took revenge on those they considered their oppressors after 2003 and finally, over the past few years, the different sectarian and ethnic groups have been fighting over power and money.  But now there are moves afoot to try and ensure that, somehow, some way, this unity lasts.

Everyone has lost something and this new treaty is a necessity, not an option.

   Over the past week details of an historic plan for reconciliation were leaked to the local media. Iraqi media affiliated with the Shiite Muslim leader heading the project were the first to let details slip, saying that the United Nations would also be involved. The plan is apparently being supported by the United Nations envoy in Iraq, Jan Kubis, and tries to establish a roadmap for Iraq’s future after the IS group have been defeated. Since then the Al Mada newspaper has published the proposal in full.

   Work around the plan – which would see Sunni Muslim factions unite with the Shiite Muslim parties who have been running the country for over 10 years now – is apparently being led by Shiite Muslim cleric, Ammar al-Hakim, who is generally considered a moderate among the Shiite political leaders. He is supported in his work by another cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, who tends to be more outspoken but who has always stressed Iraqi unity and the undesirability of external influencers, whether they are from Iran or the US. Since the plan was leaked there have been reports about a number of meetings between al-Hakim and Kurdish and Sunni politicians.

   The planned reconciliation project consists of four major articles, according to the leaked details. These specified that all parties needed to abide by the deal, that all parties would be considered equal in the deal, that any conflicts between political blocs should be annulled and that violence as a means of achieving political goals would be rejected.

   The treaty also contained many other marvellous items, such as: rejecting any division of the country along ethnic or sectarian lines, abiding by the Iraqi Constitution, commitment to a free market and equitable distribution of wealth to different provinces depending on population, the abolition of any armed groups that were not controlled by the state and an ongoing commitment to fight against any illegally armed group.

   Which all sounds wonderful. And - unfortunately – also a little bit like wishful thinking. None of these commitments are new to Iraqi politicians. Nor is the idea of holding a conference for reconciliation. There have been more than 30 similar conferences held over the past 10 years; each of these cost a lot of money, none achieved the stated goals.

   For some years Iraq even had a Ministry for National Reconciliation. This eventually lost its ministerial status before evolving into a government body. This organization would post hundreds of pictures showing Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish politicians holding hands or praying together at various meetings. Despite the pretty pictures, none of these meetings ever produced the declared goals.

   The first problem with trying to achieve anything of this kind is the division in each of the three main demographic groups in Iraq. Under current conditions it would be hard to say that the Shiite Muslim forces, both political and military, are united in Iraq. The same problem applies to the Sunni Muslims and Iraq’s Kurds. Probably the most fractured group though, are the Sunnis – the Islamic State, or IS, group has wrought havoc on any alliances that existed, causing the destruction and isolation of areas with a mostly Sunni population.

   The different Sunni political groups compete with one another for power and influence and act more like enemies than allies. For example, the party led by Salim al-Jibouri, the Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament, competes with Osama al-Nujaifi’s party for influence in Ninawa and its capital, Mosul. Other Sunni Muslim parties joust for influence in Anbar and Salahaddin.

   Before the Sunni Muslims of Iraq can enter into any negotiations, to sign onto a treaty of reconciliation, they need to choose a leader. This would entail lengthy haggling and most likely require interference from external powers, such as those in Saudi Arabia or Turkey.

   “The Sunnis need to unite and take one stand together,” suggests Abbas al-Bayati, a Turkmen MP, close to the Iraq’s Shiite Muslim Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. “They should select a leadership group that can sign onto this settlement. It is true,” he adds, “the Kurds and the Shiites don’t have as much of a problem in this area as the Sunnis do.”

   The Sunni Muslims of Iraq need to think hard about the future, al-Bayati says. “After the IS group has been expelled, reconstruction won’t be possible if they do not put aside their differences,” he argues.

   One of the major problems for Iraq’s Sunnis with any past plans for reconciliation has been the issue of another political party, the Baath party to which former leader Saddam Hussein belonged and with which he ruled the country. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis joined the Baath party during Hussein’s time in power, often simply because they wanted a job; in Iraq, the government, funded by oil money, provides most of the jobs due to the lack of a robust private sector.

   After Hussein’s regime was toppled by a US-led invasion in 2003, his Baath party was outlawed. Shiite Muslims, who had spent years being victimized and marginalized by Hussein, a Sunni, and his Sunni Muslim party, took their revenge. Baathists lost their jobs, whether they were university professors, cleaners or colonels in the army. There were most definitely some criminals among the Baath party members, who deserved harsh punishment, but these most likely numbered in the hundreds rather than the hundreds of thousands.

   To this day, the Baath party and how to deal with it remains a problem. However, the new reconciliation initiative attempts to deal with this thorny issue. The outline of the project confirms that the Baath party will never be able to return to power and that there will be no real dialogue with any dedicated Baathists. However, there are also some major concessions, a Shiite Muslim politician who had to remain anonymous as he was not supposed to comment on the leaked details, told NIQASH:

   “The new project rules out dialogue with the Baath party as an organization,” he said, “But it does allow for negotiations with senior Baath party members who have promised to abandon the party.”

   Additionally, the new project involves plans to close down an ongoing de-Baathification program, meant to purge official organisations of members of the Baath party. This program has been run by Shiite Muslim officials for years and now it is to be handed over to the supposedly more neutral Iraqi judiciary. In the past, accusations of belonging to the Baath party have led to Sunni Muslim candidates being banned from standing for public office, which in turn has seen Sunni Muslims complain they are being marginalized and prevented from taking part in national politics.

    This has been one of the major sticking points, and one of the reasons for the level of Sunni dissatisfaction that the IS group was able to exploit at first.

   The senior Shiite politician also says that dialogues will be entered into with senior Sunni politicians, some of whom have left Iraq – for example, former Minister of Finance Rafi al-Issawi, who is a prominent Sunni leader from Anbar. Major protests broke out in 2012 when former prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, issued a warrant for al-Issawi’s arrest. 

   Other prominent figures who might benefit from this reconciliation project include Iraqi business mogul, Khamis Khanjar, who supports Sunni Muslim parties in Iraq financially, and former MP, Mohammed al-Dayni, who was accused of a terrorist act in 2007 and then fled the country.

   And reconciliation won’t just be with individuals. Opportunities for dialogue will also be open to groups of all kinds, even armed groups like Ansar al-Sunna, and the many influential Sunni tribal leaders.

   It is hard to know whether this reconciliation attempt will succeed, even given the circumstances that have united Iraqis against the IS group. At least one MP remains confident though.

   “This time it is different,” Salim Shawki, an MP for the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, a Shiite Muslim political party, told NIQASH. “Because all Iraqis are united against the extremists who targeted them all, whether they were Shiite, Sunni or Kurd. Everyone has lost something and this new treaty is a necessity, not an option. It focuses on truly trying to end conflicts in Iraq, rather than just on coming up with more slogans. Everybody agrees that we should be thinking about the future of Iraq after the IS group has been destroyed.”  

Mustafa Habib -- NIQASH. org

Written on 23 November 2016.

    Le 16ème sommet de la Francophonie aura lieu les 24 et 25 novembre à Antananarivo, Madagascar. Les Sommets de la francophonie sont des rencontres des chefs d’État et de gouvernement des pays membres de l’Organisation internationale de la francophonie. 

   Le mouvement citoyen Wake Up Madagascar a tenu à faire connaître la réalité du quotidien des malgaches. Le mouvement a organisé un “sit-in” sur une place de la capitale pour interpeller les dirigeants qui vont assister au Sommet et décrit l'objectif de cette manifestation dans une lettre ouverte à la Secrétaire Générale de la Francophonie:

Madame La Secrétaire Générale,

"Nous, citoyens malgaches, sommes honorés d’être les hôtes du 16e Sommet de la Francophonie, bien que l’organisation de l’événement et les mesures prises pour son déroulement sont loin d’avoir acquis l’adhésion de tous. Nous vous souhaitons la bienvenue dans notre humble pays.

Malheureusement, ce Sommet qui se veut fédérateur écarte l’âme même de Madagascar qu’est sa population. Les mesures prises au nom du confort et de la sécurité des prestigieux invités ne servent qu’à cacher la réalité du Malgache de 2016 et pour certains d’entre nous, alourdissent la précarité quotidienne durant la semaine consacrée à la Francophonie.

Par ailleurs, un budget faramineux a été mis à disposition de l’Etat pour l’organisation de l’événement. Cependant, les dépenses occasionnées dans la préparation du Sommet restent opaques et les détails, jalousement gardés par l’Administration. Malgré les incessantes demandes de la société civile et de simples citoyens, le budget y affecté et ses sources sont volontairement laissés flous, laissant planer des doutes et des inquiétudes légitimes."

La lettre ajoute:

"Dans le quotidien malgache, nos citoyens meurent chaque jour dans des cambriolages, dans des attaques à main armée, dans des attaques de dahalo. L’Etat, qui se plie en quatre pour recevoir le sommet francophone, n’agit pas pour les administrés.

Nous nous sentons exclus de notre propre vie, de notre propre ville, de notre propre pays. Et c’est injuste !

Quelle est notre réalité, en 2016 :

- 92% des malgaches vivent en dessous du seuil de pauvreté. Un chiffre terrible qui s”illustre par la difficulté du Malgache lambda à trouver quotidiennement son besoin le plus basique : la nourriture.

- 1.400.000 personnes sont en état d'insécurité alimentaire dans le Sud, dont 840.000 personnes au plus haut niveau d'insécurité alimentaire

- Une insécurité galopante en milieu urbain et en milieu rural

- 7 personnes sur 10 n'ont pas accès à l'eau potable- Les coupures d'eau et d’électricité sont quotidiennes sur tout le territoire, pour ceux qui y ont accès."

Ketakandriana Rafitoson, porte-parole du collectif, explique à RFI le pourquoi le sit-in et les messages portés par les participants:

Et quand il y a un sommet où il s’agit d’inviter des étrangers, l’Etat se plie en quatre pour les accueillir. Mais nous, alors qu’on demande des services publics de base, -par exemple des problèmes d’électricité, de délestage qu’on a au quotidien, l’eau boueuse, les routes qui ne sont pas réparées-, personne ne nous écoute.(La teneur des messages?) : « Je suis les milliers de sans-abris », « Je suis celui qui n’a pas de travail », « Je suis les 1 400 000 Malgaches qui souffrent d’insécurité alimentaire dans le sud ». Les dirigeants veulent jeter de la poudre aux yeux à la communauté internationale tandis que le peuple se meurt.

Aucun chiffre officiel n’a été communiqué non plus sur le coût des dépenses relevées à ce jour. Cette opacité fait partie des réalités malgaches que le mouvement souhaite faire savoir aux  visiteurs de la Francophonie.

Written on 24 November 2016.

Also available inالعربية

Shimon Shamir, Israel's former ambassador to Egypt and Jordan discusses the changing face of Islamism. Although his Schiff Memorial Lecture is a bit dated it still offers first hand insight and provides an excellent overview.

   In historical terms, Islamism is a modern movement. While its adherents claim that it is a purely indigenous effort to purge foreign elements that have penetrated Islam in the modern period, the irony is that Islamism itself was born of the friction between religious loyalties and modern, Western-dominated realities. From the start, the movement thrived in places where Western power and culture abounded -- many Islamist activists were Western-educated professionals who spent years in Europe or the United States, while many terrorist cells were formed by Muslims living in the cities of Germany, Britain, and Belgium. This Western connection facilitated the absorption of modern methods and instruments, including weaponry, Internet communications, aircraft, banking systems, smartphones, and so forth.

   Beginning in the 1930s, the Muslim Brotherhood established some of the main elements of Islamism: defining the enforcement of sharia as the ultimate goal, proclaiming jihad, sanctioning political assassinations, placing the umma(community) of Islam above the nation-state, and creating a binding spiritual-political leadership. In the decades since, Islamist movements have undergone three major developments: radicalization, globalization, and territorialization.

   First, popular thinkers such as Egypt's Sayyed Qutb inspired Islamists to emphasize offensive rather than defensive jihad, and to focus on the West -- and Western-allied Muslims -- as their target. Later, globalization played a role when mujahedin from all over the Muslim world flocked to conflicts in Afghanistan and Bosnia, then returned home thoroughly trained, indoctrinated, and ready to form extensive webs of Islamist activism. The Islamic State/ISIS is the latest example of the third trend: Islamists controlling territory of their own in which they are free to establish institutions, make sharia the law of the state, form regular armies, use schools and the media to disseminate their ideology, recruit more followers, and launch interventions in other countries.

   As for why Islamism emerged and grew in the first place, it was largely a product of the disorientation, humiliation, and frustration that resulted from Western conquests of Muslim lands and the subsequent discovery that Westerners possessed greater wealth, more advanced science and technology, thriving industries, impressive political institutions, and innovative ideas. The eventual liberation of these lands only intensified the crisis because it revealed that their problems did not result just from occupation as claimed, but also from within. These problems have persisted ever since -- as the scores of Arab experts who prepared the UN's 2002 Arab Human Development Report showed, countries in the region lag behind most of the world in all dimensions of development: economic, social, civil, political, and cultural.

   Among many Muslims, frustration about their circumstances turned into anger over the years, and Islamists gave expression to this mood, magnified it, and derived their strength and influence from its prevalence. In addition to externalizing blame, their doctrines pushed the argument one step further: if the West, particularly America, is the source of Muslim predicaments, then Muslims must mobilize for a holy war against it. This Islamist mindset persists today, stoked by a growing conviction that the fortunes of the West are waning. Meanwhile, Islamism has proven its durability, and policymakers should reconsider their expectations that a "war on terror" alone will eradicate the threat it poses. Islamism today is quite literally on the map and should be handled accordingly.

   Yet far too many Westerners, especially in Europe, are unaware of Islamism's full dimensions and the fact that its adherents hate the West not simply because of what it does, but because of what it is. These and other misunderstandings impede the formulation of effective policies for coping with the Islamist challenge. For example, when Hamas first emerged in Gaza in the 1980s, Israeli authorities did not bother to examine its links with the Muslim Brotherhood, which would have shown them that there was no true separation between the group's socio-religious, political, and militant aims. Only later did they outlaw the group, after it grew significantly in strength.

   More recently, U.S. officials made similar miscalculations in their handling of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. If Washington had better understood the group's temporary political pragmatism, it likely would have seen that the Brotherhood is the same movement it always was -- one that came into being as a militant response to the West and is still committed to imposing sharia on Egypt. This misapprehension raised eyebrows not only among many Egyptians, but also in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, whose leaders began to doubt the reliability of the U.S. partnership after 2011.

   The take-home message seems clear: when situations such as the Egyptian revolution arise, an outside player who does not have a hand on the pulse of a different society, who is not adequately conversant with its culture, and who does not thoroughly apprehend the nature of the forces at play should not take sides. Only when one of these forces emerges as a grave threat to vital interests is intervention called for -- as is definitely the case with ISIS in Syria and Iraq today.

   The United States and the West should understand that their expectations of a Middle Eastern society cannot be the same as their expectations of a Western society. To be sure, skepticism about whether Muslim countries can be democratic is as wrong as the 1930s skepticism about whether Catholic countries can be democratic. Some elements of Islam support democracy, and others do not; in the end, it depends on the people and how they interpret Islam.

   Yet the prevailing assumption in the West -- that once a dictator is removed, democracy follows -- does not reflect reality. Elections do not mean democracy unless they develop from the grassroots, which is not happening yet in most Arab societies. Moreover, the role played by religious ideologies is much stronger than what can be understood based on Western experience. Separation between religion and state, a central theme in the West, is not accepted among most Arab Muslims.

   Many of these issues are readily apparent in Egypt, where the people ousted Mubarak, held free elections, voted Islamists into power, and then, when they found out that was a mistake, looked for an alternative who was more or less a Mubarak type of a ruler: namely, Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, a leader who came from the army like Gamal Abdul Nasser and Anwar Sadat before him. Despite the misgivings Westerners have about politics that do not match their expectations of democracy, they should realize that this is what Egyptians -- and most other Arab nations -- can sustain at this stage of their history.

   Going forward, it is in America's interest to develop as much cooperation with Egypt as possible, since it is the most important country in the Arab world. The current government in Cairo is pragmatic -- it is willing to work with the West and is also open to cooperation with Israel on security matters.

   Elsewhere, the U.S.-led campaign against ISIS is a positive sign, but the general impression is that the United Stated is tired from its interventions around the world. As a result, Washington has seemingly chosen a compromise approach: bombing ISIS targets without committing ground forces. The danger is that the bombing campaign validates the group's claims about its fight against the West, thereby boosting its recruitment efforts. The key to defeating ISIS ideologically is to defeat it militarily, since the group draws legitimacy from military success.

   For its part, Israel sees the Islamic State as a very serious threat. The group's fighters are present on the Golan ceasefire line, along with al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. Israelis also worry about Jordan, since ISIS is gathering on its border as well and sees the Hashemite regime as illegitimate. And in Sinai, the terrorist group Ansar Beit al-Maqdis is shifting toward ISIS.

   As for the Palestinians, it is important to remember the central role that ideology plays in Middle Eastern politics. The PLO's ideology is political, and therefore compromise is possible if its supporters so choose. Yet religious ideology is a different matter: its claim to legitimacy is divine wisdom, not popular will, and so it cannot change goals, though it can agree to temporary compromises such as ceasefires. The Palestinian movement has a long history of combining political and religious ideology; Hamas, for example, has an Islamist ideology yet still aspires to represent Palestinian nationalism. But such contradictions are common among political movements and should not obscure the core nature of groups like Hamas.

Summary prepared by Oula Abdulhamid Alrifai.  © 2014 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Reposted with permission.

Written on 23 November 2016.

Dal 2004 a oggi, la percentuale di stranieri sul totale dei denunciati nel complesso è rimasta stabile, ma è cresciuta molto per due reati: gli scippi e le rapine agli uffici postali. Il fenomeno riguarda in particolare le grandi città del Centro-Nord e alimenta le preoccupazioni dei cittadini.

Esercito a Milano?

   Fa discutere la richiesta del sindaco di Milano, Giuseppe Sala, di un intervento dell’esercito nelle strade della città dopo la morte del trentasettenne Antonio Rafael Ramirez, di Santo Domingo, accoltellato nella zona di piazzale Loreto. Sono giustificate le preoccupazioni di Sala?

   Dal 1992, il tasso di omicidi è continuamente diminuito nel nostro paese e non è mai stato così basso. Tuttavia, negli anni della grande crisi, il numero dei borseggi e dei furti in appartamento è cresciuto.

   Ma l’andamento dei reati non è stato lo stesso in tutta Italia. Analizzando la frequenza di quattro reati nelle grandi città italiane negli ultimi dodici mesi (tabella 1) troviamo conferme e sorprese rispetto a quanto è avvenuto nell’ultimo trentennio. La conferma è che in quelle centro-settentrionali sono più frequenti i reati contro il patrimonio compiuti con l’inganno (ad esempio, borseggi e furti in appartamento), in quelle meridionali i delitti violenti (gli omicidi e le rapine). Le soprese sono che Milano, Torino e Bologna hanno tassi di rapine in pubblica via più alte di tutte le altre (con l’eccezione di Napoli) e che Milano ha un tasso di omicidi di poco inferiore a Palermo e superiore a quello di Genova, Bologna, Firenze, Torino e Roma.

Tabella 1 – Tasso per 100 mila abitanti di quattro reati commessi nelle grandi città italiane nel 2015

Fonte: elaborazioni su dati Ministero dell’Interno

   La richiesta del sindaco di Milano evoca però anche la delicata questione degli immigrati. Il timore che gli stranieri presenti nel nostro paese compiano un numero sproporzionato di alcuni reati rispetto al loro peso demografico è presente da tempo nella popolazione italiana ed è probabilmente cresciuto dal 2014 a oggi con l’arrivo di decine di migliaia di profughi. Da cosa nasce questo timore? Dalla difficoltà di capire e accettare gli altri, i diversi, come alcuni dicono o dall’alto numero di reati (di alcuni tipi di reati) commessi dagli stranieri? Ho sottolineato l’espressione “alcuni tipi”, perché è indubbio che altri reati – quelli detti dei colletti bianchi e dei potenti (corruzione e concussione, appropriazione indebita, insider trading, aggiotaggio) – continuano a essere commessi quasi esclusivamente dagli italiani.

Quali reati commettono gli stranieri

   Per capire se, e in che misura, vi siano stati cambiamenti da questo punto di vista non possiamo basarci sulla presenza degli stranieri negli istituti di pena. In primo luogo perché si entra e si resta in carcere per ragioni del tutto diverse: per custodia cautelare, in attesa di giudizio e in esecuzione di pena, dopo la condanna definitiva. Ma, a parità di reato commesso, la custodia cautelare è imposta più spesso agli stranieri. In secondo luogo, a parità di pena, gli stranieri godono meno degli italiani delle misure alternative e di pene sostitutive della detenzione. I dati migliori che abbiamo sono quelli sulle denunce.
Analizzando l’andamento di dodici reati commessi in Italia dal 2004 a oggi (tabella 2), vediamo che la percentuale di stranieri sul totale dei denunciati talvolta ha subito delle oscillazioni (per i furti in appartamento), talvolta è lievemente aumentata (per gli omicidi) e solo per due – gli scippi e le rapine contro gli uffici postali – ha conosciuto una crescita considerevole. Nel complesso si può comunque dire che la quota di stranieri che ha compiuto questi reati è rimasta stabile in tutto il periodo e sicuramente non ha risentito del forte flusso di profughi.

Tabella 2 – Percentuale di stranieri sul totale dei denunciati, dal 2004 al 2015, per dodici reati

Fonte: elaborazioni su dati del Ministero dell’Interno

   Ma oltre a questa buona notizia, i dati della tabella 2 ne presentano anche una cattiva, che riguarda la frequenza del coinvolgimento degli stranieri in questi delitti. Pochissimi (il 5 o 6 per cento) sono stati e sono tuttora gli immigrati denunciati per una rapina di banca, cioè per il reato più remunerativo. Un po’ di più, ma comunque sempre molto pochi, quelli accusati di aver commesso una rapina contro gli uffici postali. Il che equivale a dire che gli stranieri restano estranei non solo ai reati dei colletti bianchi, ma anche a quelli violenti, predatori, che rendono maggiormente.

   Ma per tutti gli altri delitti la quota degli stranieri sui denunciati è alta, talvolta molto alta. Supera il 25 per cento per gli omicidi consumati, il 30 per cento per quelli tentati e per le lesioni dolose, il 40 per cento per le rapine in pubblica via e quelle contro gli esercizi commerciali, il 50 per cento per le rapine in abitazione, i furti in appartamento e contro gli esercizi commerciali, addirittura il 60 per cento per i borseggi. Come non bastasse, queste percentuali presentano valori ancora maggiori nelle regioni centro-settentrionali. Nelle grandi città, la quota degli stranieri denunciati per un borseggio raggiunge il 74 per cento a Bologna, il 79 per cento a Firenze, il 90 per cento a Milano, il 92 per cento a Roma. Questi, e gli altri dati della tabella 3, ci fanno capire perché, in certi comuni italiani, la quota non può aumentare ancora molto e perché la preoccupazione di molti cittadini sia fondata. È un grande problema irrisolto, che la destra agita da tempo strumentalmente e che la sinistra ignora.

Tabella 3 – Percentuale di stranieri denunciati nel 2015 nelle grandi città italiani per quattro reati

*non significativo
Fonte: elaborazioni su dati Ministero dell’Interno

 

Marzio Barbagli -- LaVoce.info